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Abstract  
This thesis addresses the problems associated with security of the electricity supply in the 
UK. The British electricity supply industry has experienced a significant structural change. 
Competition has been brought into the electricity industry and a single wholesale electricity 
market of Great Britain has been established. The evolution of the British electricity market 
raises new challenges, such as improving the liquidity of wholesale markets and 
developing clean energy. The wholesale electricity prices are less transparent and trading 
arrangements are very complex in the British electricity market. In this thesis a 
fundamental model, called a stack model, has been developed in order to forecast 
wholesale electricity prices. The objective of the stack model is to identify the marginal 
cost of power output based on the fuel prices, carbon prices, and availability of power 
plants. The stack model provides a reasonable marginal cost curve for the industry which 
can be used as an indicator for the wholesale electricity price. In addition, the government‗s 
targets for climate change and renewable energy bring new opportunities for wind energy. 
Under the large wind energy penetration scenario the security of the energy supply will be 
essential. We have modelled the correlations between wind speed data for a set of wind 
farms. The correlation can be used to measure the portfolio risk of the wind farms. 
Electricity companies should build their portfolio of wind farms with low or negative 
correlations in order to hedge the risk from the intermittency of wind. We found that the 
VAR(1) model is superior to other statistic models for modelling correlations between 
wind speeds of a wind farm portfolio.  
Key words: Electricity supply industry, competition, trading arrangements, wholesale 
prices, stack model, climate change, wind energy, energy security, portfolio risk. 
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Chapter1 Introduction 
The UK electricity industry has changed radically in the last two decades. Structural 
change and regulatory reform had a major impact on the UK electricity supply industry 
(ESI). Several other countries have used the British experience to restructure their 
electricity industries. The consequent development of wholesale electricity markets in the 
UK has been a focus for many academic studies. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to extend these studies in a number of ways. These 
include the development of a marginal cost pricing model of short-run wholesale energy 
prices and the analysis of forecasting models for wind energy, which is likely to have a 
strong bearing on spot electricity prices in the future. The thesis also reviews the evolution 
of the British electricity industry, showing how this new research relates to the current 
market structure. In what follows, we explain how these themes are linked. We begin by 
reviewing the evolution of the UK electricity market. 
Thus, following Mrs Thatcher‘s radical reforms of the public sector, the previously 
nationalised British ESI was privatised in 1990. The components of the ESI were 
unbundled into four sectors: generation, transmission, distribution, and supply. The 
transmission and distribution sectors are both natural monopolies. The main objective of 
the reform was to bring competition into the generation and supply sectors. A wholesale 
electricity spot market, the Pool, was set up after privatisation in England and Wales. 
Market power in the generation sector was a significant problem under the Pool mechanism. 
It was no surprise that the pricing mechanism of the Pool was criticised for being 
manipulated by the two large generation companies, PowerGen and National Power. The 
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argument was that this duopoly exercised market power to manipulate the market price 
(there was a uniform price in the Pool), by changing the electricity output or offer prices.  
The regulator replaced the Pool with the new electricity trading arrangements (NETA) in 
England and Wales in 2001. The regulator argued that NETA was more in line with 
arrangements being adopted in other competitive commodity and energy markets than was 
the Pool (Offer 1998d). In 2005, NETA was extended to Scotland under the British 
Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA). Since the introduction of 
NETA, there has been a growing degree of vertical reintegration of the ESI. There have 
been mergers between generating and supply companies as well as mergers between 
electricity supply, water, and gas companies. There are many retail packages of electricity 
and gas available to consumers. However, this should not be seen as necessarily implying 
that the retail market is competitive. In fact, retail prices tend to move quite sluggishly. In 
contrast, wholesale electricity prices are volatile. They are also less transparent than retail 
prices because of the extremely complicated pricing mechanism under NETA and BETTA. 
The majority of electricity trading is carried out through bilateral contracts for which traded 
prices are not revealed. Moreover, there are power exchanges, futures markets, and 
balancing markets for electricity trading. The amount of research on this relatively new 
market is limited.  
The difficulty of understanding fluctuations in the British wholesale electricity price is the 
main motivation for our research. There are two main categories of electricity pricing 
models: stochastic models and fundamental models. Stochastic models are proposed for 
modelling spot price dynamics in different commodity and financial markets. These models 
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are widely used to model the unique characteristics of spot electricity prices, such as 
seasonality, mean reversion, jumps and volatility. 
We have examined these characteristics of the British spot electricity price. However, the 
one of the main contributions of the study is to develop a fundamental model, called a stack 
model. The objective of the stack model is to identify the marginal cost of power output 
based on the fuel prices, carbon prices, and availability of power plants in the wholesale 
electricity market. This price can be regarded as an indicator of market wholesale prices, 
which can help the market participants to determine their trading strategy. The stack model 
provides the marginal cost curve for the generation industry. This marginal cost curve can 
be updated to take account of changes in input costs, such as fuel prices, carbon costs and 
load factors.  
Another function of the stack model is that it can be used to examine the level of security 
of the energy supply. The thesis describes some experiments conducted using the stack 
model including the variation of capacity. One variation is on carbon and fuel prices whilst 
another concerns different levels of penetration of wind farms. A further variation includes 
how transmission constraints may impact on wholesale prices.  
The electricity market is designed to work as other commodity markets under 
NETA/BETTA. A balancing market has been developed to keep the electricity system in 
physical balance at all times in order to maintain the security and quality of supply. In real 
time, both demand and supply are subject to variations that cause imbalance of the system. 
Imbalance is costly and settled by the system operator. The system operator must have 
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access to spinning or immediately available reserves, the cost of which will increase as the 
magnitude of the imbalance increases (Milborrow 2001). 
Electricity companies and traders come into the balancing market to buy or sell electricity 
at the spot price. By this means they adjust their supplied electricity level to equal to the 
volume of their bilateral contracts. For example, a supplier may need to buy more 
electricity to meet the short position of their contract. A generator may need to sell extra 
electricity generated (which means they generate more electricity than the amount of their 
contracts) to the spot market to generate additional revenue. Nevertheless, the main price 
and reverse price associated with the balancing mechanism are very volatile. There are 
arguments that the imbalance settlement of NETA causes difficulties for renewable energy 
companies in both financial and physical terms. Due to intermittency of renewable sources 
they are a potential cause of imbalance and thus exposed to high imbalance charges. It has 
been suggested that large-scale aggregation by wind generators might be a solution to the 
problem (Milborrow 2001). 
Since wind is the only ‗fuel‘ to power the wind turbines, intermittency of wind can cause 
the electricity output pattern of wind farms to fluctuate. The intermittency of winds is 
stochastic. The short term fluctuations of wind farm output require system balancing 
services. The long term variations have impact on the reliability of the system in meeting 
peak time demand. On average there is around one hour per year in summer when over 90% 
of the UK experiences low wind speed conditions, however these extreme weather 
conditions occurs around one hour every five years in winter. The UK experiences a 
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seasonal maximum in wind power availability during winter and an increase in wind power 
availability during the day times compared to night times. (Sinden 2007) 
The government has set a series of targets for developing renewable energy and dealing 
with climate change. The government believes that successful renewable energy 
technologies are the main route by which the goal of a low carbon economy can be 
achieved. At present, it appears that the majority of renewable energy will have to be 
delivered by wind, since wind power generation is the most developed technology 
available at present.  
Another research question included in this thesis is to what extent wind energy outputs are 
―risky‖ in the sense of being positively correlated. Or are they effectively independent? 
Energy companies who own a large-scale aggregation of wind farms need to manage the 
associated risks of fluctuated wind energy output, due to the intermittency of wind. The 
idea is that electricity companies‘ portfolios are composed of diverse wind farms at 
different locations. A portfolio of wind farms with a negative correlation or no correlations 
of wind energy output has low portfolio risk. The wind energy output of this portfolio will 
not be affected when wind speed increases in one part of the country and decreases in 
another part of the country.  I have investigated the correlations associated with wind 
turbine output can be measured by using the correlation of wind speed at those wind farms 
using a variety of statistical models, one of which, Vector Autoregression models takes 
account of cross-site correlations. 
This thesis is organised in the following way. Chapter 2 reviews the evolution of British 
ESI. It summarises the features of British ESI in terms of generation, demand, technology, 
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and regulation in the process of evolution. It also explores the development of the 
wholesale market and trading arrangements. This helps us to understand the complexity of 
the British electricity market and helps place the subsequent analysis in context. Chapter 3 
examines the characteristics of British electricity spot prices by developing a stack model 
for forecasting the marginal cost curve for the generation industry and illustrating some of 
its properties. The first part of Chapter 4 reviews British renewable energy policy and its 
development. It explains the main issues associated with a large wind energy scenario. 
Then different methodologies are used to model the correlations of wind speed in order to 
assess the portfolio risk of wind farms. Chapter 5 concludes the study. 
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Chapter 2 The evolution of British electricity market 
1. Introduction 
It has been twenty years since the British government privatised the electricity supply 
industry. The first country to reform its electricity industry was Chile, which commenced 
reform in 1978. However, reforms in the British ESI were more radical. The liberalisation 
and restructuring of British ESI has become a case study for industrial reform throughout 
the world. 
The evolution of the British electricity market refers to the reform of competition and 
regulation in the electricity industry rather than technical evolution. The purpose of the 
reform was to create a new world of competition and choice in the electricity industry.  
There are four components of the industry. These components are generation, transmission, 
distribution and supply. The generation sector is the production process of electricity in 
power stations. Transmission refers to the transportation of electricity through high voltage 
cables (the so called ‗grid‘). Distribution is the transportation of electricity at lower 
voltages and facilities to final customers. Supply refers to the sale of electricity to final 
customers.  
The construction and maintaining electricity transmission and local electricity distribution 
systems requires large sunk capital costs and capital equipment ―with significant visual 
environmental impact‖ (Pollitt and Newbery 2000). The transmission and distribution 
sectors are often considered to be natural monopolies. The key concept of the reform was 
that ―it is possible and desirable to separate the transportation from the thing transported‖ 
(Hunt & Shuttleworth 1996b). The objectives of the reform in the British ESI were to 
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unbundle its sectors, regulate the natural monopoly of wire businesses, and improve 
competition in the generation and retailing sectors. 
The following key questions need to be addressed before any further research is applied. 
What is the structure of the British electricity industry? What are the rationales behind the 
reforms? How do electricity markets work? Why do we need electricity markets?  
This chapter provides the background and foundation for my PhD thesis. It enables me to 
understand the process of evolution in the British ESI and the pricing mechanisms under 
different trading arrangements. This chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses 
the evolution of electricity industry in chronological order. It describes and discusses the 
features of the British ESI in terms of generation, demand, regulation, and technology. 
There are economic, regulatory, and political reasons for privatising the industry and 
introducing new electricity trading arrangements. In section 3 the wholesale electricity 
markets, the Pool and NETA, are introduced. It compares the pricing rules under different 
market mechanisms. The last section is the conclusion. 
2. History of the British ESI 
2.1 Nationalised industry 1947-1989 
The British ESI was nationalised by the Labour government under the Electricity Act 1947. 
The nationalised British ESI exhibited considerable ‗structural diversity‘, in having four 
grids, three regulatory systems, and two regulators (Pollitt & Newbery 2000). There was 
one grid for England and Wales, one for Northern Ireland, and two in Scotland.  The three 
regulatory systems were based on the three separate jurisdictions. Thus the regulator in 
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Northern Ireland was different from that in Scotland, who in turn was different from that in 
England and Wales. 
The ESI in England, Wales, and Southern Scotland was nationalised in 1947 as the British 
Electricity Authority (BEA). In the period between 1947 and 1955 the BEA and 12 Area 
Boards were responsible for the generation, distribution, and retailing of electricity in 
England and Wales.  In the South of Scotland the two boards controlled by the BEA were 
the South East Scotland Electricity Board and the South West Scotland Electricity Board. 
These boards were integrated into the BEA generation activity and were responsible for 
distribution and supply of electricity in the region. However, the North of Scotland Hydro-
electric Board (NSHB or NSHEB), which had controlled the electricity supply in the North 
of Scotland from 1943, remained independent of the BEA. 
In England and Wales the BEA was replaced on 1 April 1955 by the Central Electricity 
Authority (CEA) under the Electricity Reorganisation (Scotland) Act 1954. This resulted in 
the merger of the two Scottish Area Boards and the associated electricity generation and 
distribution plants into the South of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB). Thereafter, the 
vertically integrated Scottish ESI was under the control of the SSEB and NSHB. 
There were further reorganisations of the British ESIs in England and Wales in 1957. The 
Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) was established to replace the CEA under the 
Electricity Act 1957. The CEGB was a vertically integrated statutory monopoly due to 
control of the electricity generation and bulk transmission. The 12 Area Boards acted as 
regional distribution monopolies which were responsible for local distribution, metering, 
billing, customer advice, and ancillary activities. The CEGB had determined the ‗principal 
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organizational features of the industry for the subsequent 30 years‘ (Vickers & Yarrow 
1998). In addition, they had interconnectors with Scotland and France with which it could 
trade electricity. 
The vertically integrated Scottish ESI was export-constrained by the capacity of the inter-
connector to England. The capacity of the Scotland to England interconnector had been 
initially upgraded from 800MV (Megawatt) to 1200MV, and then up to 2000MV (Pollitt & 
Newbery 2000). The capacity of this interconnector is currently being strengthened to carry 
power at the rate of 2200MV
1
.  
Northern Ireland Electricity (NIE) was a single state-owned vertically integrated company, 
which was established by statute in 1972. It was physically separated from the rest of the 
United Kingdom until the construction of an inter-connector (500MV) with Scotland was 
completed in 2001. 
The structure of British ESIs in each region remained stable from 1947 to 1989.  The 
public owned ESIs were a traditional regulated monopoly. Figure 2.1 describes the 
integrated structure of the British state-owned ESIs in three regions. The Electricity 
Council was established as a regulatory watchdog that facilitated coordination and set rates 
in England, Wales, and Scotland. The CEGB and Area Boards were both represented on 
the coordinating body of the Electricity Council.   
 
 
                                               
1
 http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committees/enterprise/inquiries/rei/ec04-reis-
shawalan.htm 
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Figure 2.1. The structure of the British nationalised ESIs 1957-1989 
 
Source: “The changing face of the electricity markets in the UK” (Tovey, 2003). 
 
Supply and demand  
In 1948 the BEA operated 297 power stations with a total generating capacity of 12,900 
MW (Surrey 1996). In 1958, the CEGB inherited 262 power stations with a capacity of 
24.34GW (gig watt), and annual sales of 40.3TWh (terawatt hours). The electricity output 
increased rapidly in the 1960s due to a huge programme of power-station and transmission-
line construction. By 1971 the CEGB owned 187 power stations with a total capacity of 
49.28GW and had annual sales of 184TWh (Wood 2008).  
During this period of nationalisation the total generating capacity was increasing despite 
the declining number of power stations.  This was partly due to an increase in power plant 
size and some of the country‘s largest coal-fired and nuclear stations started producing 
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power. In the 1970s increasing demand and larger power stations in operation required 
more power to be transferred around the country. Consequently a 400kv super-grid was 
completed in this decade. This has enabled the transmission network as whole to take 
advantage of economies of scale. 
The main features of the British ESI in terms of generating capacity, plant mix, and 
electricity sales in 1987 are summarised in Table 2.1 (Surrey 1996). The nationalised 
British ESI had generating capacity of over 63GW and annual sales of electricity were 
more than 256TWh. The British ESI had been developed as a large-scale monopolistic 
industry in the preceding four decades. 
Table 2.1  Main features of British ESI, 1987 
Capacity by type Capacity 
(MV) 
Electricity 
generated 
(GWh) 
Consumer category  Number 
(thousands) 
Sales 
 (GWh) 
Fossil fuel 50,263 226.382 Domestic 22,383 93,254 
Nuclear 6,519 50,282 Farm 263 4,109 
Hydro  4,085 3,312 Industry/Commercial 2,103 153,689 
Other  3,001 512 Other 5 5,137 
Total  63,868 280,488 Total 24,754 256,189 
Source: “The British electricity experiment” (John Surrey 1996), page16. 
In response to forecasted growth in electricity demand and fears of a shortfall of local coal 
production, the CEGB improved its hydro power plants, nuclear plants and built new oil 
plants. Despite the diversification of primary fuel sources, the ESI remained heavily 
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dependent on British deep-mined coal. By the late 1980s, the CEGB met around 75 percent 
of the fuel requirement from coal and 20 percent from nuclear power (Surrey 1996). 
Bulk supply tariffs (BSTs) for distributor (Area Boards) applied to purchases of power 
from the CEGB. BSTs were the wholesale electricity prices of nationalised electricity 
industry and were the mechanism for passing all the CEGB costs to the Area Boards and 
then to final electricity consumers (Surrey 1996). This price mechanism had been altered 
several times and became highly complex price. BSTs were paid by distributors (Area 
Boards) for purchasing power from the CEGB and were set on long run marginal costs 
(LRMC) bases. Each Area Board then distributed and sold its electricity to customers in 
each region at its own tariffs. The BSTS have two-part charges: one charging for capacity 
of both generation and transmission, and another one is the variable costs of energy and 
regionally differentiated losses. The Area Boards offered a variety of tariffs with various 
forms of peak-hour capacity charges. Whilst the pricing had been complex, the investment 
planning and particularly investment delivery was poor, slow and costly, and there were 
few incentives to deliver cost efficiency. 
2.2. Problems of state ownership and the process of privatisation 
The nationalised ESI was extensively seen as essential to aid economic recovery following 
the Second World War. It was successful in expanding the electricity capacity and 
transmission infrastructures. However, the regulatory system reflected an ―inefficient 
equilibrium that only privatisation appeared capable of upsetting‖ (Gilbert 1996). 
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Electricity generation was highly dependent on coal during the four decades of state-owned 
ESI development. There was little incentive to improve the efficiency of generators and no 
incentive to develop Combined Heat and Power plants (CHP). This was because the sale of 
heat was not included in the Electricity Council‘s articles of association (Essex, 2004) and 
the development of renewable energy was limited. In England and Wales, the CEGB 
dominated the electricity market and was responsible for the planning and transmission of 
the electricity supply. As a result, there was no incentive for independent producers to 
develop renewable electricity since they were unable to sell the electricity to the market. 
In addition, the productivity of nationalised ESI in terms of fuel efficiency or use of labour 
was criticised in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1970s, the British state-owned utilities 
produced a level of productivity significantly lower than that of public utilities in other 
comparable OECD countries (Floud & McClosky 1994). Table 2.2 shows that the British 
labour productivity in the state-owned electricity industry was significantly less than that in 
the German and American ESI.  
Table 2.2 Comparative labour productivity in network monopolies, 1970-4 
Industry Date West German output per man/ 
UK output per man 
US output per man/ 
UK output per man 
Gas 1975 2.21 3.32 
Electricity 1975 2.11 3.54 
Water 1975 0.99 1.97 
Railways 1970 1.08 3.95 
Local bus/rail 1970 1.34 1.45 
Post and telecom 1970/2 1.08 2.28-3.17 
Source: Floud & McClosky(1994) Page 189. 
In the 1980s, privatisation became the centrepiece of the policy programmes of the 
Thatcher government (Surrey 1996). The term ‗Privatisation‘ means the government sells 
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the state-owned business to the private sector. In the period between 1979 and 1997 more 
than £60 billions of state assets were sold to the private sector and the share of employment 
accounted for by state owned industries fell from over 7 percent to less than 2 percent 
(Parker 1998). The privatisation of natural public utility sectors began with the sale of 
telecommunications (1984), followed by gas supply (1986), water and sewerage services 
(1989), electricity supply (1990) and the railways (1993-1996). 
In the early years of Thatcher government reform of the British ESI was implemented to 
encourage more independent generation. The Energy Act 1983 was introduced to create 
competition and remove monopoly power from the electricity supply boards. This was 
intended to open up the industry to new entrants. However, it failed to create sufficient 
competition and small scale entrants to the market were deterred due to the dominance of 
the CEGB (Einhorn 1994).  
The White Paper 1989 and the Electricity Act 1989 set out the regulatory reform of the 
British ESI. This reform was seen as a radical and successive means to create competition 
in the non-natural monopoly sectors of the ESI. The new structure of the electricity supply 
and generation sectors broke up the vertically integrated structure of the nationalised ESI. 
A regulatory framework for the natural monopoly sectors-transmission and distribution was 
established. 
Privatisation 
The restructuring of the British ESI coincided with the privatisation of the industry. The 
UK government began this process in 1989 and privatised it through initial public shares 
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offerings in 1990. It divested modern nuclear power stations in 1996 and finally 
deregulated the market in 1998, resulting in all consumers being able to choose suppliers 
freely.  
In England and Wales the UK government radically restructured the electricity industry on 
31st March 1990.  The new industry structure was composed of three generating companies: 
National Power (52 percent of total capacity at that time), PowerGen (33 percent), and 
Nuclear Electric (15 percent). National Power obtained 60 percent of conventional 
generating capacity with 40 power stations (about 30GW capacity). The remaining 40 
percent of conventional generating capacity with 23 stations (20GW capacity) were placed 
in PowerGen. Nuclear Electric consisted of 12 nuclear stations (8GW capacity). The 
National Grid Company (NGC) was separated from the generating companies but got 2GW 
of pumped storage generation as well as the high voltage grid. The 12 Area Boards were 
restructured to form 12 Regional Electricity companies (RECs) providing distribution and 
retailing services.  
There were numerous companies offered for sale. The above four companies were vested 
as public limited companies on 31 March 1990. National Power and PowerGen initially 
sold sixty percent of their shares on March 1991. The remaining shares in both companies‘ 
were sold in February 1995. Nuclear Electric remained in public ownership until July 1996. 
NGC was transferred to the joint ownership of the RECs, which in turn were sold to the 
public in December 1990. The RECs each had two separate functions: distribution and 
retail supply. These functions must be accounted for separately. The government retained a 
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‗golden share‘ in each REC until March 1995, giving it the power to block any takeover or 
merger. 
The electricity industry in Scotland was restructured in a different way. On 31 March 1990, 
the Scottish ESI was integrated into two geographically distinct companies. The North of 
Scotland Hydro-Electric Board became Scottish Hydro-Electric (later Scottish & Southern 
Energy). Non-nuclear assets of the South of Scotland Electricity Board were transferred to 
Scottish Power plc. These two vertically integrated companies were privatised in June 1991. 
They were free to sell into the English market using the English pool price as the reference 
price for Scottish trading, and operating under the same system of regulation (Pollitt & 
Newbery 2000). The nuclear stations were placed in a state-owned company called Scottish 
Nuclear. It entered into a contract for all its output with Scottish Power and Hydro-electric 
for the next 15 years. In 1996 Scottish Nuclear became a subsidiary of British Energy 
which was privatised shortly after.  
At privatisation the Government took the decision to leave existing structure in Scotland 
largely intact (Littlechild 1996). This was significantly in contrast to the reorganisation of 
the industry in England and Wales, due to the relatively small size of the Scottish system, 
only around one-eighth of the size that in England and Wales. It was considered that 
vertical integration had been a successful industry structure in Scotland, and that it had 
particular beneficial features in serving sparsely populated areas. Firstly, Littlechild argued 
that the ―restructuring contracts‖ which to provide each of the companies with a balanced 
mix of generating plant had influenced the degree of competition that was likely or possible 
between the two companies. Secondly, in Scotland, the companies as suppliers were 
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predominantly purchasing from their own generation sources which imposed an explicit 
limit on the price they can charge in respect of generation (Littlechild 1996). Thirdly, 
although there was no electricity market in Scotland, generators were allowed to contract 
directly with consumers with non-discrimination terms. However, there were no means of 
ensuring generators‘ outputs match their consumers demand.  
After privatisation, there was a substantial overall increase in output of Scottish generation- 
up 28% between 1989/1990 and 1994/1995. Whilst Scottish demand had grown at only a 
modest rate, export to England and Wales had increased significantly reflected in an 
increase in market share of the interconnectors. There had been a pattern of falling price to 
consumers in England and Wales after privatisation. However, in Littlechild‘s paper, he 
provided evidence to show that there were different patterns of falling price in Scotland and 
England and Wales. In Scotland there had been steady and then falling prices for domestic 
consumers. 
A Northern Ireland Electric company (NIE) containing transmission, distribution, and 
retailing assets, was established in 1993. The four generating plants were sold to trade 
buyers in 1992. Until 1999 there was no competitive trading system as all electricity was 
sold to the power procurement business of NIE under long-term contracts, effectively a 
single buyer system (Pollitt & Newbery 2000). 
Figure 2.2 summarises the structure of ESI after restructuring and privatisation. The ESI in 
England and Wales was de-integrated. The generation sector was separated from 
transmission, distribution, and retail sectors. In Scotland and Northern Ireland the ESIs 
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were vertically integrated, but with separate accounting regimes for generation, distribution, 
and retail. 
Figure 2.2. The structure of ESI after privatisation. 
 
The Electricity Council was replaced by a new system of independent regulation. It was 
headed up by the director general of electricity supply supported by the Office of 
Electricity Regulation (OFFER), to regulate the privatised electricity industry in England, 
Wales and Scotland.  
After privatisation there was a major shift from coal to natural gas with the purchases of 
British coal falling from 74 million tonnes in 1991 to 30 million by 1996 (Newbery & 
Pollitt 1997).  This decrease led to lower carbon dioxide emissions and the lifting of the 
European ban on burning gas to generate electricity. However, it had a huge negative 
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impact on the British coal industry. The massive decline of the coal industry led to 
employment levels falling by 243,000 through the privatisation (Newbery & Pollitt 1997). 
2.3. Discussion of the rationale behind privatisation 
A major objective of privatisation was to improve economic efficiency. However, there 
were also political reasons for restructuring. In 1972 and 1974, striking coal miners caused 
major disruption to British electricity supplies. Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister 
on 4th May 1979.  She moved to reduce or eliminate union power, partly by means of 
privatising UK utilities – a traditional seat of union power. 
In addition, the processes of restructuring and privatisation are separate dimensions of 
change. The British electricity industry was restructured prior to privatisation. There were 
both structural and ownership reasons to reform the British ESI. Firstly, the British 
electricity industry might learn a lesson from the reform of the British gas industry, the 
most relevant privatisation prior to that of the electricity industry. The gas industry was 
privatised as one entity—British Gas (BG). It was argued that BG as a public monopoly was 
basically transformed into a private monopoly. In favour of this arrangement was the notion 
that the single firm may take advantage of internalising externalities. However, it was 
argued that it was a ‗cosy monopoly business‘ (Hawley 1999), which would need strictly 
regulated intervention to benefit consumers. As a monopoly it is hard to set up a 
competitive operating framework, raising the question of whether or not the company 
should have been broken up prior to privatisation. In 1996 BG was split into two separately 
listed companies, BG and Centrica. This was achieved by drawing a distinction between 
functional sectors. BG comprises extensive global exploration and production activities as 
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well as the gas pipeline and storage network. Centrica provides the retail services in the UK. 
The process of the British ESI reform was different from the reform of the British Gas 
industry. In England and Wales the CEGB was initially split into three companies in order 
to break up the monopoly, and was then privatised. In addition, the NGC got the 
transmission networks which remained a natural monopoly. 
Secondly, if a government decides it wants to privatise its electricity industry, it needs to 
place a value on the asset (Hunt & Shuttleworth 1996a). The value of an asset is the net 
present value of future cash flows the asset can earn. It is difficult to measure the value of 
the whole ESI because each sector has a different nature and regulation. The government 
needs to provide sufficient information to investors and also to assure the security and 
supply of electricity. Reforms in the ESI were not only to change management an 
ownership but also to change the industry structure to improve competition. Privatisation 
only meant changing ownership but restructuring was necessary to make competition 
feasible. 
In the electricity industry it is feasible to separate four different functional sectors. The 
transmission and distribution sectors own the infrastructure or monopoly franchise. In order 
to avoid negative externalities (for example, duplication of networks) and improve the 
security of the network it is necessary to keep networks as a natural monopoly, but with 
direct government regulation. However, there are many generators and retail service 
companies in the relevant markets. It also makes ‗entry contestable‘ which is ‗the ability of 
entrants to lock in the entry price with a contract as in generation‘ (Newbery & Pollitt 
1997). Therefore, separating potentially competitive parts of the industry (generation and 
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retail sectors) from the natural monopoly network is feasible. As a result the British 
government restructured the electricity industry shortly before privatisation. 
2.4 Privatised British ESI 1990-2001 
Since 1990 the electricity industry in England and Wales has experienced considerable de-
integration from the structure which preceded privatisation. In 1990 the industry was split 
into four components: generation, transmission, distribution, and supply. The transmission 
and distribution grids had separate ownership from generation plants. They were regulated 
monopolies that provided open and comparable access at reasonable rates. It is widely 
accepted that competitive markets are feasible in electricity generation and supply sectors.  
There has been extensive criticism of the level of competition in electricity generation. In 
the first three years operation of the Pool the high concentration of generation plants was 
criticised. The potential for serious market power problems has been indicated through 
oligopoly simulation analysis, since suppliers face extremely inelastic demand and entry 
requires long lead times (Green & Newbery 1992).  By the end of 1993, the regulator had 
decided that Pool prices were at unjustifiable levels and that more competition would be 
needed to bring them down (Green 1996).  
The structure of generation was changed again. The generators discarded plants to rival 
companies on two occasions. Once in order to avoid referral to the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission (MMC) and once in return for being permitted to merge with the 
electricity retailers (Green 2006). National Power divested 4GW and PowerGen divested 
2GW of coal-fired plants to Eastern Group in 1996. They later divested their capacity again 
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and in 1999 the two dominate companies had less than 25% market share. The change in 
market shares in generation is described by Bunn and Martoccia (2005), as shown in Figure 
2.3. The level of competition in generation was improved following the decline in market 
share of two dominating generation companies,  
They found that the value of Hirshman-Herfindahl Index (HHI), defined as the sum of the 
squared market shares of the companies in the market, was around 1600 following the 
divestments of 1996. This is often used as a normative index of the adequacy of 
competition and had come down from 3800 when the industry was restructured in 1990. 
Further divestments in 1999 resulted in an HHI value of around 1100. This is well below 
the US antitrust mergers threshold of 1800, generally taken as a benchmark for a 
competitive market (Bunn & Martoccia 2005). 
Figure 2.3. Declining market shares in generation. 
 
Source:  Page 307 (Bunn & Martoccia 2005) 
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Table 2.3 presents the capacity and market share for each generator in 1990 and 1998. The 
market share of the two main generators, National Power and PowerGen, were reduced to 
27 percent and 25 percent respectively. The new entrants had market share of 12 percent in 
1998 with generation capacity of 7.3 GW. The surplus of capacities was created in England 
and Wales after market restructure. One potential reason could be that the new combined-
cycled gas turbines (CCGT) were profitable investments. Another reason is that coal-fired 
power plants are incentivised to stand by for operation due to the high capacity payments. 
The capacity payments are collected from customers as a prorated uplift similarly to other 
uplift charges such as transmission charge (Oren 2000). 
Table 2.3. Generators’ capacity and market share in 1990 and 1998.  
 1990 1998 
 Capacity (GW) Market share (%) Capacity (GW) Market share (%) 
National Power 30 47 17 27 
PowerGen 19 30 15.4 25 
Eastern 0 0 6.7 11 
Nuclear Elect 8.7 14 7.3 12 
Magnox Elect 0 0 3.1 5 
New entrants 0 0 7.3 12 
First Hydro 2.1 3 2.1 3 
Interconnectors 2.9 5 3.2 5 
Other 0.2 1 0.2 1 
Total 62.8 100 62.3 100 
Source: “Preview of electricity trading arrangements” (Offer 1998c). 
The effects of entry were also studied by Green and Newberry in their 1992 paper. They 
found that the new generators made the entry decision based on whether the current 
average annual spot price exceeds the entrant‘s costs. Theoretically, existing generators had 
incentives to set lower prices to deter entrants. In practice however, IPPs (Independent 
Power Producer), usually with equity participation by RECs, signed 15-year contracts with 
their REC for the sale of electricity and also had contracts to purchase gas. They could lock 
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in future prices and hence avoid the risk of retaliatory pricing behaviour by the incumbents 
(Pollitt & Newbery 2000). Those potential entrants made the generation market contestable. 
The ―dash for gas‖ resulted in over 14GW out of 62GW total capacity being CCGT by 
1998.  
Figure 2.4. RECs in England, Wales and Scotland in 1990. 
 
Source: National Grid Company 
Figure 2.4 shows the location of 14 RECs in Scotland, England and Wales. The 
government implemented restructuring in the local distribution and retail sectors and laid 
out a three-step timetable for introducing competition into retailing. After the industry was 
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privatised in 1990, the 5000 consumers with more than 1MW demand were free to contract 
with any supplier. These consumers account for approximately a third of total electricity 
demand, although all other consumers were in captive market in which local RECs had 
franchise monopoly. In 1994 between 45,000 to 50,000 customers with a demand of 
100kW to 1MW were free to choose their supplier. In 1998 the whole retail market 
deregulated, meaning that all customers in the UK are now free to choose their suppliers. 
Even small businesses and domestic customers had access to competition in 1998. 
Customer choice is critical in forcing the generator to adopt the least-cost fuel choices and 
limit the franchise monopoly power of RECs.  
In Scotland two electricity companies were vertically integrated, thus generation prices in 
Scotland were regulated. The regulator used a formula that would lead two Scottish 
electricity companies to converge with prices in England by the mid 1990s (Green 2006). 
2.5. RPI-X regulatory regime 
The country‘s transmission and distribution sectors remained natural monopolised and 
were regulated by the OFFER and since 1999 by the Ofgem- Office of gas and electricity 
market. Transmission was still a monopoly through the NGC, although the networks were 
open to use by other parties and operated on a price cap basis. Access to the distribution 
operation of the RECs was regulated so that any seller of electricity had equal right to use 
the associated distribution network. This required regulation to limit prices and to ensure 
that the network was adequate to the task of securing competitive supplies.   
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Under the traditional RPI-X system proposed by Littlechild in 1983 and in use in telecoms, 
gas, airports, water as well as in electricity, there is a relatively simple but powerful 
balance between: 
 Obligations to deliver outputs (obligations to connect, to develop an economic and 
efficient network, to meet planning standards, etc.) and 
 Incentives to reduce costs (Crouch 2006).  
In each REC, the overall distribution charges were price-capped at RPI-X (retail price 
index). X is generally considered to be a productivity factor, and equals average cost 
reduction of comparable firms. The firms‘ incentives to reduce operating costs (OPEX) 
were stronger than capital expenditure (CAPEX) throughout the first review period, partly 
due to the greater use of comparative analysis mimicking competitive pressure in this area 
(Crouch 2006). The reason is that the link between input of CAPEX and output - in terms 
of changes in the performance of the assets - is much less immediate for CAPEX than it is 
for OPEX, so companies can defer capital expenditure more easily (NAO 2002). Therefore, 
the allowed revenues for RECs were capped under this framework. Ofgem instituted 
rolling (five year) retention periods for CAPEX for the electricity distribution sector with 
effect from 1 April 2000. This allows companies to realize the benefits of their cost 
reduction efforts over a set period of time, or until the next review cycle comes due
2
. 
 
Ofgem‘s primary objective, as defined in the Electricity Act 1989 is to protect the interests 
of electricity and gas consumers, where appropriate through promoting competition. For 
network monopolies, Ofgem protects consumers‘ interests through a system of incentive 
                                               
2 http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/frame/elect2.htm#RPI-X: Price Caps Versus Rate-of-
Return Regulation 
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regulation. The incentives to reduce costs arise because companies that do so get to keep 
the benefits for a period of time (Crouch 2006). Ofgem reported in 2002 that Ofgem‘s use 
of this RPI-X framework to control monopoly suppliers‘ prices had resulted in substantial 
efficiency savings and price reductions for consumers, but found that regulators should 
continue to consider risks inherent in the RPI-X approach, which could distort incentives 
for investment
3
.  
There are several criticisms of the RPI-X framework. Firstly, Helm (2003) criticised that 
―RPI-X does not encourage investment, and truncates the management of the networks into 
five-year periods, creating a mismatch between the time horizon of asset management and 
investment decisions, and those which are profit-maximizing under RPI-X.‖  The 
―sweating of assets‖ may have contributed to underinvestment in electricity infrastructure 
in last decade. It is because that forward-looking price-setting period is long enough for 
shareholders to reap some of the benefits of cost efficiencies. This raised questions about 
the trade-off between low prices and the level of network renewal and investment. In 
addition, there was a deviation from competitive market that RPI-X set fixed prices for a 
fixed period. The regulation did not measure or create incentives for the companies‘ true 
output efficiency. The further criticism of the RPI-X framework is that it fails to 
incorporate aspects of the public interest other than economic efficiency (Helm 2003). 
Such as social and environmental issues need to be taken into account and which may arise 
within the five-year period.   
                                               
3 http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/energy-and-climate-
change/NAO%20Briefing%20for%20ECCC%20on%20Performance%20of%20Ofgem_P1%20(2).pdf 
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2.6. NETA—reintegrated industry 2001-2005 
The New Electricity Trading Arrangement (NETA) was introduced in England and Wales 
on 27
th
 March 2001, replacing the Pool with a system of voluntary bilateral markets and 
power exchanges. The government attempted to reduce the high electricity prices in 
England and Wales and reduce the concentration among generators. NETA was operated 
by ELEXON, the Balancing and Settlement Code Company (BSCCo). All licensed 
electricity companies were obliged to sign the BSC and other parties could also opt to do so. 
There was a growing degree of vertical reintegration of the ESI. In the electricity industry 
there had been mergers between generating and supply companies as well as mergers 
between electricity supply, water, and gas companies. The size of generating companies 
had been approximately in proportion to their own consumer base. The vertically integrated 
structure for industry developed from 1996 onwards.  
By the end of May 2005 the generation sector was decentralised leaving more than 40 
major generators of which the ―Big Six‖ dominated the British gas and electricity market. 
Table 2.4 lists the percentage of distribution capacity for those companies. The generation 
plants were owned by British Energy at that time. However, British Energy de-listed from 
the London Stock Exchange on 3 February 2009 and is now part of EDF Energy. The 
combination of EDF Energy and British Energy formed one of the UK‘s largest energy 
companies. 
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Table 2.4. Percentage distribution of capacity for ―Big Six‖ energy companies. ( at the end of May 2005) 
Company Capacity (% of British ESI total capacity) 
British Energy 15% 
RWE 12.3% 
E.on UK 11.8% 
Scottish & Southern Energy 11.3% 
Scottish Power 8% 
EDF 6% 
Source: BERR statistic. 
The other five companies are integrated energy companies owing both generation and retail 
operations. The ownership structure of each supplier is summarised in Table 2.5 in 1990, 
2001 and 2004.  
Table 2.5 Ownership structure of electricity suppliers. 
RECs in 1990 In 2001 In 2004 
Midlands 
Yorkshire 
Northern 
Innogy Npower (REW) 
Eastern 
Norweb 
TXU (USA) PowerGen (E.on) 
Scottish Hydro-electric 
Southern 
SWALEC 
SSE SSE 
London 
SWEB 
SEEBOARD 
EDF EDF 
Scottish Power 
Manweb 
Scottish Power Scottish Power 
East Midlands PowerGen PowerGen (E.on) 
Source: Wikipedia. 
 
In April 2004 Scottish Hydro Electric-Southern Electric (SSE) acquired Atlantic Electric 
and Gas. Powergen purchased TXU‘s British generation and retail operations. These 
mergers raise competition concerns. The concentration of electricity was even higher after 
the German utility group E-on completed a takeover of PowerGen.  
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Figure 2.5 Fuel input for electricity generation 1970-2008 
 
Source: BERR. 
Figure 2.5 shows the distribution of fuel input for electricity generation from 1970 to 2008. 
Prior to the privatisation of the British ESI, the fuel input for electricity generation 
depended heavily on coal and oil. The UK experienced a year-long coal mining strike 
between 1984 and 1985. From Figure 2.5 it is clear that oil as an input increased 
significantly together with a dramatic reduction of coal input during this period. 
Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s there was a massive shift by the newly privatised 
electricity companies towards generation using natural gas. This became known as the 
―Dash for gas‖. By 2000, 39% of the UK‘s electricity came from gas-fired stations 
compared to less than 1% in 1990. The key drivers for this shift were the development of 
North Sea gas and later gas turbines had higher efficiency. Another main reason for ―Dash 
for gas‖ was the domestic gas market, which was gradually opened up from April 1996. 
Until then, British gas was vertically integrated and signed long-term contracts for beach 
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deliveries of gas. The gas industry has been gradually unbundled, a spot market has 
emerged, and the spot price of gas was about half the old contract price after privatisation. 
New gas was therefore cheaper and new suppliers can offer considerable discounts on the 
British Gas price, effectively stranding the old contracts
4
 in late 1990s. 
There has been continuing reliance on fossil fuel for generation under NETA with the rise 
in gas prices prompting a slight increase in the proportion of coal in the supply mix in 
recent years (2000-2007). The UK has recently become a net importer of gas since 2004. 
The nuclear fraction has declined as power plants age and some nuclear plants are out of 
service for repairs. 
Renewable sources still make up a very small portion of the generating mix. Wind energy 
is the fastest growing type of renewable energy, but there are frequent difficulties in 
gaining planning consent for onshore and offshore turbines. Although the government is 
committed to generating 10% of electricity from renewable sources by 2010, it is extremely 
unlikely that the target will be reached
5
. The government has plans for a new generation of 
coal-fired power plants provided it is proven that they can reduce their emissions
6
. In 
addition, the government has given a green light to plans for replacement nuclear stations – 
a significant shift in outlook from the time of the 2003 Energy White Paper. Renewable 
polices will be discussed in the Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
During the 1990‘s there were two separate Regulators, OFFER and Office of Gas 
Regulation (OFGAS).  In June 1999, the two separate Regulators were merged into Office 
                                               
4
 http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/faculty/newbery/files/iaee.pdf 
5
 There are 6.9% of electricity from renewable sources in 2010. 
6
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8014295.stm 
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of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem), to recognise the important link between Gas and 
Electricity. At the same time it was appreciated that there could be a conflict of interest 
between the duties of the Regulator and its responsibility in consumer protection. A new 
body, Energywatch, was established as a result of the Utilities Act in 2000.  In 2002 the 
electricity system operator NGC, merged with the corresponding gas operator (TRANSCO) 
to form National Grid Transco (NGT) (Tovey 2003). 
Criticisms of NETA 
The generating and retailing sectors have become more competitive after privatisation and 
restructuring. However, there are concerns about the new market structure under NETA. 
NETA does not provide any obvious means of dealing with transitory shocks which create 
a suddenly shortage and send prices soaring upwards (Bidwell & Henney 2004). In these 
cases, NETA would be vulnerable to the threat of intervention by regulatory and political 
authorities. The anticipation of such intervention to cap prices has had a dampening effect 
on investment incentives. This problem seems to be prevalent in electricity markets and 
underlies the various capacity payments and obligations used around the world to smooth 
out rewards for building capacity and to provide a more continuous stimulus to investment 
(Bidwell & Henney 2004). The implications of the lack of such arrangements creating a 
barrier to security of supply in the UK is worthy of further investigation.  
NETA has created specific problems for renewable and intermittent generators. This is 
because, given a system designed with large-scale coal and nuclear in mind, ―there is little 
balancing capacity for renewable on the system and the transmission network is ill-
designed to cope‖ (Helm 2002). The arrangement of intermittent and remotely located 
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small-scale embedded generation is very expensive. The NETA arrangements create a 
further disadvantage to such production by deterring investments which would assist in the 
transition to a more renewable-intensive energy balance. 
2.7. BETTA- - A single wholesale electricity market 
NETA was extended to Scotland following the British Electricity Trading and 
Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) on 1
st
 April 2005. The principles and market 
mechanisms remain unchanged. The purpose of BETTA is to facilitate the creation of a 
single, integrated, and competitive wholesale electricity market covering the whole of 
Great Britain (GB). 
This involves: 
A single GB system operator 
Common rules and charging arrangements for connecting to and using the transmission 
system; 
 common set of balancing and settlement arrangements. 
In general terms, the distribution of demand and generation across the GB transmission 
system is such that much of the generation capacity is located in or towards the northern 
regions, while much of the demand is located in the southern areas of the system. Therefore 
power broadly flows from the north to the south, particularly at peak time. The stability and 
consistency of the system are maintained by the sole GB system operator.  
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The NGC has published a seven year statement about the objectives of development for the 
British ESI
3
.The aggregate power station capacity is projected to rise from 76.3GW in 
2006.07 to 94.5GW by 2012/13. The largest proportion of the overall increase is due to 
CCGT plant at 53.4%
7
. The second largest proportion of the increase is due to wind energy, 
with on-shore wind accounting for 27% and off-shore wind accounting for 18.2% of the 
increase. On this basis, the capacity of CCGT plant would overtake that of coal in 2008/09. 
By 2011/12, CCGT capacity would exceed coal capacity by 4.6GW and account for 35.6% 
of the total transmission contracted installed generation capacity. Similarly, wind 
generation capacity (both on-shore and off-shore) is set to rise to 9.4GW by 2012/13. 
Newly installed capacities will change the composition of the generation sector, thereby 
changing the marginal costs of power plants. Power stations across the UK are coming to 
the end of their natural life. The majority of the current fleet of nuclear power stations will 
be decommissioned by 2020. These plants currently make up approximately 16 per cent of 
electricity generation. There are further plans to decommission coal-fired power stations. 
Power stations generating a minimum of 20GW will need to be replaced in the next 10 to 
15 years
8
. In addition, BETTA will facilitate economies of scale in transmission system 
operation and imbalance measurement and settlement, by means of a single operator 
replacing the current three operators. 
3. Developments in the British electricity market 
The restructuring and reform in the British ESI has not only unbundled the ownership and 
improved competition in generation and supply, but has also resulted in the wholesale 
                                               
7
 http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/sys_06/print.asp?chap=3 
8
 http://www.osec.ch/internet/osec/de/home/export/countries/gb/export/economic_report.-ContentSlot-55341-
File.File.pdf/EnergySectorReport2008-invest_en.pdf 
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electricity market operating more like a commodity market. This section describes and 
compares the different electricity trading arrangements within the relevant wholesale 
markets. It helps us to understand the rules of electricity trading and the development of 
these rules. 
3.1 The liberalised market –The Pool, 1990-2001 
The establishment of a wholesale electricity market (the Pool) in 1990 has been one of the 
main achievements from the process of restructuring and privatisation of the electricity 
industry. The Pool was the basic design for determining the electricity price in the original 
British wholesale electricity market (England and Wales) through which all publicly 
supplied electricity was sold.  
3.1.1 The Pool mechanism 
The Pool was a mandatory uniform-price auction and day-ahead spot market. It was 
mandatory because generators with a capacity greater than 100MW were required to sell 
electricity units via the Pool. In addition, all suppliers and large users were required to buy 
electricity from the Pool. All electricity was despatched by the NGC. The NGC was both 
the independent system operator and the independent market operator, which ran the 
market‘s clearing, settlement and payment systems. All generators were required to follow 
instructions from the NGC in order to maintain the balance between generation and 
demand.  
Therefore, the Pool was a central despatch mechanism. The NGC decided whether a 
generating unit would be despatched based on a ―price merit order‖. The generators 
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submitted bids to the NGC for the various amounts of power they were willing to sell at 
various prices and for time periods during the following day. In other words, generators 
submitted bids to the NGC in order to generate electricity. The NGC produced a forecast of 
demand (plus any reserve required) for each half hour period of the following day and then 
scheduled the generators' offers to meet this level of demand. The NGC would stack the 
generating units (which were bid by generators for specific half hour) by price ascending 
order until the forecasted demand had been met. This could be seen as a supply curve by 
stacking the bids in price merit order (Bower 2000). The NGC would then begin planning 
the operational despatch of plants and calculate the half-hourly system marginal price 
(SMP) for the following day. The SMP was the cost of generation from the most expensive 
generation plant accepted by the NGC, based on a forecast of demand with transmission 
constraints ignored. Figure2.6 presents the process of generators bidding in the Pool for a 
particular half hour segment. Thus, the merit order was established through this 
competitive process for each half hour, ranking each generating unit by price. 
Theoretically, the profit-maximising strategy for the owner of a single plant is to bid at 
marginal cost in the competitive wholesale market. The SMP was then intended to reflect 
the short-run marginal cost of electricity. However, to ensure system security during peak 
demand load, it was requested that certain selected stations had generating sets available. 
Therefore, there was an additional payment called the capacity payment which was paid to 
generators for each unit of capacity declared available to generate, regardless of whether or 
not it was called upon. It was irrespective of output and calculated on the day prior to 
trading. The capacity payment was a kind of financial incentive for maintaining some 
additional (peak load) generation capacity in the event that demand exceeded consumption 
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forecast (EIA 1997). The capacity payment was not the actual cost, and it was based on the 
expected cost of power cuts. This capacity payment is formula driven which relates actual 
demand to the capacity of the system (Robinson 2000). 
Figure2.6 Example of merit order and SMP 
 
Source: The changing face of the Electricity Markets in the UK (Tovey 2003).  
The expected cost of power cuts was the difference between the economic value of the load 
which cannot be met and the short-run marginal cost of meeting it. The government set the 
first item as the Value of Lost Load (VOLL). The SMP was believed to be equal to the 
short-run marginal cost. Hence, the capacity payment was calculated as equal to the Loss of 
Load Probability (LOLP) multiply the expected cost. The LOLP represented a statistical 
likelihood that the demand would not be met. This was calculated by a computer 
programme. 
 
First generation stack 
(i.e. 800MW, £10/MWh) 
 
Second generation stack 
(i.e. 700MW, £11/MWh) 
 
Forecast demand for 
1a.m. to 1:30 a.m. 
(i.e.1750MWh) 
Third generation stack 
(i.e.200MW, £12/MWh) 
Fourth generation 
stack (i.e. 50MW, 
£12.5/MWh) 
 Other bids but not been 
schedule to dispatch 
(> £12.5/MWh) SMP= £12.5/MWh 
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The successful bidders or dispatched generators received the Pool purchase price (PPP), 
which was composed of the SMP and capacity payment. However, other failed bidding 
generators were able to receive the capacity payment if they were selected to be the reserve 
plants. The RECs paid a uniform Pool sell price (PSP) on the demand side of the Pool. The 
PSP was equal to the PPP for off peak load demand. However, for peak load demand the 
PSP would be made up of the PPP and uplift. This additional element included energy 
uplift and unscheduled availability payments. The energy uplift covered the cost of calling 
on additional plants to run in order to meet deviations from forecasted demand, and replace 
plants that had become unavailable through outages or generators‘ availability re-
declarations. The unscheduled availability payments were made to generating stacks which 
were not included in the NGC‘s despatching schedule. These payments were bid in the 
day-ahead market to encourage investment in capacity for peak load demand in the same 
way as capacity payments operated. In addition, consumers paid many other costs, such as 
ancillary services and the costs of maintaining the transmission system. 
In addition to the Pool, most generators and suppliers entered into bilateral contracts. The 
standard contract was the Contract for Difference (CfD). It was introduced to the market at 
Capacity Payment = LOLP * [VOLL- max (SMP, the set‘s bid price)]  
PPP = SMP + Capacity Payment 
PSP = PPP + uplift 
LOLP-the Loss of Load Probability, the risk that demand will exceed capacity. 
VOLL-The Value of Lost Load, which was set to reflect the cost of demand exceeding supply at £2/KWh 
in 1990. Since then it had been updated in line with the retail price index. 
If the generator‘s bid price is less than SMP, it will be despatched. 
Source: “Power markets and market power” (Newbery 1995). 
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the beginning of the liberalisation process in 1990. It specified a strike price and volume. 
The PPP price was the underlying price of the CfDs. If the Pool price in any time period 
was higher than the CfD‘s strike price, then the generator would refund the purchaser the 
difference between the actual Pool price and the strike price for that period. In a similar 
way, an REC would pay the generator the difference when the PPP price was less than the 
strike price. The CfD was a kind of financial contract, so generators were not required to 
produce electricity in order to meet their contractual obligations.  
There was also a market for Electricity Forward Agreements (EFAs) which allowed the 
main components of electricity price uncertainty to be hedged on a short term basis. The 
EFAs were more standardised than the CfDs. There were several types of EFAs, each of 
them covering a specific time period within a day, for several days, and with a  length of 
contract which could vary from 1 to 52 weeks. The EFAs were negotiated with the help of 
a broker, while the CfDs were privately negotiated.  
3.1.2 Criticisms of the Pool mechanism 
The Pool mechanism was criticised extensively during its 11 years life. It was possible for 
the market to be manipulated by big generators due to the poor market design which 
invited strategic bidding by suppliers (Woo, Lloyd, & Tishler 2003). The market exhibited 
poor price signalling and inadequate performance as a shadow market (Midttun & Thomas 
1998). The market has been criticised for being only half a market, meaning that there were 
supply bids but no demand-side (HC 1992).  
The profit-maximising strategy for the generator should be to bid at marginal cost. The 
British system, however, was dominated by only two large generation companies (National 
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Power and PowerGen) from 1990-1996. Green and Newberry (1992) concluded that the 
effective duopoly had set the price for over 90 percent of the first three years of operation 
and the market power existed. It is clear that these two companies had the market power 
and incentive to manipulate the price due to a lack of competition in the generation market 
(Offer 1998a). In 1996 and 1999, the two companies were required by the regulator and the 
government to sell some of their generating plants to other companies in order to increase 
diversity in the market. However, this effort failed as evidence showed that ‗National 
Power and PowerGen raised their prices in winter of 1997–98, sacrificing market share to 
Eastern and other generators in a successful attempt to keep Pool prices up while fuel costs 
continued to fall‘(Newbery 1998;Offer 1998b). 
Figure2.7. Electricity Pool average weekday prices. S- Summer; W- Winter. (£/MWh) 
 
Data source: Electricity Pool annual report 1997/98. (Electricity Pool 1997) 
The main way in which the duopoly manipulated the market was that big generators took 
advantage of the capacity payment mechanism. This mechanism was seriously 
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misconceived in that it rewarded shortage rather than rewarding new investment as was 
originally intended (Thomas 2006). Figure2.7 shows the average summer and winter 
weekday SMP, PPP, and PSP prices in the Pool from 1990 to 1998. The gap between SMP 
and PPP was due to capacity payments and uplift. It is clear that the electricity pool prices 
were more than the SMP, especially in winter. The capacity payments were both volatile 
and unpredictable. The generators could simply manipulate the Pool price by withdrawing 
plants from the market at key times in order to raise the LOLP factor and consequently the 
capacity payment. The erratic price signals that this produced were a strong disincentive for 
buyers and sellers to trust the Pool for their sales or purchases. The calculation for capacity 
payments rests on the VOLL which has been criticised for being arbitrary and potentially 
too high (HC 1992). Green(1999) provided a detailed description of the interaction 
between the capacity payment mechanism and market power. He found that in practice 
many of the perceived problems in the Pool were the result of market power, rather than 
the basic design of the Pool which was capable of sending the right price signals to 
generators.  
3.2 Liberalised market –NETA/BETTA 
NETA was designed to provide greater competition in the wholesale market, whilst 
maintaining a secure and reliable electricity system. It is a system of self-despatch rather 
than central-despatch (the Pool). NETA is based on bilateral trading between generators, 
suppliers, customers, and traders. The majority of electricity has been traded through the 
OTC (over-the-counter) market and power exchanges (ELEXON 2004).  
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Under NETA the electricity market is designed to work as other commodity markets. 
However, electricity differs form other commodities. It is both difficult and costly to store 
significant quantities of electricity. Therefore, it is necessary for NETA to keep the 
electricity system in physical balance at all times in order to maintain security and quality 
of supply. 
3.2.1 Market design under NETA/BETTA 
There are four main components to the electricity market under NETA. Figure2.8 is the 
overview of the electricity market based on NETA. Firstly, a forwards and futures market 
which allow contracts for electricity to be struck over timescales ranging from several 
years up to 24h ahead of a given half hour period. Power is traded through long-term 
confidential contracts, meaning that only the trading volumes of the contracts are disclosed 
to the regulators and not the price. Therefore, there is no ‗marker price‘ in NETA (Thomas 
2006). Secondly, short-term power exchanges (from 1 to 24 hours before consumption), 
give participants the opportunity to ‗fine tune‘ their contract positions in a simple and 
accessible way (Ofgem 2001). In this spot market the deals are bilateral, and are settled at 
the price registered on the power exchange. Thirdly, there is a balancing mechanism 
market through which the NGC accepts offers and bids for electricity in close to real time. 
This enables the NGC to balance supply and demand. The generators are required to 
inform the NGC of the plants they are contracted to operate and the output from each plant 
(without the contract prices) prior to gate closure. Retailers must declare the amount they 
are contracted to buy, and this should be the amount they expect their consumers to 
consume. The fourth part is an imbalance settlement process. This process makes payments 
to and from those market participants whose contracted positions do not match their actual 
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metered electricity production or consumption. It also settles other costs of balancing the 
system.  
Under the NETA/BETTA arrangements the NGC takes responsibility for the security of 
electricity supply. The market participants, especially brokers and speculators do not need 
to take responsibly for electricity supply security. The balancing mechanism provides a 
means by which the NGC can buy or sell additional energy close to real-time to maintain 
energy balance, and also to deal with other operational constraints of the Transmission 
System. Approximately 2 percent of electricity demand was bought and sold by the NGC 
through this mechanism (Ofgem 2002). 
Figure2.8 Overview of market structure under NETA/BETTA 
 
Source: National Grid Company 
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The generators may generate more or less energy than they have sold through bilateral 
contracts during the process of electricity production and trading. Suppliers may purchase 
more or less power through bilateral contracts than their customers‘ actual consumption 
and traders may buy more or less energy than they have sold. Such circumstances are 
regarded as being ‗in imbalance‘ and the ‗energy imbalances‘ have been bought or sold 
from or to the system (ELEXON 2006). The balancing mechanism allows electricity 
companies and traders to submit offers to sell energy (by increasing generation or 
decreasing consumption) to the system. These participants also can submit bids to buy 
energy (by decreasing generation or increasing consumption) from the system, at a price of 
the company's choosing. This process is called imbalance cash-out. The NGC accepts 
offers and bids as necessary in order to balance the system. The NGC will take the lowest 
priced offers and accept the highest priced bids. Figure 2.9 illustrates this process of 
imbalance settlement. The‘cash-out’or imbalance prices, the system buy price (SBP) 
and system sell price (SSP), applied to imbalances are derived largely as the weighted 
average prices of these accepted balancing mechanism offers and bids. 
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Figure2.9 Energy imbalance and imbalance cash out 
 
Source: National Grid Company 
 
Data source: EXELON 
Figure2.10 provides an example of half-hourly SSP and SBP. The date (7th June 2008) has 
been randomly chosen. It illustrates the gap between SSP and SBP. There is a large gap 
during the peak time. If the energy companies have a short position or deficit at peak times 
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Figure2.10. One sample of Daily SBP and SSP (£/MWh)
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they will have to buy energy in the balancing market at the price paid at SBP. Hence, 
energy companies usually prefer to have a surplus or long position in order to avoid this 
price risk,. 
In addition, since the introduction of NETA three main power exchanges have been 
developed: UKPX, APX power UK, and UK IPE (International Petroleum Exchange). The 
power exchanges are competitive wholesale markets in which futures and forward 
contracts are traded and electricity spot prices are issued.  
In 2002 APX power UK was appointed as NGC's agent for notifying PGBT contracts (Pre-
Gate Closure BMU Transaction). APX Power UK contributes data to ELEXON and was 
also appointed a Market Index Data (MID) provider by ELEXON on 25 February 2002. 
The role of MID provider is to formulate the cash-out imbalance prices on a daily basis and 
to offer authoritative industry benchmark indices. I have used this MID to analyse the 
characteristics of spot electricity prices in Chapter 3. 
3.2.2 Impacts on the electricity price 
Since NETA was initially proposed in 1998, the wholesale price has fallen by 40 percent 
(Ofgem 2002).  There are a range of views on the extent to which the reduction of the 
wholesale price was caused by NETA itself (Borenstein 2000; Thomas 2006; Helm 2002). 
It has been argued that improvements in efficiency and productivity due to the reform have 
contributed significantly to the cut in price. It is difficult to identify the reasons for the 
short-term volatility of the wholesale prices. The new arrangements have made it harder for 
prices to be manipulated due to more complex pricing mechanisms than were in place in 
the Pool.  
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The price paid for electricity by domestic consumers have not  significantly reduced since 
NETA was implemented, although they have fallen broadly in line with the trend in 
suppliers' overall costs since 1998 (Helm 2002). The electricity prices paid by industrial 
and commercial consumers have fallen by 18 percent since the introduction of NETA. In 
contrast, retail prices have fallen little, reflecting the far higher cost of supplying domestic 
consumers. These costs have risen due to new environmental costs and the substantial costs 
of processing changes to supplier (Thomas 2006).  
4. Conclusion 
 
The nationalised British ESI was a monopoly. The CEGB had monopoly power in the 
generation and high voltage transmission of electricity. Local Area Boards dominated the 
low voltage distribution and retailing business of electricity. This structure deterred new 
entrants and restricted competition in the industry. The purpose of the reform was to 
privatise the industry to improve the level of efficiency and competition. Four functional 
sectors were separated prior to privatisation. The transmission and distribution sectors were 
left to remain as a natural monopoly in order to avoid negative externalities and improve 
the security of the network. However, they were subject to direct government regulation. 
The generation and supply sectors were contestable markets rather than monopolies, thus 
they were privatised and reintegrated during a further restructuring process. The reform 
brought about benefits in terms of productivity, quality of services, and new investment. 
Furthermore, it allowed the demand side to participate the market.  
The electricity market (the Pool) was not a perfectly liberalised market after privatisation. 
The Pool was designed to act a spot market to match the supply with demand for electricity. 
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However, the Pool prices were criticised for being subject to manipulation by oligopolistic 
electricity companies. The implementation of capacity payments and CfDs caused 
speculating activities by market participants, and consequently higher Pool price volatility. 
The Pool was replaced by NETA. The aim of NETA was to provide greater competition in 
the wholesale market, while maintaining a secure and reliable electricity system. Currently, 
there is a single integrated and competitive wholesale electricity market in the United 
Kingdom after NETA was extended to Scotland under BETTA. The wholesale electricity 
market is composed of a forward/futures market, short-term power exchanges, balancing 
mechanism, and an imbalance settlement market. The pricing mechanism for wholesale 
electricity is becoming increasingly complex and wholesale prices are experiencing higher 
volatility. This suggests that consumers gain limited benefit from falling wholesale prices. 
One reason for this is that the increasing degree of reintegration enables suppliers to make 
profits from price discrimination. A further reason is that wholesale electricity is lacking in 
transparency.  
I have examined the evolution of the British ESI and the developments in market design. In 
section 2.6, I have showed the process of vertically re-integration of generation and supply 
sectors in electricity industry. It is logical to combining risky generation with the offsetting 
risks of downstream customers to reduce the price risks under the market design of BETTA. 
However, all customers, whether domestic or business, can choose their supplier, thereby 
putting suppliers into competition. In addition, with more than 200 participants in BETTA, 
electricity wholesale market is workable competitive. The focus of the research now moves 
to the spot wholesale electricity prices. One reason for this is that the spot price strongly 
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influences the contract price (Green 1992&2003). Furthermore, in competitive market, a 
transparent price acts as an indicator for electricity companies when making decisions on 
trading, new investment in infrastructures, and new technology.  
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Chapter3 Wholesale electricity prices and a Stack model: The British 
experience 
1. Introduction 
The most common feature of previous efforts to restructure the UK electricity market has 
been the promotion of competition in generation and supply. The UK now has over seventy 
licensed suppliers of electricity and gas. This has resulted in suppliers offering several 
thousand separate electricity tariffs to each domestic consumer. Several companies now 
package electricity and gas together in order to attract new customers. All consumers are 
now free to change their power supplier in the UK. In a competitive and well-functioning 
electricity market the price should reflect the true costs to companies of generating 
electricity (including other ancillary services) and the value at which consumers are willing 
to buy electricity. For example, higher electricity prices are the main incentive for 
investment in new electricity generation capacity or transmission infrastructures, as firms 
see that there are profitable returns to be made. Furthermore, a rise in electricity price can 
also encourage consumers to be more energy efficient.  
The wholesale trading of electricity is diversified in bilateral contracts, spot market trading, 
futures market trading, and balancing market trading. The British wholesale markets for 
electricity are very complex. The BETTA arrangements are based on bilateral trading 
between generators, suppliers, customers and traders. There are a series of markets 
operating on a rolling half-hourly basis on which contracts are traded.  The generators are 
required to self-despatch their power plants under BETTA. This means that they select 
which plants run to meet contractually required electricity volumes, rather than being 
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centrally despatched by the system operator (National Grid Company). It is expensive to 
store electric power in significant amounts, which means that power generation and 
consumption need to be continually matched each second. There is a balancing mechanism 
in order to ensure the system operator  maintains power balance in close to real-time, 
except from in the case of electricity forward/futures and spot markets. These three stages 
of the wholesale markets are optional for market participants. However, the imbalance 
settlement process is compulsory for those participants.  
One of the main contributions of this PhD thesis is to develop a fundamental model (called 
the stack model) for simulating wholesale electricity prices in the United Kingdom. We are 
trying to construct industry marginal cost curves which can be the firm‘s social marginal 
costs which might be agreed with central plan or the Department of Climate Change, or we 
can focus on private costs of firms without considering costs of externalities. Here, I am 
trying to predict what will happen in the market. As a result, the stack model is to construct 
the marginal cost of generation in the electricity wholesale market. Its objective is to 
identify the marginal cost of electricity generation. Its main inputs are fuel prices, carbon 
prices, demand forecasts, and availability of power plants in the wholesale electricity 
market. This price can be regarded as an indicator of the wholesale price which can help 
the market participants to determine their trading strategy, new entrants to measure the 
profitability of this market, and also help regulators to understand fluctuations in market 
prices.  
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2. Background 
2.1 Literature review 
The non-storability of electricity makes the electricity market different from financial 
markets and other commodity markets. This is one of the reasons why so many different 
models are used for pricing and hedging electricity derivatives.  
There are two main categories of electricity pricing models: stochastic models and 
fundamental models. There have been various stochastic models proposed for modelling 
spot price dynamics and for market risk management. It is well accepted that there are 
unique characteristics of spot electricity prices, such as seasonality, mean reversion, jumps 
and volatility. As a result, many stochastic models been developed in order to deal with the 
unique properties of electricity prices. Weron et al. (Weron, Bierbrauer, & Truck 2004) 
used the jump diffusion model and regime switching model to determine the main 
characteristics of electricity spot price dynamics through use of the Nord Pool daily 
average system prices. It was found by Geman and Roncoronithat that the single jump and 
upward-jump models generate misspecification for the estimated value of risk. This model 
succeeded in explaining the behaviour of spot electricity prices in three major U.S. power 
markets (Geman & Roncoroni 2006). Some authors have built models based on the Heath-
Jarrow-Morton (HJM) approach. Benth (Benth & Koekebakker 2008) summarised the 
literature on the HJM approach and used it for pricing electricity swaps in Nord Pool. 
These stochastic models are used for pricing financial derivatives and most of them focus 
on addressing the characteristics of spot electricity prices. However, they provide limited 
explanatory insights into price formation (Karakatsani & Bunn 2008). 
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The fundamental electricity price models are based on competitive equilibrium models for 
the electricity market. The British electricity generation sector is becoming an increasingly 
competitive market after many years of privatisation and reform. The electricity prices are 
obtained from a model for the expected production costs or marginal costs of electricity 
and the expected demand or consumption of electricity. Since electricity prices are set by 
supply and demand, one approach is to model the supply function or a production-based 
model for forward contract pricing (Eydeland & Geman 1999). The fundamental models 
typically require comprehensive data sets which tend to be difficult to collect and maintain. 
Furthermore, it is often laborious to use the fundamental models to create numerous spot 
price scenarios (Vehvilainen & Pyykkonen 2005).  
An outline of my model is that it is a combination of a stochastic model and a fundamental 
model. In other words it is a hybrid process for modelling electricity prices. Figure 3.1 
shows the process of power pricing (Eydeland & Geman 1999). In general power prices 
tend to be dramatically volatile under extreme weather conditions. The prices become 
disconnected from the cost of production and may be driven higher by scarcity in the 
market due to generation shortages or transmission constraints. The stack model considers 
the formation of electricity prices as well as stochastic factors. By using a power demand 
forecast model we can address the properties of seasonality and jumps in the electricity 
price. The NGC provides a comprehensive demand forecast model which provides the 
demand data for my stack model. The stack model enables us to determine the formation of 
wholesale electricity prices. 
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Figure 3.1 Modelling electricity price process 
 
Source: “Fundamentals of electricity derivative pricing”, (Eydeland & Geman 1999). 
2.2 The behaviour of wholesale electricity prices 
It is useful to consider the parallels between wholesale electricity price and the price of 
other types of commodity. The wholesale electricity price has its own special 
characteristics due to the unique qualities of electricity. The storing of significant quantities 
of electricity is both difficult and costly. As a result, the power exchange needs to 
continually balance the generation and consumption. We examine these price behaviours 
using the half-hourly market index price data (MID) which is from ELEXON and provided 
by APX power UK. MID is used in imbalance settlement to calculate the reverse price for 
each settlement period. The sample begins on 1
st
 Jan 2005 and ends on 29
th
 Oct 2007, for a 
total of 49,536 observations. 
2.2.1 Regular intraday variation 
The graph in Figure 3.2 shows an intraday variation. It presents the average half hourly 
electricity MID price measured in pounds per megawatt hour (£/MWh) for weekdays and 
weekends. In the case of both price sets the price begins to increase at approximately a 12th 
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half hourly period, which is 6 a.m. and when the work day begins. The prices reach the first 
peak at around the 24th half hourly period, which is 12 a.m. and then fall back between the 
26th and 31st half hourly periods. The prices touch another peak as the demand builds 
between 4 p.m. and 5p.m. The prices begin to fall thereafter as demand shifts primarily to 
residential usage and the workday ends. 
 
 Figure 3.2. Average half-hourly electricity MID prices from 1st Jan 2005 to 29th Oct 2007 
 
Source: Half hourly MID from ELEXON provided by APX Power UK. 
 
Figure 3.3 shows a sample of half hourly electricity MID prices and the volume of trading 
for the time period 1st Jan 2007 to 7th Jan 2007. The units of the right vertical axis are 
£/MWh and the left vertical axis units are MWh. Figure 3.3 clearly illustrates the daily 
usage pattern with price variation and its persistence over time. In general, demand and 
price move together in approximately the same direction. 
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Figure 3.3. Half hourly electricity MID prices and volume for the period 1st Jan 2007 to 7th Jan 2007 
 
Data source: MID from ELEXON provided by APX Power UK. 
2.2.2 Seasonal effect 
In this study the term seasonality refers to periodic fluctuations. Seasonality is quite 
common in economic time series. Electricity prices change by time of day, week, month, 
and year in response to cyclical fluctuations in demand and weather conditions. If 
seasonality is present it must be incorporated into the time series model.  
The seasons have been divided simply by defining spring as starting on 1st March, summer 
on 1st June, autumn on 1st September, and winter on 1st December. It is clear that end user 
demand shows strong seasonality. Those regions which rely on hydropower plants or wind 
power plants also follow seasonal patterns on the supply side. The seasonal pattern is 
therefore an essential component in any model of electricity prices. The strong seasonality 
for energy outputs of renewable power plants will affect the short term wholesale price in 
our stack model. This will be discussed further in this chapter. 
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Figure 3.4. Average MID half hourly electricity prices by season 
 
Data Source: MID from ELEXON provided by APX Power UK. 
There are several graphical techniques that can be used for detecting seasonality. Figure 3.4 
gives us a simple example of a seasonal component. It plots the average half hourly MID 
electricity prices for each season. In the summer the electricity price peaks at 12a.m. till 
2p.m. when it is the hottest and the consumption reflects air conditioning usage. Another 
peak occurs at around between 5p.m. and 8p.m. during the winter months.  This is closely 
associated with the duration of sunshine and temperature. Thus, the seasonal fluctuations in 
demand and supply translate into the seasonal behaviour of spot electricity prices.  
The seasonal adjustment is a statistical technique which eliminates the influences of 
weather, holidays, the opening and closing of schools, and other recurring seasonal events 
from economic time series. This permits easier observation and analysis of cyclical, trend, 
and other non-seasonal movements in the data. The series becomes smoother and it 
becomes easier to compare data from month to month when seasonal fluctuations are 
eliminated. Bierbrauer et al. (Bierbrauer et al. 2007) summarised the academic literature on 
the seasonal patterns in modelling electricity prices. They concluded that Bhanot (2000) 
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uses dummy variables or piece-wise constant functions, an approximation by sinusoidal 
functions is applied by Pilipovic(1997) and Weron et al.(2004), whereas Simonsen(2003) 
and Weron et al. (2004) approximate the underlying periodical structure by a wavelet 
decomposition. Furthermore the Census X-11 method, developed at the Census Bureau, is 
a widely used method of seasonal decomposition and adjustment. A detailed summary of 
this method is provided by U.S Census Bureau. However, this method is beyond the scope 
of this study and will not be discussed. 
2.2.3 Volatility  
A key difference between electricity power exchange or electricity markets and other 
commodities markets is that electricity markets have distribution and transmission 
constraints. The problems of storage, capacity and transmission constraints, and the need 
for markets to be balanced in real time can cause electricity prices to be highly volatile. 
The marginal cost of transmission becomes infinite once constrained. The average price 
was £33.79/WMh, minimum price was 0 £/WMh (6th period on 05th Jan 2007), and the 
maximum price was £476.91/WMh (36th period on 29th Dec 2005) for my selected data 
set. Inventories cannot be used to smooth price fluctuations due to the special 
characteristics of electricity. The temporary demand and supply imbalances in the market 
are difficult to correct in the short-term.  This results in more extreme price movements in 
electricity markets than in other commodity markets (Bierbrauer, Menn, Rachev, & Truck 
2007). 
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2.2.4 Mean reversion 
Mean reversion is a tendency for a stochastic process to remain near or tend to return over 
time to a long-run average. In other words, it suggests that prices and returns eventually 
move back towards the mean or average of underlying products. This mean or average can 
be the historical average of the price, return, or another relevant average such as the growth 
in the economy or the average return of an industry. Electricity prices are generally 
regarded to be mean-reverting.  For example, suppose we observe that electricity prices 
jump from £35/WMh to £350/WMh due to unexpected plant outages or transmission 
constraints. Most market practitioners would agree that it is highly probable that prices will 
eventually return to their average level once the cause of the jump goes away. In this case 
they believe that when there is an increase in demand, generators with higher marginal 
costs will enter the market on the supply side pushing prices higher. Conversely when 
demand returns to normal the generators will leave the market and prices will fall. This is 
one of the principal assumptions of my stack model. Therefore one might expect that 
electricity prices would have shown strong mean reversion characteristics.  
We can capture the phenomena of mean reversion mathematically, with a modification to 
the random walk assumption (Blanco & Soronow 2001).  
             
             
α ( s* - st) is the mean reversion component. 
σ εt is random component. 
s* is the mean reversion level or long run equilibrium price. 
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st is the spot prices. 
α is the mean reversion rate. 
σ is the volatility. 
ε is the random shock to price from t to t+1. 
 
In addition, Alexander (2008) summaries this mean reversion process and defines a mean 
reversion mechanism with a drift term for a stationary continuous time process. He proved 
that a mean reversion process is a stationary AR(1) model.. The stack model may show 
mean reverting characteristics even though it does not specifically model these stochastic 
behaviours. This is because the model reflects the underlying data on demand and supply, 
which itself has a tendency towards mean reversion. Thus, consumer demand, at least over 
the short to medium term, tend to return to an ―equilibrium‖ level which reflects demand 
absent the effects of intra-day and seasonal variation etc. 
2.2.5 Jumps and spikes 
Figure 3.5 clearly shows that spot electricity prices exhibit infrequent but large spikes or 
jumps. Similarly as previously discussed above in the volatility section, price jumps tend to 
occur due to sudden outages or failures in the power grid and lead to a large increase in 
prices in a very short amount of time. Such price jumps are unpredictable discontinuities in 
the price process from a modelling point of view. 
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Figure 3.5 Half hourly MID electricity prices for 1st Jan 2005 to 31st Dec 2005. 
 
Data source: MID from ELEXON provided by APX Power UK. 
 
These spikes are typically interpreted as the result of a sudden increase in demand, and 
when demand reaches the limit of available capacity the electricity price exhibit positive 
price spikes. These price spikes are short-time intervals where the price process exhibits 
non-Markovian behaviour and where prices increase or decrease significantly in a 
continuous way. The typical explanation for these phenomena is a highly non-linear 
supply-demand curve in combination with the non-storability of electricity (Weron, 
Bierbrauer, & Truck 2004). In relation to spikes, the use of ARCH, GARCH, and 
TGARCH as possible mechanism for modelling these behaviours are beyond the scope of 
this study and are not discussed in this chapter.  
3. Methodology 
This section discusses the development of a stack model for pricing in the British 
wholesale electricity market. The definition of ―stack‖ in computer science is an abstract 
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data type based on principle of ―Last In First Out‖ (LIFO). However, for modelling the 
wholesale electricity price, I have used ―stack‖ based on the principal of ―First In First Out 
(dispatched)‖ (FIFO).  Here, ―stack‖ is the available generation capacity. The generation 
unit with lowest marginal cost of generation bids and comes in first. The stack is built up as 
other generation units with increasing marginal cost are brought in to provide the aggregate 
electricity output of the UK. The stack is completed when the stacked generation capacity 
meets the forecast demand of electricity for a particular time period. Figure 3.6 shows the 
stack process. One way of thinking of the model is that by explicitly modelling marginal 
costs of generation it can be used to determine the short-run supply curve of the UK power 
generation industry. 
There are several differences between the stack model and the Pool price mechanism. 
Firstly, in the stack model the wholesale electricity price is the most expensive marginal 
cost of the last capacity unit stacked-in. However, in the Pool the system price is the most 
expensive price that electricity companies bid into the system for their capacity unit. 
Secondly, the stack price reflects the fundamentals of electricity generation. Therefore, it is 
a reasonable indicator for electricity companies to determine the contract price or offer 
price in the spot market. The Pool price on the other hand has been proven to be 
manipulated by the ―duopoly‖ (Green 1999; Newbery 1998; Newbery & Pollitt 1997). 
Hence, these two price processes are theoretically different.  
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Figure 3.6 The process of bidding into the stack model. 
 
3.1 Assumptions of the stack model 
The stack model assumes that the wholesale electricity market is competitive. A number of 
issues have arisen that relate to the competitiveness of the wholesale electricity market in 
the UK. The electricity market structure may be oligopolistic rather than perfectly 
competitive. Although electricity is an identical product, there are a limited number of 
producers. There are also transmission constraints which isolate consumers from the 
effective reach of many generators, and transmission losses which discourage consumers 
from purchasing power from distant suppliers (Wen & David 2001). Moreover, 
traditionally the electricity industry was highly capital intensive which resulted in barriers 
to entry. Due to the limited number of generating companies operating in a given 
geographic region, there may have been opportunities for excess profits under the Pool 
mechanism through strategic bidding.  
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The structure of the British electricity market was dramatically transformed after NETA 
and BETTA went live, due to several regulatory, technological, and economic changes. 
There are not only generators and suppliers but also large consumers, bankers, brokers, and 
electricity companies which participate in the electricity wholesale markets. Liquid 
wholesale electricity markets may enhance the competition in both the generation and 
supply market. They also provide investment signals to market participants and reduce the 
possibility of parties manipulating prices. There are methods of improving low liquidity in 
the British wholesale electricity market including increasing the transparency of existing 
markets and providing a reliable reference price for electricity trading in UK. There are 
also a number of measures suggested by Ofgem on how to improve market liquidity, see 
Table 3.1.  
 Table 3.1 Potential measures to improve market liquidity. 
  
  Changes to market/governance arrangements such as reintroduction of self supply 
restrictions;  
 Introducing an obligation on large/vertically integrated participants to auction a     
certain proportion of their generation output;  
 Greater information provision by vertically integrated companies;  
 Introduction of regulated/subsidised intermediaries/market makers;  
 Further interconnection/integration with European markets;  
 Reform of cash-out arrangements, such as a move to a single cash-out price or 
exempting parties below a certain threshold from exposure to imbalance price;  
 Measures to make credit/collateral requirements more efficient and potentially 
ease the burden on smaller participants; and  
 Changes to industry structure. 
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Source: “Options for delivering secure and sustainable energy supplies”, (Ofgem, 2010) 
In summary, the wholesale electricity market is competitive in theory but not necessarily in 
practice. In the stack model we have assumed that generation companies engage in 
marginal cost pricing. This is because we take the view that the oligopolistic nature of the 
power generation industry is reflected more in the retail market than in the wholesale 
market (see below). The competition in wholesale prices should maximise the sum of 
consumer surplus and producer surplus in the regulated industry. The wholesale electricity 
price is set by supply and demand in the wholesale market and is equal to the marginal cost 
of the last capacity-unit in the stack model during a specific time period. These companies 
are willing to sell their output at the wholesale market price as long as their marginal costs 
are less than the market price. The marginal cost price rule is efficient but it may leave 
electricity companies incurring an economic loss.  
Under the current market structure and trading arrangements it is possible that vertically 
integrated energy companies‘ profits will become immunised against the level of wholesale 
prices, providing that their generation and retail amounts are balanced. In other words, a 
vertically integrated company could engage in competitive behaviour in one sector and try 
to reduce competition in another sector in an attempt to increase profits. However, this 
strategy may hurt the final consumers and competition in the electricity industry. For 
example, a vertically integrated supplier who owns upstream generating plants could use 
its generation business to offer unfair terms to its competitors and new entrants in the 
supply sector. It could reduce the competition and discourage new entry into both sectors. 
In addition, in 2007 the ‗Big 6‘ firms constituted 55% of the electricity output. Drax Power 
reports that the Big 6 control approximately 75% of price setting power plants when part 
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ownership, controlling interests, and the contractual arrangements of these vertically 
integrated firms are taken into account(House of Commons 2008). 
As a result, the Big 6 might be willing to set the wholesale electricity price close to their 
marginal cost of generation, in order to deter new entry and create distress among the 
generation-only companies. It is difficult to find an indicative retail electricity-only price in 
the market. The mechanism for setting British wholesale electricity prices is extremely 
complicated. One approach to estimate the price is to use a stack model. Moreover, another 
issue with the stack model is that the problem of transmission constraints is assumed to be 
solved and transmission has no influence on the wholesale electricity prices. There are 
several reasons for excluding the costs associated with transmission constraints from the 
stack model. Firstly, the basic version of the stack model is a theoretical model for 
identifying the marginal cost of generation. The costs of transmission, which also takes 
account of transmission constraints and losses, could be passed on to the consumers. These 
are not included in this version of my stack model and I have assumed that these costs are a 
part of the retail electricity pricing mechanism. Secondly, the system operator has 
identified significant transmission constraints and they are able to manage the main 
constraints during peak times. If the system and other factors remain the same, then the 
management of transmission constraints is dependent on the local level of generation 
output and demand. Furthermore, local transmission system constraints limit the output of 
onshore wind energy and other types of renewables. The stack model only includes the 
renewable power plants which have already been integrated into the national grid. 
Therefore, the associated costs of transmission constraints are not taken into account. 
However, these costs can be added into the extended version of the model which includes 
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the self dispatch strategy of electricity companies and other uncertainties of power plant 
operation. 
Transmission constraints arise wherever the market provision of generation is not 
compatible with meeting the security of supply requirements for a given level of demand 
and transmission system availability (Auckland 2006). There are two significant 
transmission constraints in the system. The first one is located at the lines connecting the 
system in Scotland and the system in England. This constraint is known as the Cheviot 
constraint after its location. Another significant transmission constraint is the constraint 
within the Scottish transmission network. The electricity generators in this constrained area 
occasionally behave unusually in terms of their self dispatch. Furthermore, the offer prices 
in the balancing mechanism are relatively high at certain times. This is believed to be the 
main reason for a sudden increase in the constraint management costs internal to Scotland 
(incurred by NGET) from November 2005 onward (Abd Jamil 2007). 
3.2 Structure of stack model 
There are two processes in the stack model. One is the process of calculating the marginal 
cost of generation. The other is the process of matching the available capacity and the 
forecast demand. Table 3.2 shows the calculation of marginal cost for different fuel type 
power plants. This section introduces the quantitative method of the stack model. 
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3.2.1 Fuel prices 
The fuel price is one of the main variables in my stack model in calculating the marginal 
costs of generation for different types of power plants. The uncertainties and volatilities in 
market prices for primary energy carriers have a short-run impact on the operating 
decisions and long-run impact on the investment and strategic decisions for electricity 
companies. Recent research (Mohammadi 2009) has demonstrated a stable long-run 
relationship and bi-directional long-run causality between coal price and real price for 
electricity.  
The proportion of net electricity supplied by fuel input in the UK for 2008 was 46 percent 
from natural gas, 31 percent from coal, 13 percent from nuclear, 1 percent from oil, 6 
percent from renewable energy sources including hydro, and 3 percent from imports 
(DUKES 2008). The majority of electricity generated is produced from natural gas, coal, 
and nuclear energy. Therefore, the price of primary energy carriers‘ account for a major 
proportion of wholesale electricity prices in the UK. The price volatilities of coal, natural 
Table 3.2. Marginal cost calculation in the stack model. 
MC= [(F / α ) + E *φ]  / ρ 
Where MC is Marginal Cost £/MWh 
F is Fuel Price function £/ unit 
α is standard conversion factor, here needs to pay attention to the unit difference. 
E is carbon emission price (£/tonne of CO2) 
φ is carbon intensity for particular fuel generation plant  (tonne of CO2/GWh) 
ρ is the efficiency function of ρ(energy efficiency, available of plant) 
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gas, and oil can directly impact on the cost of generating electricity. Thus, the stack model 
can respond to exogenous shocks originating in the fuel markets. The shocks in each fuel 
market would result in variations in the marginal cost in the stack model. Figure 3.7 shows 
the similar trends between fuel prices for coal, gas, electricity, and oil in the manufacturing 
industry. There is a positive correlation been electricity prices and fuel prices. 
Figure 3.7 Fuel prices for manufacturing industry, cash terms, 1990 to 2008. 
 
Source: DECC energy statistics qep314. 
The futures market for natural gas, coal, and oil are mature and fuel prices in different 
locations would not normally differ by more than the transportation costs from the fuel 
futures market prices in the UK. However, there are no public markets or financial markets 
for nuclear or renewable energy. Sources of energy such as wind, hydro, and other 
renewable sources are not transportable and are therefore transformed into electricity on-
site. Nuclear raw materials such as uranium are kept under strict control due to concerns 
regarding the security and peaceful uses of nuclear power. Nuclear plants are expensive to 
build but are cheap to operate in comparison to thermal power plants. They are generally 
intended as base load plants. Therefore, in the stack model the marginal costs of nuclear, 
wind power and hydro power plants are zero.  
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Renewable energy power plants such as nuclear plants and wind farms always come into 
the stack model first due to their ―zero marginal cost‖ of production. If capital costs are 
ignored, wind and nuclear plants have the lowest marginal costs. In other words, their 
capacities stack in the model first from an energy and economic efficiency point of view.  
The government‘s objectives on climate change are another important issue. Renewable 
plants play an essential role in meeting the target of a 60% reduction in carbon dioxide 
emissions. The government has proposed a renewable energy penetration target of 20% by 
2020 (Energy White Paper 2003). Therefore, renewable power plants, particularly wind 
farms, have priority to come into the stack model assuming they are available. 
3.2.2 Carbon prices 
The carbon emission price plays an important role in the stack model. It is part of the 
marginal cost for generators with coal, gas, CCGT, and oil fired plants. In theory, the 
opportunity cost of allocated emission allowance (free or not) will be passed on, since 
power producers will add the opportunity cost of carbon dioxide into the short run marginal 
cost. This factor can affect the order of coal fired plants and gas fired plants in the model. 
The carbon price could increase the marginal costs of coal fired plants more than that of 
gas fired plants due to the different ratio of carbon intensities.  
The European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the 
fundamental principal of EU member states‘ climate policy and was created on 1st January 
2005. Under this scheme the CO2 emission allowances are tradable across Europe on 
exchanges and over-the-counter trades. The aim of the EU ETS is to provide a cost 
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efficient way of reducing emissions by using a market-based ‗cap and trade‘ system. The 
electricity industry is the most dominant player within the scheme. There are three phases 
of the scheme: 2005-2007, 2008-2012 and 2013-2020. The second and third phases are 
interconnected meaning that the transfer of banked or borrowed allowances is allowed 
between phases two and three (Chevallier, Ielpo, & Mercier 2009). Figure 3.8 is an 
example of monthly price and volume for carbon futures contracts. The carbon futures 
price has fluctuated dramatically over the past four years. The price of EU Allowances 
(EUAs) typically rises when gas prices rise, since the higher cost of gas encourages energy 
firms to switch to cheaper but more carbon-intensive coal-fired power plants. This in turn 
increases their demand for carbon allowances.  
A strong carbon price is important for encouraging firms to develop low-carbon 
technologies, since the more it costs to emit carbon, the more likely they are to look to 
alternatives (Young 2010). The development of new ―clean coal‖ technology is addressing 
the problem of carbon emission. The UK government has signalled that it will proceed with 
a new generation of clean coal fired power plants. Potentially as many as four new plants 
will be built if they can be fitted with technology to trap and store CO2 emissions 
underground (BBC 2009). However, at current Phase II of EU ETS and without further 
international agreement, investors consider that the carbon price is unlikely to rise fast 
enough to compensate for the potential impacts of the price volatility that result from gas 
setting the price. The cost of gas is a much more significant driver of the electricity price 
than the cost of carbon, for example DECC analysis suggests that in 2020 a 50 per cent 
increase in the cost of carbon allowances would be offset by just a 15 per cent reduction in 
the cost of gas (HM Treasury 2010). 
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Figure 3.8 Carbon futures contracts: price and volume (ECX EUA) 
 
Source: ECX EUA futures data 2009. http://www.ecx.eu/Settlement-Prices. 
 
The majority of allowances is currently allocated free of charge, but Member States were 
permitted to auction up to 5% of allowances in Phase I and up to 10% of allowances in 
Phase II. With Phase II due to end in 2012, Phase III of the EU ETS will run from 1 
January 2013 to 31 December 2020. It will be gradually phasing-out the free allocation of 
allowances that took place in Phases I and II and replacing that with a system of allowance 
allocations through auctions.  
 
One main consequence of the change in Phase III of EU ETS on energy sector is that the 
overall cap in Phase III will inevitably be far more stringent than in previous phases. In the 
UK, and across most of the EU, there will be 100% auctioning in the power sector. This is 
likely to result in an increase in prices of commodities covered by the EU ETS, as the 
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higher cost of carbon is passed on to the consumer
9
. The regulator Ofgem has assumed 
Carbon price to rise to €50/t by 2025 under the Green Transition and Green Stimulus 
scenarios as a result of tightening of the EU-ETS and achieving a global agreement on 
climate change at Copenhagen (Ofgem 2009). We have examined this scenario in the 
experiment of high carbon prices in section 4.2. The results in stack model simulation 
results indicate that marginal cost of generation in the market will increase due to a higher 
carbon price and the marginal costs of coal-fired power plants will be greater than that of 
gas-fired power plants. 
3.2.3 Thermal efficiency 
Thermal efficiency is another factor which has been taken into account in the stack model. 
This is the measure of the efficiency and completeness of combustion of the fuel. It is 
defined as the ratio of energy output to the energy input or heat from the combustion of the 
fuel. From a technical point of view, the thermal efficiency of a typical pulverised coal 
power plant is less than that of a CCGT. The average thermal efficiency of CCGT was 51 
per cent in 2008 and it was 4.9 per cent more than in 2004. However, the average thermal 
efficiency of a coal fired power plant (36 per cent) and nuclear power plant (37.9 per cent) 
has been stable over the past five years (DECC 2008).  
The thermal efficiency is measured in terms of the delivered energy and heating value of 
the fuel. Thus, it is one factor affecting the marginal cost of generating. The average values 
of thermal efficiency for different power plants are used in the basic version of the stack 
model. The value of this variable will reflect the level of technology implemented in the 
                                               
9
 http://www.carbonretirement.com/content/eu-ets-phase-iii-new-rules-game 
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power plant at time of construction. At present, we use the average thermal efficiency for 
each generation type. The model may be developed to incorporate information on 
variations in thermal efficiency by type. 
3.2.4 Demand, plant capacity, and load factor 
The stack process is complete when the available plant capacity equals the electricity 
demand at a specific time-period (half hour or one hour). Therefore the availability of each 
power plant is an input item in the stack model. It can accommodate variations in output 
such as when plants are closed due to malfunction or for maintenance purposes. The stack 
model is sufficiently flexible to deal with these situations.  
The load factor is the measurement of this availability. In the electricity industry, load 
factor is a measure of the output of a power plant relative to the maximum output it could 
produce. Normally a power plant cannot operate at its maximum output all of the time due 
to maintenance, transmission constraints, and weather conditions. This is particularly true 
for wind farms. Some power plants may operate at less than efficient average load factor 
due to transmission constraints. Alternatively power plants may operate at high level of 
efficiency when they can produce and despatch consistently. Therefore a higher load factor 
means greater total output and a lower cost per unit. If the load factor of zero marginal cost 
power plants is increased, the wholesale electricity prices would be reduced. The average 
load factor has been used in the basic version of the stack model. However, the real time 
individual load factor for each major power plant can be used as a model input to improve 
the performance of the stack model, providing the relevant information is available.  
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3.3 Data 
The projected demand data is taken from the National Grid. The NGC‘s role as the system 
operator is to ensure the electricity supplied is always equal to electricity demanded. The 
National Grid has built a model to predict the demand in electricity. Factors considered in 
their model include weather forecasts, historical demand trends, and special TV events 
such as popular football matches. Therefore, I have used the electricity demand data from 
National Grid. 
The capacity of power stations in the UK (updated to May 2009), is another input for the 
stack model. This data set includes the capacity, location, company information, year of 
construction, and fuel type for each power station in the UK. Together with the plant load 
factor and thermal efficiency, the stack model can predict the amount of electricity supplied 
at a particular time period. The data set comes form the ―Plant capacity: United Kingdom-
DUKES5.7 and DUKES5.10‖ provide by DECC. 
The price of futures contracts for coal, oil, gas, and diesel are used as fuel price variables. 
These prices come from the prevalent fuel exchanges. The gas price data comes from APX 
Gas UK‘s market spot prices. The coal price data comes from e-coal.com market indicator 
prices. The oil price is the crude oil spot price from upstreamonline.com. The price of gas 
oil and diesel come from US energy information administration. We assume that the fuel 
spot prices in the UK are the same as the international prices. Carbon prices come from the 
ICE EUA daily contract prices. In the case of electricity companies the contract price of 
purchasing fuel can be used rather than the price from financial markets when using the 
stack model.  
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4. Empirical results 
This stack model is written using STATA10. The inputs of the model are level of demand, 
capacity of plants in operation, fuel prices, and carbon prices. The values of these variables 
are written into the model for a half hour time slot. Figure 3.9 represents an example of the 
outcomes of the stack model.  
Figure 3.9 An example of model output from the stack model (average load factors). 
 
The vertical axis is the marginal cost of power plants (£/MWh). The red line represents the 
marginal cost curve of generation for power plants. The calculation of marginal cost is 
based on the method described in Table 3.2. Table 3.3 shows the value of variables in the 
stack model and these can be updated in response to the change in parameters. In the stack 
model nuclear plants and renewable plants are assumed to have zero marginal cost. Hence 
they are first to stack in the model. Coal fired plants normally come into the model next 
due to their lower marginal cost. However, the order of coal fired plants and gas fired 
plants may change in relation to the variation in carbon price, fuel price, and new 
technology. The oil, gas oil, and diesel fired plants have the highest marginal cost and 
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therefore are usually brought them only at peak demand. Figure 3.9 is therefore the 
effective short-run supply curve for UK electricity generation. 
The horizontal axis represents the generation output stack (MW). The available capacity of 
power plants is calculated based on the average load factor in this version of the stack 
model. However, it is possible to use the generation capability of each power plant at a 
particular time in the stack model. Thus, the stack model can provide an accurate picture of 
short-run supply in UK energy generation industry. This can be followed through time to 
show how marginal costs may have changed in response to changes in fuel prices, 
technology, capacity etc. 
The average level of demand at the peak load is around 50 GWh based on information from 
the NGC. The price of fuel and carbon can be updated at any time following the price 
changes in relative markets.  If the level of demand is 50 GWh then the UK power 
generation mix would consist of nuclear, renewables, gas, coal, and oil power plants. If the 
level of demand is 20 GWh, the mix would mainly be nuclear, renewables and coal power 
plants. If nuclear power stations are offline or there no wind, then the generation mix 
would consist mainly of coal, gas, and oil plants.  
Table 3.3 Input values of the stack model experiment. 
Plants Fuel Price Conversion factor Carbon intensity (kgC/KWh) Thermal efficiency Load factor 
Gas 42.5p/therm 29.3071 KWh/therm 0.0518  0.51 0.693 
Coal 65.39 £/tonne 8.14 MWh/tonne 0.0817  0.36 0.567 
oil 50.13 £/barrel 1.64 MWh/barrel 0.0709  0.26 0.405 
Gas oil 1.19 £/gallon 36.7 KWh/gallon 0.068  0.26 0.405 
Diesel  1.22 £/gallon 36.7 KWh/gallon 0.068  0.26 0.405 
Nuclear - - - - 0.494 
Wind - - - - 0.4 
Hydro - - - - 0.354 
Other renewables - - - - 0.3 
Carbon 11.84 £/tonne     
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Source: data as described in section 3.3. 
Power plants usually have an outage schedule for maintaining their performance. This issue 
is related to the outage management of power plants which considers factors including 
plant activities, company policies, and technology. This requires a substantial amount of 
information and it is beyond the scope of this study.  However, the stack model is capable 
of dealing with the planned or unplanned outage of power plants. For example, in the 
summer there will be a significant amount of capacity from nuclear and coal power plants 
taken out of the stack to deal with maintenance. The stack model could accommodate this 
situation by adjusting the database of generation capacity. 
To illustrate its operation, I will discuss four experiments using the stack model. These are 
as follows: 
1. The capacity margin 
2. Variation in fuel price and carbon price. 
3. Different penetration levels for wind farms.  
4. Transmission constraints.  
The reason I choose these four experiments is that I focus on examining security of the 
energy supply and different marginal cost curves of production under different scenarios, 
especially high wind energy penetration scenarios. In addition, I also want to provide a 
generation map for a particular time slot in order to highlight the issues associated with 
transmission constraints.     
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4.1 Capacity margin and generation capability 
The capacity margin is an important factor for ensuring the security of the energy supply. 
Capacity margin is defined as the difference between generating capability and peak-time 
demand. The generation capability represents the maximum output with all available power 
stations in the stack model. A certain amount of capacity margin is usually required by the 
system operator. In other words the generation capacity is required to meet the expected 
demand of the system, even under conditions of unexpected power plant failure during 
peak load or unusual increases in demand.  
It has been claimed by Ofgem that the energy supply will be relatively secure until around 
2015. However, the unprecedented combination of the global financial crisis, tough 
environmental targets, increasing gas import dependency, and the closure of ageing power 
stations is likely to challenge the security and sustainability of energy supplies (Ofgem 
2010).  
In the UK there are 320 major power stations each with more than 1 MW capacity, and 
with a total capacity of 78,268 MW. However, 113 of these power stations were built 
before 1980. A large part of the ageing energy infrastructure will need replacement by 
2020 at an estimated cost of £200bn (Young 2010). 
Therefore, the marginal cost of the stack model has been calculated under the scenario of 
aging nuclear power stations being taken out of service. There are 10 nuclear power 
stations in the UK with the capacity of 10,137 MW contributing approximately 13 per cent 
of the total generation capacity. The oldest plant was built at 1967 and nine of them were 
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built prior to the 1990s. These aging nuclear power stations are to be shut down in the next 
decade, as shown in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 Nuclear power stations operating in UK 
Nuclear reactors Capacity (MW) Built year Expected shutdown 
Oldbury (Magnox) 434 1967 Dec 2010 
Wylfa (Magnox) 980 1971 Dec 2010 
Hinkley (British Energy) 840 1976 2016 
Hunterston (British Energy) 860 1976 2016 
Dungeness (British Energy) 1040 1983 2018 
Hartlepool (British Energy) 1190 1984 2014 (2019?) 
Heysham1 (British Energy) 1160 1984 2014 (2019?) 
Heysham2 (British Energy) 1240 1988 2023 
Torness (British Energy) 1205 1988 2023 
Sizewell B (British Energy) 1188 1995 2035 
Source: DECC energy statistics Duke5.11 and World nuclear association. 
In this experiment the marginal cost of nuclear stations is assumed to be very high 
(£500/MWh), see Table 3.5. Therefore, the nuclear stations will not stack into the system 
as long as the system capacity is capable of meeting the demand. It implies that aging 
nuclear stations are withdrawn from the system. Based on the average load factor, if 
electricity demanded is more than 38GWh, then oil plants will stack into the model. If 
electricity demanded is more than 40GWh there will be no sufficient capacity to meet the 
demand. Therefore, the marginal cost of generation will be extremely high. Table 3.6 
summarises the marginal costs of production for each type of power plants for this 
experiment. 
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Table 3.5 Input values for the stack model—experiment 1(withdraw nuclear stations). 
Plants Fuel Price Conversion factor Carbon intensity (kgC/KWh) Thermal efficiency Load factor 
Gas 42.5p/therm 29.3071 KWh/therm 0.0518  0.51 0.693 
Coal 65.39 £/tonne 8.14 MWh/tonne 0.0817  0.36 0.567/0.8 
oil 50.13 £/barrel 1.64 MWh/barrel 0.0709  0.26 0.405 
Gas oil 1.19 £/gallon 36.7 KWh/gallon 0.068  0.26 0.405 
Diesel  1.22 £/gallon 36.7 KWh/gallon 0.068  0.26 0.405 
Nuclear 500 - - - 0.494 
Wind - - - - 0.4 
Hydro - - - - 0.354 
Other renewables - - - - 0.3 
Carbon 11.84 £/tonne     
 
Table 3.6 Marginal cost curve for experiment 1(withdraw nuclear stations).  
 MC MW(Stacked) 
hydro 0 1502.872 
other renewables 0 1562.572 
wind 0 2481.648 
coal 25.00 18772.64 
gas 29.63 37956.59 
oil 120.79 39437.63 
gas oil 127.80 39917.56 
diesel 130.95 39971.42 
Nuclear  500 51673.66 
 
Figure 3.10 Stacked capacity and marginal cost for generation at load factor of 0.8 for coal-fired plants. 
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In another scenario of this experiment (Figure 3.10), the coal-fired power plants are 
assumed to generate constantly with a higher load factor (0.8) and other variables remain 
constant. It is possible for the peak load to be met without nuclear power stations. 
However, the system price would be set by the marginal cost of oil-fired power plants. In 
this case, the oil-fired plant would be required to serve during the peak time causing a 
dramatic increase in the system marginal cost. The system buy price in the balancing 
market will be much higher than the stack model system price if electricity companies are 
unable to meet the volume of their contracts. As a result, the wholesale and retail electricity 
prices would be likely to increase significantly. 
 A new generation of nuclear power stations would be one way to ensure there are 
sufficient power supplies, since nuclear power provides reliable, cost-effective, and low-
carbon energy. The UK government has announced significant plans for energy projects 
and 10 potential new sites for nuclear energy. Ensuring there is sufficient capacity margin 
in the system is one factor which encourages new investment in the infrastructure.  Another 
option is to invest heavily in renewable technologies. However, it seems unlikely that by 
2015 that there will be sufficient renewable capacity which is responsive to consumer 
demand to make up for the shortfall caused by nuclear plant closure. 
4.2 Carbon and fuel prices 
The use of carbon capture technology is one method of meeting targets for the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions. However, this technology is very expensive and is on a 
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demonstration rather than operation level. Therefore, thermal stations have to buy carbon 
allowance for paying a charge for pollute.  
In this experiment the carbon and fuel price is allow to change.  In one scenario the carbon 
price rises to £50 per tonne and other variables remain the same. Figure 3.11 shows the 
marginal cost curves for a low carbon price (£11.84 per tonne) and high carbon price (£50 
per tonne). It is clear that marginal costs for thermal power plants will increase as the 
carbon price increases. However, the marginal cost for coal-fired plants will be greater than 
that of gas-fired plants, since coal-fired plants have higher carbon intensity. 
Furthermore, gas prices can change the order in which types of power plant come into the 
stack model. Natural gas prices have fluctuated frequently compared to the relatively stable 
coal price. Figure 3.12 shows the historical natural gas price index in the UK from October 
2008 to February 2010. The price of natural gas has plunged dramatically. Hence the 
marginal cost of gas fired plants should react to this change. If the values of other variables 
remain the same, then the marginal cost of coal fired plants will be more than that of the 
gas fired plants when the price of gas is less than 35 pence per therm. Table 3.7 displays 
the results from the stack model. The marginal cost for power plants varies as the carbon 
price and fuel prices vary. 
 
 
 
 
 
92 
 
Figure 3.11 Marginal cost curves based on different carbon prices. 
 
 
Figure 3.12 Natural Gas price index in the ICE UK. 
 
Source: ICE natural gas index 
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Table 3.7 Marginal costs of generation.  
 Fuel Price MC Fuel Price* MC* MC** 
Hydro 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear  0 0 0 0 0 
Other renewables 0 0 0 0 0 
Wind 0 0 0 0 0 
Coal 65.39 £/tonne 25.00138 65.39 £/tonne 25.00138 33.66 
Gas 42.5p/therm 29.63709 30.50p/therm 21.60852 25.48 
Oil 50.13 £/barrel 120.7943 50.13 £/barrel 120.7943 131.2 
Gas oil 1.19 £/gallon 127.8084 1.19 £/gallon 127.8084 137.78 
Diesel 1.22 £/gallon 130.9524 1.22 £/gallon 130.9524 140.93 
Carbon 11.84 £/tonne    £50 /tonne 
* Gas price reduces to 30.50 pence per therm. 
** Carbon price increases to £50 per tonne. 
 
4.3 Wind Farms 
There are 114 wind farms with a capacity of more than 1MW in the stack model. The total 
capacity of onshore and offshore wind farms is 2297.69 MW, which is just less than 3 
percent of the total generation capacity. The British government has set a target of 
achieving renewable energy penetration of 20 percent by 2020 in the 2003 Energy White 
Paper. The current renewable energy penetration in the stack model is 8.5 percent including 
pumped storage. In addition, the intermittency of wind impacts on the output of wind farms, 
thus the average load factor of wind farms is 40 percent in the UK.  
There are two scenarios which have been simulated in the stack model. In the first scenario 
all wind turbines are offline under the extreme weather conditions. In the second, using the 
same average load factor, the capacity of wind farms is increased by four times in order to 
meet the government‘s target for renewable energy penetration.  
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The results from the first simulation show that the marginal cost is set by the coal-fired 
power plants during the off peak times. The fuel price and carbon price remain the same as 
those  of the case in  Section 4.2. The system is able to meet the base load. During the peak 
time the marginal cost is set by the gas fired power plants if average load factor is taken 
into account. However, system marginal cost can be increased significantly if oil or gas oil 
fired plants need to be called in the stack model to meet the peak load. 
The capacity of wind farms will need to quadruple to meet the renewable energy target by 
2020. An assumption of the simulation is that the new generation of nuclear power stations 
will replace the old ones. If the values of other variables are kept constant, the results 
indicate that oil and gas oil fired power plants would not be needed in the stack model to 
serve the peak load. The system marginal cost is set by the gas fired power plants during 
the peak times. However, this conclusion ignores the issue of intermittency which is 
addressed in Chapter 4. If there is a significant probability that wind power availability 
falls short of its rated capacity, the system will have to build reserve capacity to cover 
against this eventuality.  
In another case, half of the old nuclear power stations will be retired by 2020 and the new 
nuclear power stations are not yet available. Even if all wind farms are operating at 
capacity, the marginal cost will be determined by gas oil or oil fired power plants which 
will be required to generate electricity during peak times. The system marginal cost will be 
very high.  
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Figure 3.13 Stack models with different output levels of wind energy. 
 
In summary, if wind penetration increases dramatically in the UK as has occurred in 
Germany, the variation of outputs from wind farms can affect the wholesale electricity 
prices. Figure 3.13 illustrates two scenarios with different levels of wind energy output. In 
case 1 the available capacity of wind farms is not significant in the stack model with other 
factors remaining constant. Thus the price is set by the marginal cost of oil-fired power 
plants. In case 2 the available capacity of wind farms increases significantly, and as a result 
the price is set by marginal cost of coal-fired plants which is much lower than that of oil-
fired plants. 
Under the large wind energy scenario, it is recognised that the intermittency of wind power 
in a situation where it is contributing a substantial share of total electricity generation will 
mean a reduction in the load factor for conventional generators. Thus conventional power 
plants -gas-fired plants as reserved generation have to run less efficiently. This raised the 
question that ―Will the new conventional power stations be profitable in this environment?‖ 
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The security of power supply has been highlighted in the stack model experiments. The UK 
electricity industry needs more new investment in generating capacities to replace the aged 
power plants as well as to back up the intermittent renewable power plants. The stronger 
financial signal or subsidiary is essential to motivate new investment. In other words, the 
new conventional power stations need to be profitable. Therefore the Government again 
proposed capacity payments to compensate available capacities recently.  This targeted 
payments to encourage security of supply through the construction of flexible reserve 
plants or demand reduction measures (so-called negawatts) to ensure the lights stay on
10
. In 
addition, new investment in gas-fired power plants is closely related to UK gas production 
or reserve. As UK gas production falling since 2004, there will need to be much more gas 
storage. However, this topic is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
4.4 Transmission constrains 
A further function of the stack model is that it can provide information on the regions in 
which electricity has been generated. Figure 3.14 is a generation map of peak demand load 
and Figure 3.15 is a generation map of off-peak demand load. It is clear that during peak 
times the capacity stacks in South East region were double that of the off-peak time. This is 
due to the majority of power plants in the South East using coal, gas, gas oil or oil as 
energy input. The principle of the stack model is that plants using clean energy come into 
the model first, hence power plants in South East are more likely to serve only at peak 
demand. 
                                               
10
 http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/Consultations/emr/1041-electricity-market-reform-condoc.pdf 
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The majority of the hydro and wind power plants in the UK are based in Scotland. 
Therefore the region consistently produces a high proportion of the supply in the stack. 
However, transmission constrains of 2200MW between England and Scotland can reduce 
the export levels from Scotland to England. Consequently, the power plants in Scotland 
will run less efficiently. 
Figure 3.14 Generation map of the peak demand load. 
 
Figure 3.15 Generation map of the off-peak demand load. 
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In terms of investment, it may be more efficient to increase the capacity of the inter-
connector before further development of wind energy in Scotland or offshore. 
4.5 Model extension 
The availability of power plants in the stack model is measured by the average load factor 
of different fuel types. However, the availability and capability of each individual  power 
plant can vary. The extension of the stack model is to allow the dynamic adjustment of 
output. This can be performed using STATA Mata programme.  
In addition, the ROC (Renewable Obligation Certificate) price is not an input in the basic 
version of the stack model because we believe that it is not a part of price formation. ROC 
price either can add upon the wholesale electricity price as an up-lift or pass on to 
consumers at retail market.  However it is reasonable to discuss the effects of the ROC 
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000
sum of mwatts
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scheme on the electricity market. Higher ROC prices will provide financial support and 
incentives to renewable generation or even have influence on the bidding behaviour of 
electricity companies in the wholesale markets. Firstly the Renewable Obligation is 
ensuring that substantial onshore and offshore wind generation is built. Most renewable 
generation technologies are dominated by capital, however offshore wind, energy-from-
waste and biomass waste plants have high operating costs. Renewable plants, with the 
exception of most existing hydro, tend to be commercially viable only because of financial 
support through the sale of ROCs and their exemption from the climate change levy 
(MacDonald 2010). Moreover, it might be more expensive to run power plant at lower 
factor or shunt it down than keep it in operation steadily. So it is possible for a renewable 
generator to offer a negative electricity price or price which is less than operation costs in 
the balancing market in order to sell its outputs but get valuable ROC price as subsidiary. 
As a result, it proves our assumption of the stack model that renewable generation units 
come into the model first with ―zero marginal cost of production‖. However, there are still 
price risks of ROC due to the design of the RO (further discussion of RO in Chapter 4, 
section 2). As a result, there are uncertainties for investors over the future price of ROC. 
Some argue this could lead to a dampening effect on investment. There remains a risk that 
further evolution in the operation of the RO will either over-reward or under-reward 
necessary investment (HM Treasury 2010). 
There is an argument that RO provides no inventive to invest in developing new 
technologies, only in improving the efficiency of mature ones, contrary to what happens 
when using a feed-in tariff (FiTs) system. As a market based tool, the ROC system only 
defines a target to be achieved and lets the market decide how reach the optimum. In this 
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way, the cheaper technologies are selected first, and investment in newer technologies will 
only be possible when all the cheap options have been explored
11
. This means that there is 
no incentive to develop new technologies, only to maximize the efficiency of the cheaper 
ones. In the UK the main focus has been onshore wind. 
 
Premium feed-in tariffs which offer a premium over and above the wholesale market price, 
have been used in nations including Denmark, Germany and Spain to encourage 
investment in renewables. This fixed price is set in a contract that usually lasts for 15-20 
years. Comparing with the UK system, the FiT have a smaller investment risk. The prices 
contracted in on year will be higher than the ones contracted in the following year, meaning 
that late entry need to use more efficient technology to be able to compete
12
. Thus the ROC 
scheme is very expensive with the payments being invariant to the electricity price and 
volatile. A Fit scheme can be more targeted, give more certainty (long-term contract), and 
should be less expensive. Therefore, there would be an extension for stack model 
experiment that what electricity price is going to be if the policy shifts from ROCs to FiTs.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Ofgem claims that the restructured British electricity industry is competitive. The 
wholesale trading of electricity is diversified in bilateral contracts, spot market trading, 
futures market trading, and balancing market trading. The ability to forecast the wholesale 
                                               
11
 http://www.shvoong.com/social-sciences/economics/2064385-economic-efficiency-uk-policy-renewable/ 
12
 http://www.shvoong.com/social-sciences/economics/2064385-economic-efficiency-uk-policy-renewable/ 
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price is important for market participants. This issue has been a particularly important topic 
after the wholesale market was established.  
There are several fundamental and statistical models for identifying electricity prices. Spot 
electricity prices have unique characteristics, such as regular intraday variation, seasonal 
effect, mean revision, jumps and spikes. The volatility of spot electricity price can be 
determined from prevalent time series statistic models. 
The objective of this chapter is to define a method for identifying the fundamentals of the 
wholesale electricity price. The marginal cost of generation calculated by the stack model 
represents the price fundamentals. The stack model provides a reasonable simulation of the 
short-run system marginal cost of generation and considers fuel price, carbon price, 
technology, demand load, and capability of power plants. The stack model also provides 
the system marginal cost and generation map for a particular time slot. The flexibility of 
the stack model enables us to predict long-term marginal cost of generation as well. It 
requires replacing spot price of fuel, carbon with forward of futures prices. Demand of 
power is highly correlated with historical demand trends. Weather forecasts and special 
events are also can be predicted in long-term. One difficulty is the development of new 
technology which has impact on the efficiency of power generation. Therefore, it is 
possible to simulate long-term electricity wholesale prices which are important for 
electricity companies to make long-term bilateral deals.  
It is straightforward to adjust the fuel price, carbon price, and capacity availability. The 
empirical result shows that renewable power plants cannot currently influence the system 
marginal cost due to low penetration. However, if the government‘s renewable energy 
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target is been achieved then the system marginal cost will be set by coal fired plants rather 
than expensive oil fired plants during the peak time.  
Moreover, the security of the energy supply will be challenged in the next decade as a 
result of aging nuclear power plants. If capacity is not replaced the system capacity margin 
could be negative, meaning that the electricity supply will not be sufficient to meet the 
demand. Furthermore, carbon price contributes to the marginal cost of generation for fuel 
combustion plants. The variation in carbon prices can change the order of coal fired plants 
and gas fired plants in the stack. At present coal fired plants have lower marginal cost than 
that of gas fired plants. 
Transmission constraints are not included in the basic stack model due to the limited 
availability of relevant information. However, it remains an important issue in the 
wholesale market. Due to the transmission constraints plants which are located particularly 
far from urban areas, such as some distant wind farms have to operate less efficiently.  
The stack model is highly flexible and easy to update. The extended version of the stack 
model can include the dynamic availability and capability of each power plant, although 
this requires a significant amount of additional data and information. 
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Chapter4 Assessing the portfolio risk of wind farms: implications for 
large wind power penetration in the UK power market  
1. Introduction 
In the UK energy white paper 2003 the government set a target of achieving renewable 
energy penetration for electricity generation of 20% by 2020. In other words 20% of the 
electricity supply would be provided from renewable sources. This rapid expansion of 
renewable energy is planned in Britain to help counter climate change. A secondary aim is 
to enhance energy security following the run down of North Sea oil resources. If one takes 
only the domestic production into account, the UK has met its Kyoto Protocol target for 
cutting greenhouse gas emission in 2008. However, there are continuous adjustments of the 
British government‘s renewable energy policy and targets. The government‘s goals of 
dealing with climate change, especially of reducing carbon dioxide emission are becoming 
increasingly challenging.  
The government believes that successful renewable energy technologies are the main route 
by which the goal of a low carbon economy can be achieved. The majority of renewable 
energy will have to be delivered by wind energy, since wind power generation is the most 
developed technology available at present. However, in 2007 only 2% of the UK's energy 
came from wind power compared with 29% in Denmark, 20% in Spain, and 15% in 
Germany
13. In order to meet the government‘s targets the number of wind turbines on land 
in Britain is likely to grow from just above 2,000 at present to 5,000 by 2020, according to 
the British Wind Energy Association (McCarthy 2008). An even greater increase in the 
number of wind turbines is planned for offshore wind farms, with turbines installed in the 
                                               
13
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7959912.stm 
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seas around Britain's coasts. The number is likely to increase from fewer than 150 at 
present to approximately 7,500 by 2020 (McCarthy 2008). As a part of these extensive 
plans, considerations need to be given to connections with transmission networks, 
environmental issues, and levels of investment. Since wind power generation depends on 
wind speed, the intermittency of wind impacts on the output of wind farms. Therefore the 
impact of wind power generation on the running of the electricity system should also be 
taken into account. It also adds extra costs for system balancing and transmission. 
Increasing wind power penetration needs additional reserve capacity to maintain the energy 
supply. This implies investment in alternative forms of generation suited to balancing wind 
power and additional grid capacity. Both imply additional costs for system operation.  
The research question asked in this chapter is to what extent wind energy outputs are 
correlated across the country or if they can be considered independent. Electricity 
companies usually own more than one wind farm. They need to manage the associated 
risks of fluctuating wind energy output, due to the intermittency of wind speed. The 
numbers of wind farms will increase if the government‘s energy target is to be achieved. 
Therefore, it is essential for electricity companies to assess their portfolio risk of their wind 
energy, which are likely to comprise diverse wind farms in different locations. The 
generation portfolio of an electricity company can contain different types of power plants. 
However, this study is focused on the risk of supply which is associated with the 
correlation between wind farms. Thus, the portfolio means a wind farms portfolio in this 
study.  
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Modern portfolio theory is widely used in financial markets. Investor portfolios are 
composed of diverse types of assets. Investors must take account of the interplay between 
asset returns when evaluating the risk of a portfolio. The offsetting pattern of returns on 
assets stabilises the risk of the overall portfolio, then investors can control or hedge the 
portfolio risk. Similarly, a set of wind farms for an electricity company is like a set of 
equities for investors. Electricity consumers are risk averse – they place a high value on 
security of power supply. In turn, this implies that power companies are risk-averse. They 
also care a lot about energy supply security, which is similar to risk-averse investors 
wishing to avoid losses. If wind turbine outputs are independent or negatively correlated, 
then wind energy could be considered a low risk source of energy. If wind turbine outputs 
are highly correlated then wind is a risky form of power generation. Association between 
wind power levels at different locations can be measured using linear correlation 
coefficients. The correlation of wind turbine outputs can be approximated by using the 
correlation of wind speeds.  
In the large wind energy penetration scenario, electricity companies have to build a 
portfolio of wind farms with low risk. Low risk implies wind farms within the portfolio are 
not correlated at all or they are negatively correlated. The wind energy output of a portfolio 
will not be affected when wind strength increases in one part of the country and decreases 
in another part of the country.  With trading, the individual companies may be able to 
reduce risk through trades of supply in different parts of the country. However, this will not 
remove the systemic risk that is associated with the total output of the wind farm system. 
To examine the systemic risk associated with wind generation, we have fitted a variety of 
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models to British wind speed data in order to investigate the underlying stochastic structure 
of wind speeds and the consequent effect on power generation at wind farms. 
In fact, most of the power companies have a mixture of production system- coal, gas, oil 
and renewables. There is a trade off between increasing the risk of power delivery by 
building more wind farms and paying more for ROCs or failing the RO. I have restricted 
this research to a portfolio only have a number of wind farms and got the conclusion of 
invest in wind farms that are negatively correlated to reduce overall portfolio risks. 
However, this might not be hold if a power company decides to buy more ROC and build 
more gas-fired power plants in its generation portfolios, but this is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
The first part of this chapter (Section2) presents the background of UK renewable energy 
developments based on the UK climate change and renewable energy policies. It examines 
the government‘s current targets for the electricity industry and discusses the difficulties 
for the government in meeting those targets. Section3 discusses earlier studies on the 
impact on the electricity system under increasing wind energy penetration. Section4 
presents different methodologies for modelling correlation of wind speed. This section also 
compares and contrasts the results from our models. Section5 discusses methods for 
converting wind speed into power output. The final part is the conclusion. 
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2. Background of UK renewable energy policies and developments 
2.1. Dealing with Climate Change  
The UK government has set a series of guidelines to measure and tackle the greenhouse gas 
emission. The greenhouse gases targeted for reduction are Carbon Dioxide (CO2), Methane, 
Nitrous Oxide, Hydrofluorocarbon, Perfluorocarbon, and Sulphur Hexafluoride. The UK‘s 
legally binding target under the Kyoto Protocol agreed in 1997 was to reduce its 
greenhouse gas emissions by 12.5% below that of 1990 levels (base year) between 2008 
and 2012. The UK government and its devolved administrations had set a separate 
domestic goal of a 20% reduction in CO2 emissions below 1990 levels by 2010 (DETR  
2000). In 2003, the Energy White Paper adopted a long term goal to put UK on the path to 
cutting CO2 emissions by some 60% by about 2050, with considerable progress towards 
this by 2020 (DETR 2006). The Climate Change Act 2008 has also set legally-binding 
targets for the UK to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% below 1990 
levels by 2050 and CO2 by at least 26% below 1990 levels by 2020.  
The targets for reducing greenhouse gases are challenging. The Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC) states that the UK‘s greenhouse gas emission fell to about 9% 
below 1990 levels in 1998 and around 17.4% lower than 1990 levels in 2007. The 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions since 1990 has been driven by privatisation and 
liberalisation of energy supply industries, increased energy efficiency, pollution control 
measures in the industrial sector, and other policies that reduced emissions of non-CO2 
greenhouse gases (DETR 2006). The UK‘s greenhouse gas emissions fell by 19.07% in 
2008 compared with 1990 levels, excluding the purchase of carbon credits under emissions 
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trading schemes. This puts the UK well ahead of its Kyoto Protocol target. The UK has 
become one of the leading countries when it comes to tackling climate change. 
Figure 4.1 UK greenhouse gas and Carbon dioxide emissions (MtCO2e) 1990-2008.  
                        
  Data Source: DEFRA Economics and Statistics (DEFRA 2007) and (DECC 2009). 
However, the trend in reduction of CO2 emissions indicates that the government is highly 
unlikely to meet its targets for 2010 and 2020. Figure 4.1 describes the entire time series of 
UK greenhouse gas and CO2 emissions from 1990 to 2008. CO2 emissions fell by only 
around 6.4% below base year levels in 2006 and around 10.2% lower compare to 1990 
levels in 2008. CO2 emissions have stabilised since the 1990s energy industries revolution. 
There has been no significant reduction in CO2 emissions over the past five years. If this 
situation continues it is likely that the UK government will fail to meet its CO2 reduction 
target for 2010. 
The government‘s statistics of greenhouse gas emission have been criticised as ―creative‖ 
(Jowit 2009). The calculations ignore the emissions associated with the large merchandise 
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imports by the UK as well as the impact of international aviation and shipping. In other 
words, the UK statistics ignores the amount of carbon outsourced. Dieter Helm (2008) 
found that the UK‘s greenhouse gas emissions in 2005 instead of falling by over 15% since 
1990 actually rose by around 19%, if carbon outsourcing is included. Based on his 
calculations the UK‘s remarkable emissions cuts over the past two decades appear less 
impressive.  
2.2. Renewable energy targets 
A wide application of renewable and clean energies is one way to meet the government‘s 
emission targets. The majority of the UK‘s greenhouse gas emissions comprises of CO2. It 
comes primarily from transport, households, business and fossil fuel fired power plants. 
The combustion of coal, natural gas, and to a lesser extent oil for electricity generation 
contributed to around 30% of CO2 emissions in 2004 (SDC, 2005). In the 2003 Energy 
White Paper, the government argued that successful renewable energy technologies would 
be the main method of achieving a low carbon economy since most renewable energy 
sources do not produce CO2.  
Consequently, in 2000 the government set a target of 10% of electricity supply from 
renewable energy sources by 2010. A further target of 20% of electricity from renewable 
energy by 2020 was announced in 2006.  
Table 4.1 presents the current renewable electricity targets for EU countries. It is ranked by 
the order of the percentage of renewable energy penetration excluding hydro power. The 
2010 target for the UK is 9.3% renewable energy penetration excluding hydro power and 
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less than the EU target of 12.5%. In 2007 approximately 5% of electricity in the UK was 
generated from renewable sources including hydro power. The volume of electricity from 
renewable sources needed to be doubled in three years to meet the 2010 target. 
Table 4.1: 2010 targets for renewable electricity of EU countries. 
  including hydro Excluding hydro 
Denmark 29.0% 29.0% 
Finland 35.0% 21.7% 
Portugal 45.6% 21.5% 
Austria 78.1% 21.1% 
Spain 29.4% 17.5% 
Sweden 60.0% 15.7% 
Italy 25.0% 14.9% 
Greece 20.1% 14.5% 
EU 22.1% 12.5% 
Netherlands 12.0% 12.0% 
Ireland 13.2% 11.7% 
Germany 12.5% 10.3% 
UK 10.0% 9.3% 
France 21.0% 8.9% 
Belgium 6.0% 5.8% 
Luxembourg 5.7% 5.7% 
                               Source: EU directive2000. 
In order to achieve these goals and encourage investments in new renewable electricity 
capacity, the Renewables Obligation (RO) and Climate Change Levy (CCL) system were 
introduced. These provide indirect subsides to renewable energy generators. The CCL is a 
tax on energy used by business and the non-domestic sector. Electricity produced from 
renewable sources is exempt from CCL. 
The RO requires licensed electricity suppliers to source a specific and annually increasing 
percentage of the electricity they supply from renewable sources. The UK currently has 
over seventy licensed suppliers of electricity and gas. In 2005 the government passed ‗The 
Renewables Obligation Order 2005‘ requiring energy companies to derive 6.7% of the 
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energy they provide to their customers from renewable sources. The current level is 9.1% 
for 2008/2009 rising to 15.4% by 2015/2016. However, in 2007 only 5% of the UK‘s 
electricity supply came from renewable sources, with 4.9% from RO eligible sources
14
.  
A Renewables Obligation Certificate (ROC) is issued to an electricity generator accredited 
by the Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) for eligible renewable electricity 
generated within the UK. A single ROC is issued for each megawatt hour (MWh) of 
eligible renewable output generated. ROCs can be sold to suppliers on the open market 
which is administered by the Non-Fossil Purchase Agency Ltd (NFPA) and Ofgem. In 
other words, in order to meet the RO requirement either an integrated electricity company 
needs to generate the required percentage of renewable electricity or their integrated 
suppliers need to buy the appropriate amount of ROCs. Suppliers who sell electricity to 
consumers and do not own renewable generation plants have to buy ROCs on the open 
market, otherwise fines can be imposed. 
All electricity suppliers must prove to Ofgem that they have met the RO requirement by 
producing ROCs at the end of the year. If a supplier fails to meet this obligation it must pay 
a so-called "buy-out" fine for every MWh sold that was not from renewable sources. The 
buy-out payments from suppliers who have insufficient ROCs are redistributed to other 
suppliers in proportion to the number of ROCs they present. The buy-out price was £30 per 
MWh in 2002/2003. It is adjusted by the RPI annually
15
. Missing the RO by even a small 
amount can be very expensive. For example, EDF Energy Customers PLC had an RO of 
2,883,887MWh in 2006/2007. It was left with a 2% shortfall despite succeeding in meeting 
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 http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/energy/sources/renewables/index.html 
15
 http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file21130.pdf 
112 
 
98% of its RO through ROCs, obliging it to pay £2,005,000 in buy-out fine (Constable 
2008). Constable and Barfoot found that the buy-out fines (plus interest), to be 
redistributed totalled £217,888,311 and the total number of ROCs submitted was 
12,868,408. This meant that each supplier who sufficiently produced ROCs received 
£16.04 back per certificate for England and Wales in the period 2006/2007(Constable 
2008). This is an additional source of income for renewable generators. 
Figure 4.2: Daily ROC prices, average System Buy Price (SBP) and average System Sell Price (SSP) 
(£/MWh). 
 
 Data source: ROC price from NFPA. SBP and SSP prices from NETA reporting (www.bmreport.com) 
Figure 4.2 describes the daily average ROC, System Buy Price (SBP) and System Sell 
Price (SSP) prices. The ROC prices are higher than the SBP for the majority of the time 
shown on Figure 4.2. The ROC price has slowly increased and maintained a relative high 
level. It is quite steady compared to more volatile SSP and SBP prices. ROCs have 
increased the profitability of renewable energy generation as the certificates can currently 
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sell for more than SBPs. Therefore renewable generators are rewarded by the RO 
mechanism. This provides additional incentives for the production of additional renewable 
capacity.  
However, there are also negative impacts of RO. Some companies who failed to meet their 
RO target became insolvent and consequently failed to pay their fines. TXU UK LTD and 
Maverick Energy Ltd were companies in receivership that had failed to meet their RO 
target for 2002-2003 and failed to pay the required fines
16
. Furthermore, high ROC prices 
have increased wholesale electricity costs. The major suppliers have been able to pass these 
higher costs on to the consumers. As a result the electricity prices have increased and 
consumers have to pay more for electricity even though there is no explicit ‗green tariff‖. 
The BERR (2008) stated that current climate change policies have added an additional 14% 
to domestic electricity bills and 21% to industrial electricity bills, much of this from the RO 
and the CCL (BERR 2008). The Latest report from Ofgem suggests that the domestic 
energy bill could rise by 14%-60% by 2020 to fight the global warming (Adam 2009).  
Another main driver of the renewable energy target is the security of energy supply which 
depends on the diversification of supply. Increasing international competition for energy 
resources with increasing scarcity and difficulty of accessing and extracting fossil fuel 
reserves has been identified as one of the main threats to the UK‘s overall energy security. 
Furthermore, renewable energy can reduce the dependency on imported fossil fuels. The 
government believes that increased investment in the UK to meet a 15% renewable energy 
target will reduce annual UK gas imports by 12%-14% by 2020 (DECC, 2009).  
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Therefore, renewable energy targets would require a revolutionary and structural change of 
the energy generating sector in the UK. The UK‘s renewable electricity supply still requires 
around a four-fold increase to meet the 2020 target. It is an opportunity and challenge for 
the electricity industry.  
2.3. British renewable energy and wind farms 
There is significant growth in developments in renewable energy generation around the 
world. Denmark has successfully transformed its energy sector. In 1970 Denmark was 99% 
dependent on foreign energy sources such as oil and coal. However, Denmark has become 
a net exporter of natural gas, oil and electricity today. Denmark has the largest portfolio of 
wind projects in the world, integrated in to its power grid (21.6%, 3GW in 2006). Germany 
has the largest installed wind capacity with over 20 GW and an average annual penetration 
level of 5% in 2005. In Germany, Schleswig-Holstein had achieved a wind penetration of 
28% by 2005. Both Denmark and Germany have high capacity interconnector with other 
countries allowing export of surplus wind production and the import of power when wind 
production is low (Porter 2007).  
The UK has significant renewable sources and penetration of renewable electricity supply 
has been increasing, although the total penetration level of renewable electricity supply is 
still very low (less than 7% in 2007). Figure 4.3 shows that across the UK as a whole, 
onshore wind power is the renewable technology with the most significant operational 
installed generating capacity with a total of approximately 2084MW in 2007. This capacity 
had increased to 2,735MW by 2008. This represents more than half of the total renewable 
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energy generating capacity in the UK. It is the dominant renewable technology in Scotland, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland. 
Figure 4.3: Renewable generation capacity 2003-2007. 
 
Data source: BERR DUEKS7.4 
 
Another significant source of renewable electricity is hydro. There is little scope for 
increased capacity due to location and environmental considerations. Landfill gas is 
currently the most significant source of biomass based renewable generation but its 
potential for growth is limited in the short run as most large landfill sites are already being 
exploited and the importance of landfill sites may decline even further in future as available 
sites are depleted (DECC 2008). The generation capacities of wave and solar power are 
currently very small at 0.5MW and 14.3MW respectively.  
Figure 4.4 shows the current operational and planned wind farm capacity in the UK. There 
are 209 wind (onshore and offshore) projects with 2387 turbines currently in operation, 
providing a total capacity of 3301.59MW (2008). There are 41 wind farms with 596 
turbines under construction which will add a further 1697.05MW to the overall capacity.  
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Figure 4.4: Wind farms in UK in 2008. 
        
Data source: BWEA statistics
17
 
Green wind energy will play a major role in achieving a low-carbon economy. The UK has 
written ambitious carbon reduction targets into law, cutting carbon emission by 80% by 
2050. Therefore, studies on renewable energy and electricity markets are essential to 
improve the transparency and then drive investment in low-carbon energy. 
3. Literatures review of issues for large wind penetration scenarios in the UK 
3.1. Intermittency and wind resources 
Intermittency is an attribute of many renewable resources. For wind power it can be due to 
varying strength or complete absence of wind. As wind is the only ‗fuel‘ to power the wind 
turbines, intermittency of wind can cause the electricity output patterns of wind farms to 
fluctuate. The intermittency of winds is stochastic. The short term fluctuations of wind 
farms output require system balancing services which are used under NETA/BETTA 
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market arrangements. The long term variations have impact on system reliability to meet 
peak time demand. 
Farmer et al (1980) studied the impact of intermittency of wind energy when the CEGB 
was in place. Relevant research was done by Gardener and Thorpe as well (Milborrow 
2001). Since our research is based on post-NETA/ BETTA electricity market, we will 
focus on the post-NETA studies.  
The report ―Wind power and the UK wind resource‖ by the Environmental Change 
Institute at Oxford University presents an overview of the characteristics of the UK wind 
resources in terms of its patterns of availability and variability (ECI 2005). DTI, BWEA, 
and the then Energy Minster Malcolm Wicks were positive about the report but 
overoptimistic about the UK wind energy at that time. Their perception was that the report 
confirmed the UK has the best wind resources in Europe
18
. However, the report simply 
compared the UK‘s wind capacity factors to that of Denmark and Germany. It is 
inadequate to draw the above conclusion; even though Denmark and Germany are the 
leading countries of wind power generation in the European continent. Firstly, capacity 
factor or load factor describes energy produced by a generator as a percentage of that 
which would be achieved if the generator were to operate at maximum output 100% of the 
time (Gross 2006). For wind farms, the capacity factor is calculated as the volume of 
electricity generated by the turbines divided by the theoretical maximum output of those 
turbines under ideal wind condition. In this report, they found the ideal wind condition for 
a typical 2.5MW modern wind turbine is when the wind speed is between 14ms
-1
 and 
                                               
18http://www.bwea.com/media/news/141105.html 
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25ms
-1
. Within this wind speed range, the power output of turbines is constant at maximum 
output level. Therefore, the capacity factor is a measure of operational performance of 
wind turbines. It is related to the variation of wind speed but it does not describe the 
availability and variability of wind resources. Secondly, the report used the average 
capacity factor to represent the wind resources of each country. However, the 
characteristics of wind resources can vary significantly on different sites or in regions 
within the same country. For example, the average load factor was around 15% for 
Germany as a whole in 2004. However, the average load factor in that year was around 28% 
in the Schleswig-Holstein region which had considerably higher wind penetration. Thus the 
average capacity factor is not a good indicator for comparing wind resources of different 
countries.  Moreover, Germany had more than 16GW of wind capacity at the end of 2004, 
providing more than one third of the world's wind capacity at 26 billion kWh
19
. Therefore, 
the report did not provide enough evidence to prove that UK has the best wind resource in 
Europe.  
Sinden's paper (Sinden 2007) is based on the above report and provides an excellent 
presentation of characteristics of UK onshore wind farms‘ output. He identified long-term 
trends in the average seasonal and durable availability of UK wind resources. He found low 
wind speed events have a limited impact on the UK and high wind speed events are 
extremely rare. On average there is around one hour per year in summer when over 90% of 
the UK experiences low wind speed conditions, although these extreme weather conditions 
occurs around one hour every five years in winter. Furthermore, he identified the long-term 
variability in wind power output together with seasonal patterns of wind power availability. 
                                               
19http://pathsoflight.us/musing/?p=202 
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The UK experiences a seasonal maximum in wind power availability during winter and an 
increase in wind power availability during the day times compared to night times. He also 
examined the relationship between average wind power output and electricity demand 
levels by analysing capacity factors of wind farms. He found that during periods of high 
electricity demand, the average capacity factor of wind farms can reach up to 37%, but 
during periods of low electricity demand this number falls to around 13%.  
Oswald et al. (2008) built an eight region model to assess the degree of fluctuations in wind 
power output in the UK and the consequences of any volatility on the control and 
utilisation of individual generation plant on the grid.  They assumed the wind farm capacity 
to be 25GW on the UK grid system. They also assumed the level of demand remains stable 
at 407 TWh (2005 level). In their study, 25 GW capacities of wind farms would deliver 16% 
of the British electricity demand when the load factor of wind farms is 30%. This ratio will 
be 18.8% if load factor is 35%. In this case the electricity industry will meet the 
government‘s renewable electricity target by 2020. Their model uses hourly wind speed 
recorded in January of 1996 to 2005 and the monthly energy outputs from Ofgem at eight 
locations. Their model suggests that wind power swings of 70% within every 12 hour 
period are to be expected in winter. Due to the volatility of wind power, the residual 
demand on other power sources would vary over the month between 5.5 and 56GW. 
Therefore, the utilisation of large centralised plants will be reduced on average and they 
will have to deal with much larger variations in demand. This may encourage generators to 
install low-cost and low-efficiency plants rather than high-efficiency base load plants. The 
calculations for overall carbon savings might be adjusted to include this effect. They also 
demonstrate that electricity demand in Britain can reach its annual peak with a 
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simultaneous diminution of wind power to very low levels in Britain and neighbouring 
countries (Oswald 2008).  
However, we believe it is inappropriate to use only eight locations to represent the impact 
of the assumed scenario of 25GW wind farms on the British electricity system. The 
locations of their sites are spread around the west of the island and one on the east. They 
use eight regions due to the limitation of wind farm output data. Therefore, their results 
may be biased due to the regions they have selected.  In addition, the analysis of the impact 
of variable wind on individual conventional generators does not answer the question ―Will 
British weather provide reliable electricity?‖ (Gross & Heptonstall 2008) Furthermore, 
Gross and Heptonstall agree with Oswald et al. (2008) that the average load factor for 
conventional plants would decline in a large renewable electricity scenario. They do not 
believe it is necessary to keep large additional capacity of thermal plants to run as base load. 
Gross and Heptonstall argue that the main issue is that wind power and nuclear would be 
competing to meet minimum demand. However, we do not believe that this is the problem.  
Electricity demand is correlated with weather, especially cold weather in the UK. The UK 
experiences significantly higher electricity demand during winter than in summer. 
Electricity demand is higher during the day and early evening than overnight and in the 
early hours of morning. Sinden (2007) found that this pattern of electricity demand is 
similar to the pattern of the wind volatility in the UK. He found a trend of increasing 
energy production from wind power during the period of high electricity demand. 
Therefore, during the period of minimum demand the wind farms tend to experience low 
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load factors. The wind farms‘ activities will not have to be curtailed to let nuclear power 
stations serve minimum base load priority.  
There are two hypothetical methods for dealing with the problem of wind intermittency 
under the large wind penetration scenario. One novel solution is the electric car 
infrastructure which would integrate wind power and transport using renewable energy
20
. 
The infrastructure would incorporate charging points and battery swapping stations. These 
stations would be situated at locations that ensure the cars always have 100 miles of driving 
capacity. Thus the storage battery can be charged during off-peak hours or when the system 
has a surplus of electricity supply. According to the alternative method, pumped storage 
power plants would provide a green energy resource for temporarily storing energy 
generated by wind farms and other renewable resources. In this method water would be 
pumped uphill to a reservoir during low-demand periods or excess wind energy output, and 
then allowed to flow downhill to turbines during periods of high-demand. The difficulty of 
this method is the transmission constraints between wind farms and pumped storage.  
These two methods are potentially able to back up wind energy and deal with wind 
intermittency.  However, these methods are only likely to be a benefit in the long term 
since neither technology is likely to  be realised in the near future.  
3.2. The impact of variable wind power output on the electricity system 
There are studies which assess the impact of variable wind power output on the electricity 
system by using statistical analysis and power system simulation.  
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 http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/io/research/2009/1309.pdf 
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Strbac (2002) in association with ILEX Energy reported to the DTI regarding the system 
costs of additional renewables in 2020. They used scenario analysis to investigate the 
‗plausible range‘ of system costs in 2020 under various ‗combinations of demand, mixes of 
renewable technology, and volumes of renewable generation‘. This study quantified the 
additional system costs that would occur if 10% of electricity is supplied from renewable 
sources in 2010, and 20% or 30% renewable electricity penetration by 2020. Additional 
annual system costs were broken down by three sources- balancing and capacity, 
transmission, and distribution. They found that under the large renewable electricity 
scenario, in particular wind, the balancing and capacity cost is the main or dominant part of 
the system cost due to maintaining system security. The capacity cost is the cost of 
additional capacity required to maintain system security. In their study they assume that 
additional capacity is provided by open cycle gas turbine plants (OCGE). They found that 
balancing and capacity costs may vary between £143m to £284m (based on 2002 prices) 
under 20% renewable penetration in 2020 (Strbac 2002). 
Dale et al.(2004) examined costs where 20% of electricity came from renewable sources by 
2020. They assumed all the renewable electricity is sourced from wind energy. They 
determined the extra costs of the renewables scenario by comparing the total cost of a 20% 
wind scenario with a scenario where a similar amount of energy is generated by gas-fired 
plants. The implications of this alternative scenario were examined using sensitivity 
analysis. They found that the extra cost would rise if the capital costs of wind generation 
fall more slowly than anticipated, but would fall if gas prices rise more rapidly than has 
been assumed or if wind plants are more efficient. The total additional cost is estimated to 
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be around 0.3p/kWh. Furthermore, £2.5bn to £4bn of transmission investment is required 
by the NGC in order to accommodate wind energy (Dale et al. 2004).  
The costs associated with the government‘s renewable energy target are subject to a 
number of uncertainties. The above papers made the estimation under specific assumptions. 
The global economic downturn has affected the renewable energy industry. In some cases 
investment in new wind farm projects has been suspended or cancelled. The demand for 
wind turbines has fallen as a result and turbine producers having been forced to cut prices. 
Therefore the capital cost of wind turbines may decrease.  
3.3. Modelling wind energy output 
The previous section discusses the impacts of variable wind energy output on the electricity 
system. The Transmission System Operator (TSO) and Ofgem need to evaluate the relevant 
system costs and demand of investments in the National Grid for maintaining system 
security as the level of penetration of wind energy into the grid rises. The TSO needs to 
balance the electricity demand and supply second by second. The fluctuation of wind 
energy output has significant impact on SBP, SSP, and volume. Under the large wind 
energy penetration scenario, the TSO faces greater difficulties in balancing the national 
grid system. Thus modelling wind energy output is essential to the TSO for predicting and 
managing the volatility in the amount of balancing units. Therefore the TSO can avoid or 
reduce the balancing problems.  
In addition, at the risk of extremely high SBP in the balancing market, the renewable 
electricity generators have to be able to model accurate output and bid into the market. As 
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discussed in previous chapters of this thesis, when a wind power plant fails to fulfil the 
bilateral contract it is compelled to buy a certain amount of electricity from the TSO in the 
balancing market or from spot markets. Thus it can be exposed to the risk of price volatility. 
The electricity companies which own both conventional power plants and wind farms may 
change their trading strategy under the large wind energy penetration scenario. It is 
possible for them to run their conventional power plants inefficiently, since the insufficient 
electricity supply may cause high system prices. The wind farm output creates sources of 
income from electricity selling, ROC, CCL and redistributed buy-out payments. On the 
other hand, they keep the conventional plant capacity available until the TSO calls. In this 
way, they could make a significant profit from trading in the balancing market. 
The impact of higher wind energy penetration on conventional power plants has been 
discussed in the literature. Weigt(2009) has analysed the extent to which wind energy can 
replace capacities of fossil fuel power plants based on the German wind injection and 
demand data for 2006 through to June 2008. The results indicate that the wind potential in 
Germany will not allow a significant reduction in capacities of fossil fuel power plants. He 
also found that a reduction in fossil fuel prices would reduce the benefit from wind energy, 
assuming all other factors remain equal. In particular coal and gas prices have a strong 
impact on the price of electricity, whereas nuclear and lignite will only have relatively 
minor influence (Weigt 2009). Moreover, the variation of load flows from wind farms in 
the interconnected grid system may influence the dispatch and re-dispatch of electricity 
generated by the conventional power plants. In addition, Berry (2005) found that wind 
energy can provide a cost effective hedge against natural gas price volatility or price 
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increases. These findings are based on his analysis of the costs of marginal conventional 
generation given the historical probability distribution of natural gas prices, the cost of 
wind energy, wind integration costs, transmission costs for wind energy, the capacity value 
of wind, and environmental benefits of wind energy for a hypothetical utility in the South 
western United States (Berry 2005). 
Moreover, investors are more cautious in the current economic circumstances. Hence the 
modelling of wind farm output and analysing wind energy price risk in the balancing 
market are essential to wind farm owners or potential investors. However, it is a good 
investment opportunity due to the policy of financial support from the government. The 
organisation Consultancy Emerging Energy Research predicts that Europe‘s 20 largest 
utilities will double their investment in green power over the next five years, having 
allocated $13.3bn for renewable ventures to date (Refocus 2006). Therefore modelling 
wind energy production and assessing the portfolio risk of wind farms become more 
important as the level of installed capacity continues to increase.  
4. Modelling hourly mean wind speed in the UK--Methodology and results 
A wind farm‘s output is influenced by the intermittency of wind and variation of wind 
speed. The processes of modelling wind speed are the main methods in determining the 
patterns of wind farm output. These methods minimise the overall variation of outputs for a 
wind farm portfolio. In the large wind energy penetration scenario, modelling the 
electricity output of wind farms is essential for maintaining system security. In addition, 
electricity companies with large wind capacities need to manage their financial risks in the 
balancing market and electricity spot market. This is closely related to operational and 
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financial hedging strategies of companies exposed to wind-related risk. The system 
operator can make detailed schedules and plans to ensure the security and balance of the 
system based on those models. The simulating of wind speed distribution at a given 
location and time period has become the prevalent method of estimating the output of wind 
farms and to determine the ‗wind power density‘. The distribution of wind energy at 
different wind speeds is called wind power density, and it is calculated by multiplying the 
power of each wind speed with the probability of each wind speed (Celik 2003). 
A straightforward way of calculating the matrix of correlation coefficients for a wind farms 
output is by using the wind farms real output data, for example hourly or half hourly time 
series. However, the data for all wind farms is not publicly available. Due to this limitation 
most research includes only a few sites. Harrison has also presented the correlation of 
Ontario wind farm power output by using hourly power output measurements from 5 farms 
for the year August 2007 to July 2008
21
. 
Due to the shortage of wind farm output data we first need to determine the wind speed 
distribution of each site. However, we cannot use average (daily or monthly) wind speed 
data to determine the average output of a wind farm since the average wind speed data is 
insufficient to describe the potential power output. A modern wind turbine operates under a 
wind speed of between 4ms
-1 
and 24ms
-1
(ECI 2005). For example, let us assume that there 
are two sites A and B that have the same average monthly wind speed of 15ms
-1
, but at site 
A the wind blows constantly at 15ms
-1
 meaning the wind turbine at site A can operate at 
full capacity all the time. At site B the wind blows at 30ms
-1
 for half of the time, and at 
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0ms
-1
 for the other half. Although the average wind speed at site B is 15ms
-1
, the wind 
turbine does not work at all at either velocity. These two extreme situations are both 
unrealistic, but emphasise the importance of wind speed distribution. 
4.1. Data 
The historical British on-shore wind speed data is the input for our statistical models. Two 
main data sets are used here. One is the hourly wind speed data from 144 wind speed 
observation sites of the Met Office at 2008
22
. Another data set is the operational on-shore 
wind farms from the British Wind Energy Association (BWEA).  The wind speed data I 
have used was observed for each hour during 2008. There might have been yearly 
variations in wind speed. Table 4.2 displays the location and name for each site. These 10 
sites are chosen from the group of 144 wind speed observation sites to provide a reasonable 
spread across the UK. There is no specific issue, other than volume of results, from 
extending the number of sites. 
Table 4.2. Names and locations of 10 sample sites.  
Srcid Srcname Postcode latitude longitude 
48 KINBRACE, HATCHERY KW11 6 58.231 -3.921 
212 STRATHALLAN AIRFIELD PH3 1 56.326 -3.729 
326 DURHAM DH1 4 54.768 -1.585 
1006 PRESTWICK NO 2 KA9 2 55.501 -4.584 
1190 LAKE VYRNWY NO 2 SY10 0 52.757 -3.464 
1346 CHIVENOR EX31 4 51.089 -4.149 
1395 CAMBORNE TR14 0 50.218 -5.33 
16581 ROSEHEARTY AB43 4 57.698 -2.121 
16725 WAINFLEET NO 2 PE24 4 53.088 0.274 
18930 MILDENHALL NO 2 IP27 9 52.388 0.535 
Source: Met Office 
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4.2. Overview of methodologies 
This section describes how I have modelled wind speed taking all the ten sites together. 
Figure 4.5 is the histogram of average hourly wind speed during the year at each site. This 
shows the percentage distribution of each wind speed level for the ten sites. There are four 
sites which experienced a relatively high number of ―quiet hours‖ when wind speed is zero. 
They are site 212, site 1006, site 1190, and site 18930. These histograms show how wind 
speeds vary at each site. It is clear that the average hourly wind speed is non-normally 
distributed. Specifically, they often have fatter tails than a normal distribution. 
Figure 4.5. Histogram of wind speeds for 10 sites. 
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Site No. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
48 7.791334 5.512322 30.38569 0.812073 3.436035 
212 6.173839 5.556225 30.87163 0.764986 3.245261 
326 6.750228 4.664167 21.75445 1.257541 4.811117 
1006 7.894725 6.330774 40.0787 0.842515 3.50721 
1190 8.812045 6.857279 47.02228 0.945649 3.843393 
1346 10.98838 6.24153 38.9567 0.695004 3.137491 
1395 10.52188 5.426912 29.45137 0.592071 3.092658 
16581 13.03136 7.375889 54.40373 0.832484 3.600254 
16725 11.60987 5.868366 34.43772 0.695947 3.462022 
18930 8.673424 5.228178 27.33384 0.553968 3.372335 
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The Weibull distribution is a commonly used distribution for modelling wind speed, and is 
a continuous probability distribution. We can use this to model wind speed distribution at 
each location independently. It is currently beyond existing statistical capabilities to jointly 
model a number of wind farms with the Weibull distribution, because the multivariate 
Weibull is not commonly available in statistical packages. 
The usual Weibull distribution is independent of the sequence of observations. So if the 
order of observations changed there will be no effects on the estimated parameters. Thus 
there is no possibility of modelling autocorrelation with this distribution. There are no 
commonly available algorithms to model an autocorrelated wind speed pattern using the 
Weibull distribution.  
At the point when the stack model takes account of the order of wind speed data, time 
series models analysis come into play. By using only information on the past wind speed 
and the error term, univariate time series models are constructed. The ARMA 
(Autoregressive Moving Average) family of models are well known and widely used to 
model the time series of wind speed at one location or observation site. The downside of 
using an ARMA model is that its error term is assumed to be normally distributed with a 
zero mean, constant variance, and zero autocorrelation, which may not be appropriate, 
given that the Weibull formulation appears superior to the normal for modelling wind 
speeds. 
GARCH (Generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity) models are used to 
detect non-linear behaviour or volatilities in the wind speed time series. It allows the 
conditional variances of the error term to be dependent on past own lags. GARCH type 
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model also allow for a period of high or low volatility in wind speed. GARCH models can 
only be used for individual locations and also assume a normally distributed error term. 
Some of these models have been applied to single wind farms. However, the comparison 
between different models has not previously been performed and no one has modelled 
wind farms jointly with a Vector Autoregression (VAR) model. VAR models 
simultaneously estimate the correlation of wind speed data from many different sites. VAR 
is a multiple- time series generalisation of AR models. It helps us to model correlations of 
wind speed for a wind farm portfolio. Thus energy companies or investors can predict the 
wind energy output for a combination of wind farms in order to reduce the systematic risk. 
The following sections will discuss and describe these models in detail. 
4.3. Modelling wind speed at a single site with the Weibull probability distribution 
The wind turbine manufacturers and energy companies use the Weibull distribution to 
assist them in selecting a wind turbine with the ‗optimal cut-in speed and cut-out speed‘23.  
This is because the wind speed distribution describes ‗the amount of hours on a particular 
site where the wind speed levels fluctuate‘24.  
The two parameter Weibull distribution is the most widely used and cited mathematical 
expression to describe the wind speed probability distribution and other renewable energy 
sources, such as solar. The Rayleigh and Weibull distribution on wind energy has been 
used since the 1970s (Justus 1978).  
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 http://www.reuk.co.uk/print.php?article=Wind-Speed-Distribution-Weibull.htm 
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 http://www.wind-energy-the-facts.org/en/part-i-technology/chapter-2-wind-resource-
estimation/local-wind-resource-assessment-and-energy-analysis/the-annual-variability-of-
wind-speed.html 
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4.3.1. Two parameter-Weibull distribution formulation 
In the notation of Justus at el., the Weibull probability distribution function with two 
parameters, the shape factor k (dimensionless) and the scale factor c (m/s) is: 
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The scale factor c is closely related to the mean wind speed v , and they indicate how 
windy the site is on average.  The shape factor k measures the width of the distribution. The 
peaked or positive kurtosis distribution means that the wind speeds tend to be very close to 
a certain value. Furthermore, the Weibull distribution allows ‗satisfactory estimates of the 
skewness of the wind speed distribution, if the Weibull distribution has a shape parameter k, 
then the distribution of the cubed speed also follows a Weibull distribution‘ (Celik 2003).  
As summarised in Patel (2006), the Weibull distribution with k=1 is called exponential 
distribution, which is usually used in reliability studies. For k > 3, it approaches the normal 
distribution. Figure 4.6 is an example of plot of the Weibull distribution for k=1, 2 and 3 
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when the scale factor c is 10. The curve with k=2 is the typical wind speed distribution 
found in most sites. 
Figure 4.6. The Weibull probability distribution function with scale factor c=10m/s, and shape factor k 
= 1, 2 and 3. 
 
Source: Page35, Figure 3.7 Patel (2006) 
 
In Northern Europe and most other locations around the world, the value of shape factor k 
is approximately 2
25
. If the shape parameter k equals 2, the Weibull distribution is known 
as a Rayleigh distribution. 
When
c
1
 , formula (1.1) is:  
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4.3.2. Parameter estimation 
Daily and monthly patterns of variations or seasonality of wind speeds distribution could 
be measured by using the Weibull distribution. The daily effect can be detected using 23 
hour dummy variables. The fit of two parameter- Weibull distribution indicates that hourly 
average wind speed is larger during the daytime between 9am to 7pm than compared to the 
hourly average wind speed during the night. Table 4.3 shows analysis of the results for the 
two-parameter Weibull fit with hourly dummy variables for site326.  
Then                
  
      , where  
    is the hourly dummy variable.  jd is the hour of the day. 
yt is the wind speed.  
   follows the Weibull distribution vt ~ W(c,k), 
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The windiest time of day is usually 1-2pm, and this also happens to be the period of peak 
electricity demand. The coefficients of hourly dummy variables for the peak time periods 
are significant for comparing test statistics with critical values.  
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Figure 4.7 plots the scale factors from the modelling result in Table 4.3. The value of the 
scale factor peaks in hours from 11 to 15 and then falls again. The wind speed peaks in the 
middle of the day due to the sun activity. The sun provides the atmosphere with energy and 
this energy translates into wind. Therefore the wind speed is highest when the sun is 
highest rather than during evening hours. 
Table 4.3 Two-parameter Weibull fit with hourly dummy variables for site 326. 
 
ML fit of two-parameter Weibull distribution      Number of obs   =       8600 
                                                  Wald chi2(23)   =     268.48 
Log likelihood = -23770.637                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
c            | 
 _Ihour326_1 |   .1635047   .3593513     0.45   0.649    -.5408109    .8678203 
 _Ihour326_2 |   .0026743   .3591425     0.01   0.994     -.701232    .7065807 
 _Ihour326_3 |   .0212601   .3606678     0.06   0.953    -.6856359    .7281561 
 _Ihour326_4 |   .0031517   .3600079     0.01   0.993    -.7024508    .7087543 
 _Ihour326_5 |   .0394524    .360643     0.11   0.913    -.6673949    .7462997 
 _Ihour326_6 |   .1611251   .3635424     0.44   0.658    -.5514049    .8736552 
 _Ihour326_7 |   .4785208   .3693272     1.30   0.195    -.2453471    1.202389 
 _Ihour326_8 |    .661085   .3700218     1.79   0.074    -.0641444    1.386314 
 _Ihour326_9 |   1.190805   .3712973     3.21   0.001     .4630757    1.918534 
_Ihour326_10 |   1.860669   .3753601     4.96   0.000     1.124976    2.596361 
_Ihour326_11 |   2.127693   .3809217     5.59   0.000     1.381101    2.874286 
_Ihour326_12 |   2.409577   .3876957     6.22   0.000     1.649708    3.169447 
_Ihour326_13 |   2.543353   .3841058     6.62   0.000      1.79052    3.296187 
_Ihour326_14 |   2.339932   .3826258     6.12   0.000         1.59    3.089865 
_Ihour326_15 |    2.12016   .3704921     5.72   0.000     1.394008    2.846311 
_Ihour326_16 |   1.616845   .3607919     4.48   0.000     .9097056    2.323984 
_Ihour326_17 |   1.413076   .3652598     3.87   0.000       .69718    2.128972 
_Ihour326_18 |   .7501541   .3629291     2.07   0.039      .038826    1.461482 
_Ihour326_19 |   .6413446   .3655469     1.75   0.079    -.0751141    1.357803 
_Ihour326_20 |    .192088   .3587798     0.54   0.592    -.5111076    .8952835 
_Ihour326_21 |  -.0039742   .3538527    -0.01   0.991    -.6975127    .6895643 
_Ihour326_22 |   .0092434   .3562012     0.03   0.979    -.6888981    .7073849 
_Ihour326_23 |  -.0190643    .346346    -0.06   0.956    -.6978899    .6597614 
       _cons |   6.846048   .2504898    27.33   0.000     6.355097       7.337 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
k            | 
 _Ihour326_1 |  -.0071226   .0853242    -0.08   0.933     -.174355    .1601098 
 _Ihour326_2 |  -.0427396   .0843084    -0.51   0.612    -.2079809    .1225017 
 _Ihour326_3 |  -.0535456   .0840024    -0.64   0.524    -.2181872     .111096 
 _Ihour326_4 |  -.0445177   .0847405    -0.53   0.599    -.2106061    .1215707 
 _Ihour326_5 |  -.0374944   .0852657    -0.44   0.660     -.204612    .1296233 
 _Ihour326_6 |  -.0388465   .0852313    -0.46   0.649    -.2058968    .1282038 
 _Ihour326_7 |  -.0177045   .0862232    -0.21   0.837    -.1866989      .15129 
 _Ihour326_8 |   .0080082   .0872488     0.09   0.927    -.1629963    .1790128 
 _Ihour326_9 |   .1077033   .0903976     1.19   0.233    -.0694729    .2848794 
_Ihour326_10 |   .2141527   .0934364     2.29   0.022     .0310207    .3972846 
_Ihour326_11 |   .2101488   .0935365     2.25   0.025     .0268206    .3934769 
_Ihour326_12 |   .2075126   .0930595     2.23   0.026     .0251193    .3899059 
_Ihour326_13 |   .2602008   .0944757     2.75   0.006     .0750319    .4453697 
_Ihour326_14 |   .2335819   .0928917     2.51   0.012     .0515175    .4156462 
_Ihour326_15 |   .2912704   .0940728     3.10   0.002     .1068911    .4756496 
_Ihour326_16 |   .2774263   .0942722     2.94   0.003     .0926561    .4621964 
_Ihour326_17 |   .1933592   .0917973     2.11   0.035     .0134397    .3732786 
_Ihour326_18 |   .0805879   .0880976     0.91   0.360    -.0920802     .253256 
_Ihour326_19 |   .0322129   .0863593     0.37   0.709    -.1370481     .201474 
_Ihour326_20 |  -.0057461   .0857132    -0.07   0.947    -.1737409    .1622488 
_Ihour326_21 |  -.0072174   .0854415    -0.08   0.933    -.1746796    .1602447 
_Ihour326_22 |   -.008468   .0857711    -0.10   0.921    -.1765763    .1596402 
_Ihour326_23 |   .0664164   .0876177     0.76   0.448    -.1053112     .238144 
       _cons |   1.532971   .0611743    25.06   0.000     1.413072    1.652871 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Figure 4.7 Scale factor with hourly dummy variables for site326. 
 
 
Table 4.4 shows the estimated Weibull parameters with monthly dummy variables for 
site326.                
  
   ,  
where      is the monthly dummy variable.  lm is the month of the year. 
yt is the wind speed.  
vt ~ W(c,k) 
The average wind speed is higher in winter months than in summer months. It shows the 
weather is windier in January than December. The windiest months are February and 
March, but the test statistics for the coefficients of the dummy variables for these two 
months are less significant than for other months.  
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Figure 4.8 Scale factors with monthly dummy variables for site326. 
 
Figure 4.8 plots the monthly effect of wind speed at site326 based on the coefficients from 
Table 4.4. It shows that January, February, and March are the windiest months during the 
year at site326. The recent wintry weather in Britain was wet, snowy, and windy, which 
may have affected the operation of wind turbines. However, I have not discussed this topic 
in this study due to a shortage of relevant information. 
 
Table 4.4. Two-parameter Weibull fit with monthly dummy variables for site326. 
 
ML fit of two-parameter Weibull distribution      Number of obs   =       8600 
                                                  Wald chi2(11)   =    2515.02 
Log likelihood = -22660.917                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
c            | 
_Imonth326_2 |  -.7206997   .3446157    -2.09   0.036    -1.396134   -.0452653 
_Imonth326_3 |   .6509834   .3166437     2.06   0.040     .0303731    1.271594 
_Imonth326_4 |   -3.15635   .2878172   -10.97   0.000    -3.720461   -2.592239 
_Imonth326_5 |  -6.297993   .2522627   -24.97   0.000    -6.792419   -5.803568 
_Imonth326_6 |  -5.348439   .2732355   -19.57   0.000    -5.883971   -4.812907 
_Imonth326_7 |  -6.141723   .2580835   -23.80   0.000    -6.647558   -5.635889 
_Imonth326_8 |  -5.552348   .2646549   -20.98   0.000    -6.071062   -5.033634 
_Imonth326_9 |  -5.875477   .2577279   -22.80   0.000    -6.380614   -5.370339 
_Imonth32~10 |  -2.318278    .294596    -7.87   0.000    -2.895675    -1.74088 
_Imonth32~11 |  -2.235534   .3009696    -7.43   0.000    -2.825424   -1.645644 
_Imonth32~12 |  -2.782125   .3110864    -8.94   0.000    -3.391844   -2.172407 
       _cons |   11.08507   .2355213    47.07   0.000     10.62345    11.54668 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
k 
_Imonth326_2 |   -.146495    .071708    -2.04   0.041      -.28704     -.00595 
_Imonth326_3 |    .328236   .0796728     4.12   0.000     .1720803    .4843917 
_Imonth326_4 |   .0842915   .0744431     1.13   0.258    -.0616143    .2301973 
_Imonth326_5 |   .2300492    .075862     3.03   0.002     .0813623    .3787361 
_Imonth326_6 |  -.1761036   .0696726    -2.53   0.011    -.3126594   -.0395477 
_Imonth326_7 |  -.0039325   .0731894    -0.05   0.957     -.147381     .139516 
_Imonth326_8 |  -.0369142   .0719579    -0.51   0.608     -.177949    .1041207 
_Imonth326_9 |   .1566728   .0765064     2.05   0.041      .006723    .3066226 
_Imonth32~10 |   .0944208   .0738632     1.28   0.201    -.0503484      .23919 
_Imonth32~11 |   .0392154   .0760471     0.52   0.606    -.1098342    .1882651 
_Imonth32~12 |  -.1553563   .0716266    -2.17   0.030    -.2957418   -.0149709 
       _cons |   1.825581   .0515326    35.43   0.000     1.724579    1.926583 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Figure 4.9 presents the general annual pattern of wind speed distribution and estimated 
Weibull factors for the 10 sample sites. The values of two parameters for Weibull 
distribution are estimated by STATA10. The graphs of Weibull distributions are created 
using a Weibull distribution plotter programme
26
, based on the estimated parameters. 
Figure 4.9 shows that the annual Weibull distributions of wind speeds are skewed. Certain 
sites have occasionally experienced very high wind speeds but this was very rare. Moderate 
wind speeds occurred with larger frequency. However, the calculation and plot of the 
Weibull distribution omitted the data when wind speed is zero. Therefore the scale factor or 
average wind speed may be overestimated. The value of estimated shape factors (k) are 
between 1 and 3. The Weibull distribution model can be extended to all British wind speed 
observation sites. 
Figure 4.9. Weibull fit for 10 sites and their estimated Weibull factors. 
 
 
                 
 
 
 
                                               
26
 http://www.windpower.org/en/tour/wres/weibull/index.htm 
Site48 Location: Kinbrace, Hatchery 
Weibull factor: c= 8.86 
                         k = 1.49 
 
Site212 Location: Strathallan Airfield 
Weibull factor: c= 9.498 
                         k = 1.827 
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        Site326 Location: Durham 
        Weibull factor: c= 7.706 
                         k = 1.586 
 
Site1006 Location: Prestwck No.2 
 Weibull factor: c= 10.444 
                         k = 1.673 
 
Site1190 Location: Blackpool 
Weibull factor: c= 11.253 
                         k = 1.64 
 
Site1364 Location: Totnes No2 
Weibull factor: c= 12.432 
                         k = 1.851 
 
Site1395 Location: Camborne  
Weibull factor: c= 11.926 
                         k = 2.059 
 
Site16581 Location: Rosehearty  
Weibull factor: c= 14.717 
                         k = 1.856 
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4.3.3 Disadvantages of the Weibull distribution 
The Weibull distribution could be used to describe the hourly, daily, and monthly patterns 
of wind speeds variations. However, it does not take into account the correlation between 
neighbouring wind farms and it excludes any form of autocorrelation. Another 
disadvantage of this estimated Weibull distribution is that the model omits observations 
when wind speed is zero. Table 4.5 (a) and (b) show the two-parameter Weibull fit with 
hourly and monthly dummy variables for site212 and site326. The estimated average wind 
speed or scale factor c for site212 (10.62) is greater than the estimated value for site326 
(10.18). However, site212 actually experiences more quiet hours than site48 (see Figure 
4.5). In this case the Weibull distribution alone is insufficient to draw the conclusion that 
wind energy output from site 212 will be greater than the output from site48. 
 
 
Site16725 Location: Wainfleet No2  
Weibull factor: c= 13.177 
                         k = 2.111 
 
Site18930 Location: Mildenhall No2 
Weibull factor: c= 10.733 
                         k = 2.140 
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Table 4.5(a). Two-parameter Weibull fit with hourly and monthly dummy variables for site212 and 326 
 
ML fit of two-parameter Weibull distribution      Number of obs   =       6429 
                                                  Wald chi2(34)   =    1246.00 
Log likelihood = -18031.276                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
c            | 
 _Ihour212_1 |  -.2691127   .4075091    -0.66   0.509    -1.067816    .5295905 
 _Ihour212_2 |  -.0009113   .4098907    -0.00   0.998    -.8042823    .8024596 
 _Ihour212_3 |   .1755322   .4228836     0.42   0.678    -.6533044    1.004369 
 _Ihour212_4 |   .2040729   .4336293     0.47   0.638    -.6458248    1.053971 
 _Ihour212_5 |   .3205954   .4184916     0.77   0.444    -.4996331    1.140824 
 _Ihour212_6 |   .4863865    .406614     1.20   0.232    -.3105622    1.283335 
 _Ihour212_7 |    .171603   .4127134     0.42   0.678    -.6373004    .9805064 
 _Ihour212_8 |    .814851   .3970365     2.05   0.040     .0366737    1.593028 
 _Ihour212_9 |   1.308383   .4066989     3.22   0.001     .5112674    2.105498 
_Ihour212_10 |   1.717747   .4045806     4.25   0.000     .9247839    2.510711 
_Ihour212_11 |   1.708301   .3973821     4.30   0.000     .9294466    2.487156 
_Ihour212_12 |   2.126071   .3916415     5.43   0.000     1.358468    2.893674 
_Ihour212_13 |   2.224185   .3968924     5.60   0.000      1.44629     3.00208 
_Ihour212_14 |   2.614831   .3965384     6.59   0.000      1.83763    3.392032 
_Ihour212_15 |   2.577117   .3850786     6.69   0.000     1.822377    3.331857 
_Ihour212_16 |   2.151757   .3856501     5.58   0.000     1.395897    2.907617 
_Ihour212_17 |   1.755297   .3880068     4.52   0.000      .994818    2.515777 
_Ihour212_18 |   1.515751   .3840962     3.95   0.000     .7629364    2.268566 
_Ihour212_19 |   .7023202   .3792724     1.85   0.064      -.04104     1.44568 
_Ihour212_20 |   .2026974   .3772773     0.54   0.591    -.5367526    .9421474 
_Ihour212_21 |   -.145291   .3830948    -0.38   0.704    -.8961431     .605561 
_Ihour212_22 |  -.3382198   .3959934    -0.85   0.393    -1.114353     .437913 
_Ihour212_23 |  -.1045964   .4039328    -0.26   0.796    -.8962902    .6870974 
_Imonth212_2 |   1.176409   .4238598     2.78   0.006     .3456593    2.007159 
_Imonth212_3 |  -.7153899   .3515376    -2.04   0.042    -1.404391   -.0263888 
_Imonth212_4 |   -2.99816   .3370724    -8.89   0.000    -3.658809    -2.33751 
_Imonth212_5 |  -4.899843   .3157021   -15.52   0.000    -5.518608   -4.281078 
_Imonth212_6 |  -2.836176   .3372671    -8.41   0.000    -3.497207   -2.175144 
_Imonth212_7 |   -3.71473   .3279941   -11.33   0.000    -4.357587   -3.071874 
_Imonth212_8 |  -4.221478   .3378932   -12.49   0.000    -4.883736   -3.559219 
_Imonth212_9 |  -4.753882   .3479691   -13.66   0.000    -5.435889   -4.071875 
_Imonth21~10 |  -1.482391   .3462539    -4.28   0.000    -2.161036   -.8037458 
_Imonth21~11 |  -.2820482   .3863519    -0.73   0.465    -1.039284    .4751875 
_Imonth21~12 |  -1.672979   .4352185    -3.84   0.000    -2.525992   -.8199667 
       _cons |   10.62385   .4063349    26.15   0.000     9.827445    11.42025 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
k            | 
 _Ihour212_1 |  -.0296754   .1315844    -0.23   0.822    -.2875761    .2282254 
 _Ihour212_2 |   .0200576   .1358684     0.15   0.883    -.2462396    .2863548 
 _Ihour212_3 |  -.0138539   .1365292    -0.10   0.919    -.2814461    .2537384 
 _Ihour212_4 |  -.1162392   .1315426    -0.88   0.377    -.3740579    .1415795 
 _Ihour212_5 |   .0462582   .1366416     0.34   0.735    -.2215544    .3140708 
 _Ihour212_6 |   .2039386   .1432673     1.42   0.155    -.0768602    .4847374 
 _Ihour212_7 |   -.102842   .1295927    -0.79   0.427    -.3568391    .1511551 
 _Ihour212_8 |   .1662893    .140411     1.18   0.236    -.1089111    .4414897 
 _Ihour212_9 |   .0886128   .1356028     0.65   0.513    -.1771638    .3543894 
_Ihour212_10 |   .1352031   .1349175     1.00   0.316    -.1292303    .3996366 
_Ihour212_11 |   .1454593   .1340201     1.09   0.278    -.1172152    .4081338 
_Ihour212_12 |   .2739294    .136408     2.01   0.045     .0065747    .5412841 
_Ihour212_13 |    .200734   .1322738     1.52   0.129    -.0585179    .4599859 
_Ihour212_14 |   .2956208   .1359363     2.17   0.030     .0291907     .562051 
_Ihour212_15 |   .4728601   .1429543     3.31   0.001     .1926749    .7530453 
_Ihour212_16 |   .3424225   .1382656     2.48   0.013     .0714269     .613418 
_Ihour212_17 |   .2358714   .1358691     1.74   0.083    -.0304271    .5021699 
_Ihour212_18 |    .282942    .137925     2.05   0.040      .012614      .55327 
_Ihour212_19 |    .178467   .1349586     1.32   0.186    -.0860469     .442981 
_Ihour212_20 |   .1466927   .1337651     1.10   0.273    -.1154821    .4088674 
_Ihour212_21 |   .0638659   .1334988     0.48   0.632     -.197787    .3255187 
_Ihour212_22 |    .000521   .1338266     0.00   0.997    -.2617744    .2628164 
_Ihour212_23 |   .0755209   .1374006     0.55   0.583    -.1937793    .3448212 
_Imonth212_2 |   .1265391   .0879525     1.44   0.150    -.0458447    .2989228 
_Imonth212_3 |    .453746    .089747     5.06   0.000     .2778451    .6296469 
_Imonth212_4 |   .4343051    .094878     4.58   0.000     .2483476    .6202626 
_Imonth212_5 |   .6598491   .1036004     6.37   0.000     .4567962    .8629021 
_Imonth212_6 |   .5062698    .097728     5.18   0.000     .3147264    .6978133 
_Imonth212_7 |   .3925121   .0914748     4.29   0.000     .2132247    .5717994 
_Imonth212_8 |   .2108141   .0917357     2.30   0.022     .0310153    .3906128 
_Imonth212_9 |  -.0498212   .0867287    -0.57   0.566    -.2198063     .120164 
_Imonth21~10 |   .3902003   .0876793     4.45   0.000     .2183522    .5620485 
_Imonth21~11 |   .3624478   .0997327     3.63   0.000     .1669753    .5579204 
_Imonth21~12 |  -.2434089   .0812458    -3.00   0.003    -.4026477   -.0841701 
       _cons |   1.647021   .1087171    15.15   0.000      1.43394    1.860103 
 
Table 4.5(b). Two-parameter Weibull fit with hourly and monthly dummy variables for site212 and 
326 
 
ML fit of two-parameter Weibull distribution      Number of obs   =       8600 
                                                  Wald chi2(34)   =    3572.77 
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Log likelihood = -22350.273                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
c            | 
 _Ihour326_1 |   .1110596   .2245147     0.49   0.621    -.3289812    .5511004 
 _Ihour326_2 |  -.0407133   .2241438    -0.18   0.856    -.4800271    .3986005 
 _Ihour326_3 |    .034066   .2250783     0.15   0.880    -.4070793    .4752114 
 _Ihour326_4 |   .1247718   .2284561     0.55   0.585    -.3229939    .5725375 
 _Ihour326_5 |   .1123967   .2282279     0.49   0.622    -.3349218    .5597152 
 _Ihour326_6 |   .1917777   .2321495     0.83   0.409    -.2632271    .6467824 
 _Ihour326_7 |   .4997241   .2398489     2.08   0.037     .0296288    .9698194 
 _Ihour326_8 |   .8154335    .246377     3.31   0.001     .3325434    1.298324 
 _Ihour326_9 |    1.43575   .2539973     5.65   0.000     .9379242    1.933575 
_Ihour326_10 |   1.907379   .2580551     7.39   0.000       1.4016    2.413158 
_Ihour326_11 |   2.252225   .2665529     8.45   0.000     1.729791    2.774659 
_Ihour326_12 |   2.556788   .2753612     9.29   0.000      2.01709    3.096487 
_Ihour326_13 |   2.623745   .2741383     9.57   0.000     2.086443    3.161046 
_Ihour326_14 |   2.454707   .2717702     9.03   0.000     1.922047    2.987367 
_Ihour326_15 |   2.399624   .2655317     9.04   0.000     1.879192    2.920057 
_Ihour326_16 |   1.980677   .2561336     7.73   0.000     1.478664    2.482689 
_Ihour326_17 |    1.70127   .2554523     6.66   0.000     1.200593    2.201948 
_Ihour326_18 |   1.112167   .2508704     4.43   0.000     .6204705    1.603864 
_Ihour326_19 |   .6323376   .2393392     2.64   0.008     .1632415    1.101434 
_Ihour326_20 |   .1412666   .2289574     0.62   0.537    -.3074816    .5900148 
_Ihour326_21 |  -.0274125   .2217528    -0.12   0.902      -.46204    .4072151 
_Ihour326_22 |   .1390883   .2297602     0.61   0.545    -.3112335    .5894101 
_Ihour326_23 |   .0749255    .217876     0.34   0.731    -.3521036    .5019546 
_Imonth326_2 |  -.7879225   .3401457    -2.32   0.021    -1.454596   -.1212492 
_Imonth326_3 |   .5912243   .3154517     1.87   0.061    -.0270497    1.209498 
_Imonth326_4 |  -3.289263    .283134   -11.62   0.000    -3.844195    -2.73433 
_Imonth326_5 |  -6.411011   .2482087   -25.83   0.000    -6.897491   -5.924531 
_Imonth326_6 |  -5.457854   .2675623   -20.40   0.000    -5.982267   -4.933442 
_Imonth326_7 |  -6.252665   .2528982   -24.72   0.000    -6.748336   -5.756993 
_Imonth326_8 |  -5.629386   .2603396   -21.62   0.000    -6.139642    -5.11913 
_Imonth326_9 |  -5.865072   .2550024   -23.00   0.000    -6.364867   -5.365276 
_Imonth32~10 |  -2.447348   .2891454    -8.46   0.000    -3.014063   -1.880634 
_Imonth32~11 |   -2.19708   .3007318    -7.31   0.000    -2.786504   -1.607657 
_Imonth32~12 |   -2.71184   .3128046    -8.67   0.000    -3.324925   -2.098754 
       _cons |   10.18111   .2817483    36.14   0.000     9.628893    10.73333 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
k            | 
 _Ihour326_1 |   .0143824   .1068803     0.13   0.893    -.1950992    .2238639 
 _Ihour326_2 |  -.0437294   .1051933    -0.42   0.678    -.2499045    .1624458 
 _Ihour326_3 |  -.0533617   .1052762    -0.51   0.612    -.2596993     .152976 
 _Ihour326_4 |  -.0768948   .1055898    -0.73   0.466    -.2838471    .1300574 
 _Ihour326_5 |  -.0630506   .1061259    -0.59   0.552    -.2710536    .1449524 
 _Ihour326_6 |  -.0819698   .1054766    -0.78   0.437    -.2887002    .1247606 
 _Ihour326_7 |  -.0767163   .1062571    -0.72   0.470    -.2849763    .1315437 
 _Ihour326_8 |  -.0861769   .1068048    -0.81   0.420    -.2955105    .1231568 
 _Ihour326_9 |   .0012178   .1101226     0.01   0.991    -.2146185     .217054 
_Ihour326_10 |   .1479007   .1132616     1.31   0.192    -.0740879    .3698893 
_Ihour326_11 |   .1084535   .1126551     0.96   0.336    -.1123465    .3292536 
_Ihour326_12 |   .0847862    .111485     0.76   0.447    -.1337203    .3032927 
_Ihour326_13 |    .131911   .1124008     1.17   0.241    -.0883905    .3522124 
_Ihour326_14 |   .1104446   .1109725     1.00   0.320    -.1070575    .3279467 
_Ihour326_15 |   .1372659   .1113876     1.23   0.218    -.0810498    .3555816 
_Ihour326_16 |   .1223467   .1123605     1.09   0.276    -.0978758    .3425692 
_Ihour326_17 |   .0505334   .1100543     0.46   0.646     -.165169    .2662358 
_Ihour326_18 |  -.0806095   .1056297    -0.76   0.445    -.2876398    .1264209 
_Ihour326_19 |  -.0295247   .1053612    -0.28   0.779    -.2360288    .1769794 
_Ihour326_20 |  -.0444441   .1049637    -0.42   0.672    -.2501692    .1612811 
_Ihour326_21 |  -.0025082    .106369    -0.02   0.981    -.2109876    .2059713 
_Ihour326_22 |  -.0860963   .1043909    -0.82   0.410    -.2906986     .118506 
_Ihour326_23 |   .0930974   .1096709     0.85   0.396    -.1218537    .3080485 
_Imonth326_2 |  -.1042698   .0720406    -1.45   0.148    -.2454668    .0369272 
_Imonth326_3 |    .343005   .0790336     4.34   0.000      .188102     .497908 
_Imonth326_4 |   .1652743   .0751149     2.20   0.028     .0180518    .3124968 
_Imonth326_5 |   .4660302   .0804392     5.79   0.000     .3083723     .623688 
_Imonth326_6 |  -.0598661   .0715964    -0.84   0.403    -.2001925    .0804602 
_Imonth326_7 |    .195116   .0775507     2.52   0.012     .0431193    .3471126 
_Imonth326_8 |   .0737054   .0735637     1.00   0.316    -.0704767    .2178876 
_Imonth326_9 |   .2395739   .0777815     3.08   0.002      .087125    .3920227 
_Imonth32~10 |   .1917406   .0754197     2.54   0.011     .0439208    .3395604 
_Imonth32~11 |   .0383284   .0753608     0.51   0.611     -.109376    .1860328 
_Imonth32~12 |  -.1784471    .070659    -2.53   0.012    -.3169363   -.0399579 
       _cons |   1.807827   .0906653    19.94   0.000     1.630126    1.985527 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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4.4. Time series modelling 
The Weibull distribution calculates the frequency distribution of the wind speed in 
individual wind farms. For each site the hourly time series wind speed data is considered 
―independent‖ by the Weibull distribution. Nevertheless, short-term wind speed time series 
―is of high dependence‖ (Aksoy et al. 2004). The time series properties of wind speed 
provide another way of attempting to understand their variation. 
Both the speed and direction of wind could be predicted by using physical or 
meteorological information, such as descriptions of orography, roughness, obstacles, and 
meteo (Lei et al. 2009). However, in the short term the physical or meteorological 
conditions may be best understood by looking at the recent history rather than having a 
model that treats the past as irrelevant for forecasting the present. For this reason the time 
series analysis tools could be used to model the wind speed from historical wind speed data 
for individual sites.  
4.4.1 Univariate time series--ARMA models 
ARMA models are used to capture the persistent effects within time series. Modelling with 
the ARMA process will enable us to decide the correlation of current hourly wind speed 
with the wind speed of a few hours ago. 
4.4.1.1 ARMA model formulation 
In Table 4.6, where 
tu is a random process with zero mean and constant variance
2 . 
i 1  are autoregressive coefficients which quantify the dependence of wind speed ty on 
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its past values 
itt yy  1 . Autoregressive of order p means that the current value of y 
depends on past values in a process with p lags. ARMA model helps us to determine 
whether there is significant inertia within the British hourly wind speed time series. For this 
type of modelling, unlike the Weibull case, the order of the observations is critical. 
The ARMA model (Box & Jenkins 1976) has been widely used by researchers to predict 
the hourly average wind speed time series. Torres et al. used the ARMA model to predict 
the hourly average wind speed up to 10 hours in advance for five locations in Spain (Torres 
et al. 2005 ). They found that the errors with ARMA models for modelling 10 hours in 
advance are between 12% and 20% smaller than with the persistence model. The 
―persistence model‖ implies that the average wind speed forecast for the next hour is 
simply equal to the average wind speed for the current hour (Kavasseri & Seetharaman 
20009). Daniel and Chen have made forecasts for 1 to 6 hours in advance. They detected a 
deterioration of the results when the forecast was made for a period more than 2 hours in 
advance when applying the ARMA model to three years time series data in Jamaica 
(Daniel & Chen 1991).  
In addition, Aksoy et al. (2004) used four years of hourly wind speed data from one 
meteorology station in Diyarbakir, a south-eastern Anatolian city, to compare the predicted 
performance of the different models. They found the second-order autoregressive AR(2) 
model is preferred to AR(1). Similarly, Nfaoui et al. (1996) determined that an AR(2) 
model is capable of more accurately simulating the wind speed series for one location. 
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Moreover, there are several other types of time series models based on ARMA models. 
Kavasseri and Seetharaman examined the use of fractional-ARIMA or f-ARIMA models to 
model and forecast wind speeds on the one-day-ahead and two-days-ahead horizons by 
using the wind speed time series from four potential wind generation sites in North Dakota. 
The f-ARIMA process is characterised by a slow decay in its autocorrelation function 
compared with a standard ARIMA process. They suggested that the f-ARIMA model is the 
most appropriate for modelling both short term and long term wind speed, and is able to 
improve the accuracy of forecasting by an average of 42% when compared with the 
persistence method (Kavasseri & Seetharaman 20009). 
Table 4.6 ARMA Model Specification 
 
An autoregressive model of order p , denoted an AR ( p ), can be expressed as 


 
p
i
titit uyy
1
                                            (2.1) (Brooks, 2002) 
 
A moving average model of order q  , denoted a MA( q ), can be expressed using 
sigma notation as  


 
q
i
titit uuy
1
                                             (2.2) (Brooks, 2002) 
 
tu is white noise disturbance term which is assumed to be normally distributed .  
Then the general ARMA ( qp, ) is in the form 
 
 
 
p
i
q
i
titiitit uuyy
1 1
                             (2.3) 
 
For forecasting wind speed, 
ty  is the value of wind speed at time t .  
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My aim is to identify the order of qp, for the ARMA model using British hourly wind 
speed data. In order to obtain appropriate estimators from ARMA, it is necessary to use 
stationary wind speed time series. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test is performed to 
identify whether or not the one year hourly wind speed time series data are stationary. The 
null hypothesis is that the variable contains a unit root, and the alternative is that the 
variable was generated by a stationary process. The Dickey-Fuller test results for unit root 
on site326 in Table 4.7 shows that the negative test statistic is less than critical value, thus 
the null hypotheses is rejected. The hourly wind speed time series is stationary. In addition, 
there is insufficient evidence to prove a trend, i.e. that this area is inevitably windier than 
previous short-term time periods.  Tests at the other sites show similar results. 
  
The Dickey-Fuller test allows us to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. In order to 
make the error term white noise, the test should include sufficient lags in the testing 
regression. Table 4.8 indicates that the test statistic t-ratio allows us to reject the null 
hypothesis of the second unit root. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.7. Dickey-Fuller test on site326 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =      8751 
 
---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
 
Z(t)            -22.444            -3.430            -2.860            -2.570 
 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 
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Some researchers believe that the wind speed experiences seasonality and cyclic behaviour. 
Torres et al. (2004) considered that the evolution of the hourly wind speed during the day is 
not stationary but exhibits cyclic behaviour. They raised each one of the observed hourly 
values to the same index to make the distribution approximately Gaussian. Their data set 
contained nine-year monthly data. However, our analysis covers hourly data over a period 
of one year. Therefore, I cannot check for the type of cyclical behaviour identified by 
Torres. However in the short term the physical or meteorological conditions won‘t change 
dramatically and may be best understood by looking at the recent history rather than having 
a model that treats the past as irrelevant for forecasting the present. For this reason the time 
series analysis tools could be used to model the wind speed from historical wind speed data 
for individual sites. Thus we believe 12 months hourly wind speed data is credible.   
4.4.1.2 Estimation of ARMA family models 
Table 4.9 is a list of a series estimated using ARMA models for the hourly wind speed at 
site326. I have used wind speed data for one random site to present the models. By 
Table 4.8. Augmented dickey-fuller test for unit root on site326 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =      8705 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)            -15.148            -3.960            -3.410            -3.120 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
D.nwinds~326 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
nwindspe~326 | 
         L1. |  -.0790723     .00522   -15.15   0.000    -.0893046   -.0688399 
         LD. |  -.2693882   .0111463   -24.17   0.000    -.2912375   -.2475389 
        L2D. |  -.0683067   .0114886    -5.95   0.000    -.0908271   -.0457864 
        L3D. |  -.0097763   .0114718    -0.85   0.394    -.0322638    .0127112 
        L4D. |   .0011186   .0113679     0.10   0.922    -.0211651    .0234022 
        L5D. |   .0065089   .0107323     0.61   0.544    -.0145288    .0275467 
      _trend |  -.0000286   8.84e-06    -3.23   0.001    -.0000459   -.0000113 
       _cons |   .6609792   .0617581    10.70   0.000     .5399186    .7820398 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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comparing the test statistics it is seen that the majority of coefficients of the models are 
statistically significant, except for ARMA (2,1) and ARMA(2,2). The significance of test 
statistics drops dramatically in these two models. 
tˆ  is a white noise process with zero 
mean and constant standard deviation ˆ  . 
Additional criteria have been used for model selection. The well known criteria are 
Akaike‘s Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike 1973) and Schwarz‘s Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC or SC) (Schwarz 1978). Both criteria are likelihood-based and represent a 
different trade-off between ‗fit‘, as measured by the ‗log likelihood‘ value, and by the 
number of free parameters, p+q+1 (Verbeek 2004). By measuring the AIC and BIC for this 
series of models we find that the ARMA(1,1) model has minimum AIC, and the ARMA(1 
24, 1) model has minimum BIC. The BIC criterion can be preferred on the basis that it has 
the property that ‗it will almost surely select the true model‘ (Verbeek 2004).  
Table 4.9 Estimated models for hourly wind speed on site326. 
 
 Estimated models Log 
likelihood 
AIC BIC 
AR(1) 
1
ˆ6.74 0.891t t ty y     
        (29.01)       (211.41)        ˆ 2.116   
   
-19008.23 38020.452 38034.609 
AR(2) 
1 2
ˆ6.737 0.669 0.249t t t ty y y       
      (22.44)          (85.62)               (31.42)          ˆ 2.049        
 
-18729.07 37464.141 37485.376 
 
AR(3) 
1 2 3
ˆ6.735 0.653 0.205 0.065t t t t ty y y y         
       (20.99)        (80.30)                  (21.19)                (7.53)          ˆ 2.045   
 
-18710.53 37429.061 37457.374 
AR 
(1,24) 1 24
ˆ6.729 0.868 0.051t t t ty y y       
            (21.57)        (191.71)             (10.37)            ˆ 2.105   
 
 
-18964.91 37935.811 37957.046 
ARMA 
(1,1) tttt yy  ˆˆ291.0974.0734.6 11    
           (20.37)         (281.12)             (-32.66)          ˆ 2.045   
 
-18710.7 37427.391 37448.626 
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ARMA 
(2,1) ttttt yyy  ˆˆ252.0039.0905.0734.6 121    
          (20.58)         (28.03)                 (1.35)                 (-7.88)     ˆ 2.045   
 
-18710.11 37428.222 37456.536 
ARMA 
(2,2) tttttt yyy  ˆˆ066.0ˆ474.0171.0127.1735.6 2121              
(20.61)         (1.69)                   (-0.27)              (-0.71)         (0.34)  ˆ 2.045   
-18710.04 37430.075 37465.468 
ARMA 
(1&24,
1) 
ttttt yyy  ˆˆ282.0219.0935.0772.6 1241    
           (16.16)       (246.30)               (6.06)                  (-30.98)            ˆ 2.041   
-18695.55 37427.421 37391.108 
 
 
Figure 4.10. Predicted hourly wind speed data for site326 
  
The ARMA(1,1) and ARMA(1& 24,1) models have been run using  the hourly wind speed 
data for site326 in January 2008. Figure 4.10 plots the predicted values or fitted values of 
two models and the real average hourly wind speed data. The plot line of the 
ARMA(1&24,1) model is overlapping on the line of the ARMA(1,1) model, although there 
are minor differences in predicted values. The horizontal axis of Mastcal on Figure 4.10 
represents the time series of hours from 1:00 1
st
 January to 23:00 31
st
 January in my 
STATA programme. However, the hourly wind speed data which I have used are supplied 
as integers which suggest the possibility of a small amount of measurement error. As 
0 
10 
20 
30 
420800 421000 421200 421400 421600 
MastCal 
Hourly Wind speed ARMA(1,1) prediction, one-step 
ARMA(1 24,1) prediction, one-step 
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indicated, these models can be applied to all wind farms or other sites to forecast the 
individual wind speed time series. A forecast would normally be carried out at least 1 hour 
and up to 24 hour in advance. In our model, the coefficients are statistically significant and 
indicate that wind speed is related to day-ahead wind speed and previous wind speed.  
 
Hourly and monthly dummy variables can be added into the ARMA models. Table 4.10 
shows the estimated coefficients for ARMA(1,1) with hourly dummy variables. It is 
windier between 10am to 5pm at site326. It is less windy in the early morning. Table 4.11 
shows the estimated coefficients for ARMA(1,1) with monthly dummy variables. Their 
values suggest that this site experiences stronger wind during the winter months. 
Figure 4.11 Monthly and hourly effect of wind speed at site326. 
 
Figure 4.11 plots the modelling results from ARMA(1,1) in Table 4.10 and Table 4.11. It 
shows similar monthly and hourly effects as that of the Weibull distribution.  
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Table 4.10 ARMA(1,1) with hourly dummy variables for site326 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.11 ARMA(1,1) with monthly dummy variables for site326. 
ARIMA regression 
 
Sample:  420769 - 429551, but with gaps         Number of obs      =      8764 
                                                Wald chi2(13)      =  68758.04 
Log likelihood = -18685.57                      Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ARIMA regression 
Sample:  420769 - 429551, but with gaps         Number of obs      =      8764 
                                                Wald chi2(25)      = 101066.68 
Log likelihood = -18587.26                      Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                 OPG 
nwindspe~326 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
nwindspe~326 | 
 _Ihour326_1 |   .1318477   .1203044     1.10   0.273    -.1039446      .36764 
 _Ihour326_2 |   .0269203    .139759     0.19   0.847    -.2470024     .300843 
 _Ihour326_3 |   .0578417   .1539311     0.38   0.707    -.2438578    .3595412 
 _Ihour326_4 |  -.0165544   .1627966    -0.10   0.919    -.3356298     .302521 
 _Ihour326_5 |  -.0311992   .1786967    -0.17   0.861    -.3814384    .3190399 
 _Ihour326_6 |   .1228435   .1797178     0.68   0.494    -.2293969    .4750839 
 _Ihour326_7 |   .3823718   .1865456     2.05   0.040      .016749    .7479945 
 _Ihour326_8 |   .5838626   .1905914     3.06   0.002     .2103103    .9574149 
 _Ihour326_9 |    .992902   .1925279     5.16   0.000     .6155542     1.37025 
_Ihour326_10 |   1.547142   .1972207     7.84   0.000     1.160597    1.933688 
_Ihour326_11 |   1.838227   .1947184     9.44   0.000     1.456586    2.219868 
_Ihour326_12 |   2.146847   .1947172    11.03   0.000     1.765208    2.528486 
_Ihour326_13 |   2.234046   .1963972    11.38   0.000     1.849115    2.618978 
_Ihour326_14 |   2.076323    .195368    10.63   0.000     1.693409    2.459237 
_Ihour326_15 |   1.879889   .1940626     9.69   0.000     1.499533    2.260244 
_Ihour326_16 |   1.429342   .1882229     7.59   0.000     1.060432    1.798252 
_Ihour326_17 |   1.276508   .1846653     6.91   0.000     .9145706    1.638445 
_Ihour326_18 |   .6893164   .1791829     3.85   0.000     .3381244    1.040508 
_Ihour326_19 |   .6267627   .1700451     3.69   0.000     .2934804    .9600451 
_Ihour326_20 |    .228052   .1624433     1.40   0.160    -.0903311     .546435 
_Ihour326_21 |   .0813936   .1491096     0.55   0.585    -.2108559    .3736431 
_Ihour326_22 |  -.0530268   .1322569    -0.40   0.688    -.3122455     .206192 
_Ihour326_23 |  -.0403837   .1140866    -0.35   0.723    -.2639893    .1832219 
       _cons |   5.977818   .3617455    16.52   0.000      5.26881    6.686826 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ARMA         | 
          ar | 
         L1. |   .9518718   .0032012   297.35   0.000     .9455975    .9581461 
          ma | 
         L1. |  -.3252873    .008787   -37.02   0.000    -.3425095   -.3080651 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /sigma |   2.016799   .0112216   179.73   0.000     1.994805    2.038793 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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             |                 OPG 
nwindspe~326 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
nwindspe~326 | 
_Imonth326_2 |  -.0619982   .7799584    -0.08   0.937    -1.590689    1.466692 
_Imonth326_3 |   .2065788   .8432176     0.24   0.806    -1.446097    1.859255 
_Imonth326_4 |  -2.463991    .868964    -2.84   0.005    -4.167129    -.760853 
_Imonth326_5 |  -4.639325    1.16019    -4.00   0.000    -6.913255   -2.365395 
_Imonth326_6 |  -4.722618   1.092929    -4.32   0.000     -6.86472   -2.580516 
_Imonth326_7 |  -4.763693   1.099199    -4.33   0.000    -6.918083   -2.609302 
_Imonth326_8 |  -4.652556   1.099215    -4.23   0.000    -6.806978   -2.498135 
_Imonth326_9 |  -3.783235   .9581771    -3.95   0.000    -5.661227   -1.905242 
_Imonth32~10 |  -2.569999   .8411156    -3.06   0.002    -4.218555   -.9214423 
_Imonth32~11 |  -2.073846   .9166504    -2.26   0.024    -3.870448   -.2772442 
_Imonth32~12 |  -2.595538   .9171547    -2.83   0.005    -4.393129   -.7979482 
       _cons |    9.41804   .6067473    15.52   0.000     8.228837    10.60724 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ARMA         | 
          ar | 
         L1. |   .9322764   .0038992   239.09   0.000      .924634    .9399188 
          ma | 
         L1. |  -.2810992   .0092257   -30.47   0.000    -.2991812   -.2630171 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      /sigma |   2.039556   .0112681   181.00   0.000     2.017471    2.061641 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
4.4.1.3 Limitations 
The use of raw wind speed time series as an input is rarely used in previous academic 
papers. The time series were first transformed in order to avoid non-stationarity or to 
impose normal-type distributions in most of cases (Alexiadis et al. 1998; Daniel & Chen 
1991; Contaxis & Kabouris 1991; Hu et al.1991). In these papers the wind speed data has 
been collected over a longer time period than used here, such as 7years. Some of their data 
is for short intervals- half hour to 10-minutes. It may be necessary to convert the wind 
speed data to be stationary as these authors have. However, the wind speed data do not 
appear to be non-stationary for the time span I have used as shown by the Dickey-Fuller 
test. In addition, it has been argued that the ARMA family models tend to underestimate 
the wind speed since they can not accommodate shocks caused by extreme weather 
conditions.    
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4.4.2 ARCH-GARCH model 
The above class of estimated models (see Table 4.9) are linear models. For example, the 
AR(1) model estimates the property of the linear estimator which is the correlation in time 
series of wind speed at a single site.  
                                        
ttt uyy  1  
If the model is transferred to be a stochastic differential equation model, then 
                                  )()1( tdydtdy    
Where )(t is a white noise process. 
      And      
1 tt yydt  
The Weibull distribution analysis showed that the wind speed distributions have fat tails 
and excess peaking at the mean. Moreover, the previous simulation of ARMA models 
showed volatility in wind speed. A linear specification might not be sufficient to describe 
all of wind speed data. The ARCH and GARCH models are widely used non-linear models 
for modelling behaviour and forecasting volatility. They can also be used to detect non-
linear behaviour in wind speed time series. For this reason, I will now examine whether a 
GARCH based model might provide a better fit for the data that I have used in my previous 
experiments. This model may be used to test whether the volatility of wind speed is 
autocorrelated. 
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Figure 4.12 Real hourly wind speed for site326 from 1
st
 January to 31 December 2008. 
 
An important feature of the wind speed time series is described in Figure 4.12. This 
volatility clustering describes the tendency of periods of high wind speed to be followed by 
periods of high wind speed within a short interval. The current level of volatility is closely 
correlated with the level of volatility observed during the immediately preceding time 
period. It is a reasonable characteristic for wind speed in reality. Therefore, this model may 
be used to test whether the volatility of wind speed is autocorrelated.  
4.4.2.1 ARCH-GARCH model formulation 
The ARCH –GARCH family models are used to model the phenomenon referred to in the 
section above. For ARCH models, the ‗autocorrelation in volatility‘ is modelled by 
allowing the conditional variance of the error term,
2
t , to depend on the immediately 
previous value of the squared error (Brooks 2002). 
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 tt u                  ARCH(1) 
The GARCH models allow the conditional variance to be dependent on its previous lags. 
                
2
1
2
110
2
  ttt u      GARCH(1,1) 
   
In order to ensure that the ARCH family models are appropriate for modelling wind speed 
data, it is sensible to run the Engle (1982) test for the presence of ARCH effects in the 
residuals. The GARCH-type models can then be estimated due to fact that GARCH models 
are an extension of ARCH models and help to overcome some of the limitations of ARCH 
models, such as difficulties of identifying q and non-negativity constraints. Furthermore, 
GARCH models are more parsimonious compared to ARCH models and avoid over-fitting 
(Brooks 2002).  
4.2.2.2 Estimation of coefficients  
The test is run on the data for site326. There are 8,764 hourly wind speed observations 
during the whole year of 2008. Firstly, the AR(1) model is estimated on site326 data based 
on the model specification in previous section. The residuals are then retrieved. The test is 
a joint null hypothesis that all q lags of the squared residuals have coefficient values which 
Table 4.12. ARCH-GARCH model specifications. Source: (Brooks 2002) 
ARCH (q) Model 
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are not significantly different from zero. We set the value of q = 5. Table 4.13 provides the 
test statistics of coefficient values for 5 lags. The )(2 q  statistics are significantly greater 
than the critical value, and as a result the presence of ARCH effects is suggested in the 
wind speed data. 
 
Table 4.14 is the ARMA(1 24, 1)-GARCH(1,1) model specification for site326 data. The 
coefficients of the ARCH-GARCH equations are highly significant when comparing the 
test statistics with critical values. The sum of the coefficients on the squared error (
2
tu ) and 
lagged conditional variance (
2
1t ) is approximately 0.995, which implies that ‗shocks to 
the conditional variance‘ will be highly persistent (Brooks, 2002). Figure 4.13 plots the 
simulated hourly wind speed for site326 data from 1
st
 January to 31
st
 January 2008 and the 
real average wind speed. Table 4.15 presents the results of the above model re-estimated 
including monthly dummy variables. 


11
1
33221 ...
m
mtjtjttt luxxxy    
Table 4.13. LM test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) on 
site326 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lags(p)  |          chi2               df                 Prob > chi2 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
       1     |        478.890               1                   0.0000 
       2     |        550.093               2                   0.0000 
       3     |        648.169               3                   0.0000 
       4     |        676.176               4                   0.0000 
       5     |        703.921               5                   0.0000 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         H0: no ARCH effects      vs.  H1: ARCH(p) disturbance 
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Figure 4.13. Predicted hourly wind speed by GARCH(1,1) for site 326. 
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Table4.14. ARCH family regression -- ARMA disturbances 
 
Sample:  420769 to 429551, but with gaps 
                                                Number of obs      =      8764 
                                                Wald chi2(3)       =  65376.79 
Log likelihood = -17903.89                      Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                 OPG 
  wind speed |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
wind speed   | 
       _cons |   5.180125   .2000063    25.90   0.000      4.78812    5.572131 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ARMA         | 
          ar | 
         L1. |   .9264098   .0047142   196.51   0.000     .9171701    .9356496 
        L24. |   .0275059   .0039683     6.93   0.000     .0197282    .0352837 
          ma | 
         L1. |  -.2794666   .0119854   -23.32   0.000    -.3029576   -.2559757 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ARCH         | 
        arch | 
         L1. |   .0774534   .0042202    18.35   0.000     .0691819    .0857249 
       garch | 
         L1. |    .917987   .0040942   224.22   0.000     .9099625    .9260114 
       _cons |   .0315314   .0047297     6.67   0.000     .0222613    .0408015 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 4.15. ARMA(1&24,1)-GARCH(1,1) model with monthly dummy variables  
ARCH family regression -- ARMA disturbances 
 
Sample: 420769 - 429551, but with gaps             Number of obs   =      8764 
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(14)   =  51330.66 
Log likelihood = -17875.92                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                 OPG 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
nwindspe~326 | 
_Imonth326_2 |  -1.137702   .9418015    -1.21   0.227    -2.983599    .7081948 
_Imonth326_3 |   1.592027   .7489045     2.13   0.034     .1242012    3.059853 
_Imonth326_4 |  -2.227601   .7384482    -3.02   0.003    -3.674933   -.7802693 
_Imonth326_5 |  -3.627625   .7903526    -4.59   0.000    -5.176688   -2.078563 
_Imonth326_6 |  -3.738259   .7763161    -4.82   0.000    -5.259811   -2.216707 
_Imonth326_7 |  -3.609279   .7841112    -4.60   0.000    -5.146109   -2.072449 
_Imonth326_8 |  -3.565075   .8140488    -4.38   0.000    -5.160581   -1.969569 
_Imonth326_9 |  -3.013208   .7637929    -3.95   0.000    -4.510214   -1.516201 
_Imonth32~10 |   -2.61126   .7791056    -3.35   0.001    -4.138279   -1.084242 
_Imonth32~11 |  -3.177696     .93479    -3.40   0.001    -5.009851   -1.345541 
_Imonth32~12 |  -2.076823   .8791346    -2.36   0.018    -3.799895   -.3537507 
       _cons |   7.724114   .5636112    13.70   0.000     6.619457    8.828772 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ARMA         | 
          ar | 
         L1. |   .9187423   .0050376   182.38   0.000     .9088688    .9286158 
        L24. |   .0207875   .0041239     5.04   0.000     .0127047    .0288702 
          ma | 
         L1. |  -.2746861   .0122276   -22.46   0.000    -.2986517   -.2507205 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ARCH         | 
        arch | 
         L1. |   .0791515   .0043444    18.22   0.000     .0706365    .0876664 
       garch | 
         L1. |   .9163586   .0041905   218.67   0.000     .9081453    .9245719 
       _cons |   .0320564   .0047752     6.71   0.000     .0226972    .0414157 
 
 
 
Figure 4.14 Monthly effect modelled by ARMA(1 24,1)-GARCH(1,1) model 
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Figure 4.14 shows the monthly effect of wind speed based on the modelling result from 
ARMA(1 24,1)-GARCH(1,1) process. It shows a pattern of monthly effect which is similar 
to that of the Weibull distribution and ARMA family. This model provides a good 
prediction of volatility in wind speed because the coefficient estimated on 
2
1t  is very high 
and it is significant. The model proves the volatility in wind speed is highly persistent. 
Figure 4.13 shows the good prediction of volatility in wind speed because the predicted 
wind speed data vary in the same pattern as the real wind speed data in site326. 
4.5 Multivariate models--Vector autoregressive models 
The time series models described in previous sections have focused on variations of single 
equation models or univariate time series models. A VAR model is a multiple-equation 
system or a multiple-time series generalisation of AR models. It allows the value of a 
variable to depend on more than just its own lags or combinations of white noise terms 
(Brooks 2002).  VAR models simultaneously estimate the interrelationship between more 
than one endogenous variable. It allows us to take the interdependence between different 
wind speed time series into account.  
VAR is the formal model most closely to measure the correlation between wind speeds in 
different wind farms. It allows us to include all the wind farms of the portfolio in the model. 
Thus it is the closest method to our notion of the portfolio theory to test the correlation. The 
downside of using VAR is that the error terms are less specific for wind speed than those of 
the Weibull distribution. 
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VARs have been used primarily in macroeconomics to capture the relationship between 
important economic variables (Kapetanios et al. 2008; Valadkhani 2004; Lee 1997). VARs 
are also widely used to measure the stock price-volume relation (MacDonald & Power 
1995; Kaliva & Koskinen 2008; Bohl & Siklos 2004). However, few studies have been 
done on the renewable energy sector using VARs. Ewing et al. examined the 
interdependence in wind speed data measured in the same location at four different heights 
by using a VAR model. They found that a multiple-equation system or VAR is capable of 
capturing the underlying cross-variable dynamics for wind at various heights
27
.  
In my research, I have put ten sites/wind farms into a portfolio. The VAR model is used to 
analyse the interrelationships between different time series data on wind speed within the 
portfolio. The dynamic impact of random disturbances or shocks caused by extreme 
weather conditions on the system of variables or portfolio can be captured using a VAR 
model. The VAR has been used to forecast the dynamics of the state of nature for wind at 
various locations. 
4.5.1 VAR model formulation and selection without exogenous variables 
ttptpttt uxyyyy    2211  
where 
ty is a j vector of endogenous variables. 
tx is a k vector of exogenous variables, p 1  and  are matrices of coefficients to be 
estimated and 
tu is a vector of innovations that may be contemporaneously correlated with 
                                               
27
 http://www.ecu.edu/cs-educ/econ/upload/ecu0607.pdf 
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each other. However they are uncorrelated with their own lagged values and uncorrelated 
with all of the right-hand endogenous and exogenous variables. 
The variables
ty included in the VAR model are wind speed from ten different sites within 
my portfolio. The ten wind farms within the portfolio are the same as those I have 
discussed in the previous section in connection with the univariate time series analyses. All 
variables to be included in the VAR are required to be stationary in order to carry out joint 
significance tests on the lags of the variables. As with the test results from the previous 
section on ARMA, all variables were subjected to augmented Dickey- Fuller tests. The test 
results show that variables do not contain unit root. Therefore, the original 10 wind speed 
time series are inputs for the VAR. The VAR model with exogenous variables will be 
discussed in a later section. 
Information criteria AIC and BIC for univariate time series model selection can be used in 
VAR as well to determine the appropriate lag lengths. There are three steps to calculate the 
AIC and BIC for the VAR. 
(1) The determinant of the residual covariance is described as: 







 
t
T
uu

'ˆˆdetˆ  
where  is the number of parameters per equation in the VAR model, and T is the    
number of observations.  
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(2) The log likelihood value is computed assuming a multivariate normal Gaussian 
distribution as:  
  ˆlog)2log1(
2
j
T
  
(3)The AIC and BIC are calculated as: 
T
n
T
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where )( jkjn  is the total number of estimated parameters in the VAR model (Brooks 
2002). 
I have calculated the values of AIC and BIC based on the VAR without exogenous 
variables. Table 4.16 shows that value of AIC, BIC, and degree of freedom for VAR 
models with different lags which are computed using STATA 10. According to Table 4.16, 
the VAR model with a lag length equal to 4 has the minimum AIC and BIC values, but has 
the largest number of estimated parameters. Theoretically, this 4
th
-lag VAR model is 
preferred to other models. However, the number of estimated parameters increases 
dramatically when a 4
th
 lag is used. 
Table 4.16. AIC and BIC for VAR models with different lag length. 
Model Degree of freedom AIC BIC 
Lag1 110 369144.5 369912 
Lag2 210 356748.1     358208.5 
Lag3 310 346585.1     348732.2 
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Lag4 410 337126.1     339954.6 
 
Furthermore, within the framework of the VAR system of equations the significance of 4 
lags of each of the individual site is examined jointly with an F-test as shown in Table 4.17. 
It clearly shows that most of the coefficients on individual lags are not significant for all 4 
lags. The values of the coefficients and degrees of significance vary with the lag length for 
different sites. The current wind speed for each site is significantly correlated with its own 
1
st
 lag wind speed. The value of each individual site‘s 1st lag coefficients are similar and 
approximated to 0.60 in VAR(4). Thus, the current wind speed for each individual site is 
closely related to its own lagged value and this result is in accord with the conclusions from 
our univariate time series models. The values of coefficients for endogenous variables with 
other lag lengths are relatively small. As the number of lag length increased, values of 
lagged coefficients reduce further, and most of them are not statistically significant. One 
possible explanation for this might be that as the distances between each pair of wind farms 
vary, the correlation of lagged wind speed between wind farms falls as distances between 
them increase.  
 
Table 4.17. A Part of the VAR(4) model result for the 10 sites portfolio. 
 
Vector autoregression 
 
Sample:  420773 - 429551, but with gaps            No. of obs      =      7323 
Log likelihood =   -168153                         AIC             =  46.03661 
FPE            =  4.66e+07                         HQIC            =   46.1694 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  4.17e+07                         SBIC            =  46.42286 
 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
nwindspeed48         41     2.70692   0.7594   23117.52   0.0000 
nwindspeed212        41     2.44331   0.8088   30986.89   0.0000 
nwindspeed326        41     1.97366   0.8259   34736.01   0.0000 
nwindspeed1006       41     2.62236   0.8291   35535.42   0.0000 
nwindspeed1190       41     2.87569   0.8263    34841.3   0.0000 
nwindspeed1346       41     2.49569   0.8417   38949.11   0.0000 
nwindspeed1395       41      2.0919   0.8519   42114.82   0.0000 
nwindspeed16581      41     2.83282   0.8530   42494.31   0.0000 
nwindspeed16725      41     2.16049   0.8651    46943.2   0.0000 
nwindspeed18930      41     2.26073   0.8142   32092.37   0.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
nwindspeed48 | 
nwindspeed48 | 
         L1. |   .6508229   .0118403    54.97   0.000     .6276163    .6740295 
         L2. |   .1445416   .0139942    10.33   0.000     .1171134    .1719699 
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         L3. |   .0349278   .0140458     2.49   0.013     .0073985    .0624571 
         L4. |   -.017661   .0120113    -1.47   0.141    -.0412028    .0058808 
nwindspe~212 | 
         L1. |   .0566484   .0129996     4.36   0.000     .0311696    .0821272 
         L2. |   .0149068   .0152489     0.98   0.328    -.0149805    .0447942 
         L3. |  -.0165042   .0152808    -1.08   0.280    -.0464539    .0134455 
         L4. |  -.0190302   .0129208    -1.47   0.141    -.0443545    .0062942 
nwindspe~326 | 
         L1. |   .0787499   .0160378     4.91   0.000     .0473165    .1101833 
         L2. |   .0018914    .018593     0.10   0.919    -.0345502    .0383331 
         L3. |  -.0304114   .0186644    -1.63   0.103    -.0669929    .0061702 
         L4. |  -.0527438   .0161301    -3.27   0.001    -.0843582   -.0211293 
nwindsp~1006 | 
         L1. |    .052044   .0121944     4.27   0.000     .0281435    .0759446 
         L2. |   .0143937   .0144429     1.00   0.319    -.0139138    .0427012 
         L3. |  -.0168754   .0145052    -1.16   0.245     -.045305    .0115542 
         L4. |   .0007515   .0124077     0.06   0.952    -.0235671    .0250701 
nwindsp~1190 | 
         L1. |   .0172653   .0111147     1.55   0.120     -.004519    .0390497 
         L2. |  -.0149027   .0134347    -1.11   0.267    -.0412344    .0114289 
         L3. |   .0128102    .013444     0.95   0.341    -.0135395    .0391599 
         L4. |  -.0315589   .0112952    -2.79   0.005     -.053697   -.0094208 
nwindsp~1346 | 
         L1. |    .015744   .0128438     1.23   0.220    -.0094294    .0409175 
         L2. |  -.0084303    .015415    -0.55   0.584    -.0386431    .0217825 
         L3. |   .0091607   .0153912     0.60   0.552    -.0210054    .0393269 
         L4. |  -.0230389   .0125222    -1.84   0.066    -.0475819    .0015041 
nwindsp~1395 | 
         L1. |    .038073    .015184     2.51   0.012      .008313    .0678331 
         L2. |  -.0324372   .0189919    -1.71   0.088    -.0696607    .0047863 
         L3. |    .008624   .0190607     0.45   0.651    -.0287344    .0459823 
         L4. |  -.0255901    .015526    -1.65   0.099    -.0560205    .0048404 
nwinds~16581 | 
         L1. |   .0393059   .0112469     3.49   0.000     .0172625    .0613494 
         L2. |   .0055889   .0138769     0.40   0.687    -.0216093    .0327871 
         L3. |  -.0113334   .0138507    -0.82   0.413    -.0384802    .0158134 
         L4. |  -.0078405   .0111152    -0.71   0.481    -.0296259    .0139448 
nwinds~16725 | 
         L1. |   .0475031   .0149641     3.17   0.002     .0181739    .0768322 
         L2. |  -.0040548   .0182833    -0.22   0.824    -.0398893    .0317798 
         L3. |  -.0059053   .0182886    -0.32   0.747    -.0417503    .0299397 
         L4. |  -.0152053   .0149423    -1.02   0.309    -.0444917    .0140811 
nwinds~18930 | 
         L1. |   .0427024   .0142795     2.99   0.003     .0147151    .0706897 
         L2. |  -.0388563   .0161479    -2.41   0.016    -.0705057    -.007207 
         L3. |   .0091903   .0162088     0.57   0.571    -.0225785     .040959 
         L4. |  -.0240874   .0141396    -1.70   0.088    -.0518004    .0036257 
       _cons |   .6900856   .0940239     7.34   0.000     .5058021    .8743691 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
nwindspe~212 | 
nwindspeed48 | 
         L1. |    .038499   .0106873     3.60   0.000     .0175523    .0594456 
         L2. |    .021386   .0126315     1.69   0.090    -.0033712    .0461432 
         L3. |  -.0126183    .012678    -1.00   0.320    -.0374668    .0122301 
         L4. |  -.0392199   .0108416    -3.62   0.000    -.0604691   -.0179707 
nwindspe~212 | 
         L1. |   .6262845   .0117337    53.37   0.000     .6032869    .6492821 
         L2. |   .1296749   .0137639     9.42   0.000      .102698    .1566517 
         L3. |   .0328339   .0137927     2.38   0.017     .0058007    .0598671 
         L4. |   .0070266   .0116626     0.60   0.547    -.0158316    .0298848 
nwindspe~326 | 
         L1. |   .0622367    .014476     4.30   0.000     .0338643     .090609 
         L2. |   .0200576   .0167824     1.20   0.232    -.0128353    .0529504 
         L3. |  -.0073633   .0168468    -0.44   0.662    -.0403825    .0256558 
         L4. |  -.0234776   .0145593    -1.61   0.107    -.0520134    .0050581 
nwindsp~1006 | 
         L1. |   .0936116   .0110069     8.50   0.000     .0720385    .1151846 
         L2. |   .0296681   .0130364     2.28   0.023     .0041172    .0552189 
         L3. |   .0067386   .0130926     0.51   0.607    -.0189225    .0323997 
         L4. |  -.0423235   .0111994    -3.78   0.000    -.0642739   -.0203731 
nwindsp~1190 | 
         L1. |   .0156018   .0100323     1.56   0.120    -.0040612    .0352647 
         L2. |   .0009923   .0121264     0.08   0.935    -.0227751    .0247597 
         L3. |   .0021033   .0121348     0.17   0.862    -.0216804     .025887 
         L4. |  -.0018883   .0101952    -0.19   0.853    -.0218706    .0180939 
nwindsp~1346 | 
         L1. |  -.0010364   .0115931    -0.09   0.929    -.0237583    .0216856 
         L2. |   .0087157   .0139138     0.63   0.531    -.0185549    .0359864 
         L3. |  -.0193522   .0138924    -1.39   0.164    -.0465807    .0078763 
         L4. |  -.0007867   .0113027    -0.07   0.945    -.0229396    .0213663 
nwindsp~1395 | 
         L1. |    .007567   .0137053     0.55   0.581     -.019295     .034429 
         L2. |   -.022842   .0171424    -1.33   0.183    -.0564406    .0107565 
         L3. |   .0189905   .0172046     1.10   0.270    -.0147298    .0527109 
         L4. |  -.0260528   .0140141    -1.86   0.063    -.0535198    .0014143 
nwinds~16581 | 
         L1. |   .0026706   .0101516     0.26   0.792    -.0172263    .0225674 
         L2. |   .0030012   .0125255     0.24   0.811    -.0215484    .0275508 
         L3. |   .0042054   .0125019     0.34   0.737    -.0202978    .0287086 
         L4. |  -.0031018   .0100328    -0.31   0.757    -.0227657    .0165621 
nwinds~16725 | 
         L1. |   .0115204   .0135069     0.85   0.394    -.0149526    .0379934 
         L2. |   .0163297   .0165028     0.99   0.322    -.0160152    .0486746 
         L3. |  -.0224748   .0165076    -1.36   0.173    -.0548291    .0098796 
         L4. |  -.0152476   .0134872    -1.13   0.258    -.0416821    .0111868 
nwinds~18930 | 
         L1. |   .0478241   .0128889     3.71   0.000     .0225622    .0730859 
         L2. |  -.0092451   .0145754    -0.63   0.526    -.0378124    .0193221 
         L3. |  -.0062721   .0146304    -0.43   0.668    -.0349472    .0224029 
         L4. |  -.0149907   .0127626    -1.17   0.240     -.040005    .0100236 
       _cons |   .2636001   .0848677     3.11   0.002     .0972626    .4299377 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
-------------+Part of model result omission------------------------ 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
nwinds~16725 | 
nwindspeed48 | 
         L1. |   .0197085   .0094502     2.09   0.037     .0011865    .0382306 
         L2. |   .0016454   .0111693     0.15   0.883    -.0202461    .0235369 
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         L3. |  -.0174862   .0112105    -1.56   0.119    -.0394583     .004486 
         L4. |  -.0109303   .0095867    -1.14   0.254    -.0297198    .0078593 
nwindspe~212 | 
         L1. |   .0022217   .0103755     0.21   0.830    -.0181139    .0225573 
         L2. |  -.0026861   .0121707    -0.22   0.825    -.0265403    .0211681 
         L3. |  -.0229003   .0121961    -1.88   0.060    -.0468043    .0010037 
         L4. |   .0011989   .0103126     0.12   0.907    -.0190135    .0214112 
nwindspe~326 | 
         L1. |   .1084452   .0128003     8.47   0.000      .083357    .1335335 
         L2. |  -.0050944   .0148398    -0.34   0.731    -.0341799     .023991 
         L3. |   -.011895   .0148968    -0.80   0.425    -.0410921    .0173021 
         L4. |   -.036757   .0128741    -2.86   0.004    -.0619897   -.0115244 
nwindsp~1006 | 
         L1. |   .0028682   .0097328     0.29   0.768    -.0162078    .0219441 
         L2. |   .0181204   .0115274     1.57   0.116    -.0044729    .0407136 
         L3. |  -.0153811   .0115771    -1.33   0.184    -.0380719    .0073096 
         L4. |  -9.19e-06    .009903    -0.00   0.999    -.0194188    .0194004 
nwindsp~1190 | 
         L1. |   .0513993    .008871     5.79   0.000     .0340124    .0687862 
         L2. |  -.0011751   .0107228    -0.11   0.913    -.0221913    .0198412 
         L3. |   .0022381   .0107301     0.21   0.835    -.0187926    .0232688 
         L4. |   .0037638   .0090151     0.42   0.676    -.0139055     .021433 
nwindsp~1346 | 
         L1. |   .0321559   .0102511     3.14   0.002      .012064    .0522477 
         L2. |   -.019461   .0123033    -1.58   0.114     -.043575    .0046529 
         L3. |   .0066684   .0122843     0.54   0.587    -.0174084    .0307451 
         L4. |  -.0252488   .0099944    -2.53   0.012    -.0448375   -.0056601 
nwindsp~1395 | 
         L1. |   .0214082   .0121189     1.77   0.077    -.0023444    .0451608 
         L2. |  -.0148732   .0151582    -0.98   0.326    -.0445826    .0148363 
         L3. |   .0197116   .0152131     1.30   0.195    -.0101055    .0495288 
         L4. |    .013527   .0123919     1.09   0.275    -.0107607    .0378147 
nwinds~16581 | 
         L1. |   .0074494   .0089766     0.83   0.407    -.0101444    .0250431 
         L2. |  -.0067911   .0110757    -0.61   0.540     -.028499    .0149168 
         L3. |   .0114792   .0110547     1.04   0.299    -.0101876    .0331461 
         L4. |  -.0152184   .0088715    -1.72   0.086    -.0326061    .0021693 
nwinds~16725 | 
         L1. |   .7097565   .0119434    59.43   0.000     .6863478    .7331652 
         L2. |   .0947969   .0145926     6.50   0.000      .066196    .1233978 
         L3. |     .00972   .0145968     0.67   0.505    -.0188893    .0383292 
         L4. |  -.0031114    .011926    -0.26   0.794     -.026486    .0202632 
nwinds~18930 | 
         L1. |     .14112    .011397    12.38   0.000     .1187823    .1634577 
         L2. |  -.0302394   .0128883    -2.35   0.019       -.0555   -.0049789 
         L3. |  -.0074423   .0129369    -0.58   0.565    -.0327981    .0179136 
         L4. |  -.0520426   .0112853    -4.61   0.000    -.0741614   -.0299238 
       _cons |   .7048252    .075044     9.39   0.000     .5577416    .8519088 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
nwinds~18930 | 
nwindspeed48 | 
         L1. |   .0338788   .0098887     3.43   0.001     .0144974    .0532603 
         L2. |   .0016251   .0116876     0.14   0.889    -.0212821    .0245323 
         L3. |  -.0341551   .0117306    -2.91   0.004    -.0571467   -.0111634 
         L4. |  -.0226219   .0100315    -2.26   0.024    -.0422832   -.0029605 
nwindspe~212 | 
         L1. |   .0146159   .0108569     1.35   0.178    -.0066632     .035895 
         L2. |   .0005712   .0127354     0.04   0.964    -.0243898    .0255322 
         L3. |   .0055052    .012762     0.43   0.666    -.0195079    .0305183 
         L4. |  -.0176737   .0107911    -1.64   0.101    -.0388238    .0034764 
nwindspe~326 | 
         L1. |    .068569   .0133942     5.12   0.000     .0423168    .0948213 
         L2. |  -.0105096   .0155283    -0.68   0.499    -.0409446    .0199254 
         L3. |  -.0119445   .0155879    -0.77   0.444    -.0424962    .0186073 
         L4. |  -.0239507   .0134714    -1.78   0.075    -.0503541    .0024527 
nwindsp~1006 | 
         L1. |   .0113585   .0101844     1.12   0.265    -.0086025    .0313195 
         L2. |   .0205103   .0120622     1.70   0.089    -.0031313    .0441518 
         L3. |  -.0310107   .0121143    -2.56   0.010    -.0547542   -.0072672 
         L4. |  -.0010052   .0103625    -0.10   0.923    -.0213154    .0193049 
nwindsp~1190 | 
         L1. |   .0403499   .0092826     4.35   0.000     .0221563    .0585435 
         L2. |   .0122759   .0112203     1.09   0.274    -.0097155    .0342673 
         L3. |  -.0132359    .011228    -1.18   0.238    -.0352424    .0087706 
         L4. |  -.0087343   .0094334    -0.93   0.355    -.0272234    .0097548 
nwindsp~1346 | 
         L1. |   .0522761   .0107268     4.87   0.000      .031252    .0733001 
         L2. |  -.0075231   .0128741    -0.58   0.559    -.0327559    .0177097 
         L3. |   .0162442   .0128542     1.26   0.206    -.0089496    .0414381 
         L4. |  -.0106773   .0104581    -1.02   0.307    -.0311748    .0098203 
nwindsp~1395 | 
         L1. |   .0290483   .0126812     2.29   0.022     .0041936     .053903 
         L2. |  -.0256099   .0158615    -1.61   0.106    -.0566978     .005478 
         L3. |  -.0011422    .015919    -0.07   0.943    -.0323428    .0300584 
         L4. |   .0076303   .0129669     0.59   0.556    -.0177842    .0330449 
nwinds~16581 | 
         L1. |   .0223157    .009393     2.38   0.018     .0039056    .0407257 
         L2. |  -.0013636   .0115896    -0.12   0.906    -.0240788    .0213515 
         L3. |  -.0020888   .0115676    -0.18   0.857     -.024761    .0205834 
         L4. |  -.0003413   .0092831    -0.04   0.971    -.0185357    .0178532 
nwinds~16725 | 
         L1. |   .1927582   .0124976    15.42   0.000     .1682634    .2172531 
         L2. |   .0106649   .0152696     0.70   0.485     -.019263    .0405928 
         L3. |  -.0575201   .0152741    -3.77   0.000    -.0874567   -.0275834 
         L4. |  -.0327408   .0124794    -2.62   0.009    -.0571999   -.0082817 
nwinds~18930 | 
         L1. |   .5355048   .0119258    44.90   0.000     .5121307     .558879 
         L2. |   .1215674   .0134863     9.01   0.000     .0951348        .148 
         L3. |   .0475692   .0135371     3.51   0.000     .0210369    .0741015 
         L4. |   .0136168   .0118089     1.15   0.249    -.0095283    .0367618 
       _cons |  -.0381506   .0785259    -0.49   0.627    -.1920585    .1157574 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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The estimation of unrestricted VAR requires that the same lag length of 4 for all of the 
endogenous variables is used in all equations. In this case, each single increase in the 
number of lags results in the number of estimated parameters increasing by 100. The 
formula )( jkjn   determines the number of estimated parameters and this is a 
polynomial expansion in this VAR Gaussian model. Thus the overparameterisation is one 
of the major problems with VAR. It will be difficult to see which sets of variables have a 
significant effect on each dependent variable and which do not for a VAR that includes 
longer lags (Brooks, 2002). Therefore, I have decided to use VAR(1) to identify the 
interdependence of different wind speed time series data by taking the value of estimated 
parameters and overparameterisation into account.  
4.5.2 Granger Causality test 
Since a reduced form VAR is employed to estimated wind speed, each equation can 
effectively be estimated using OLS. The VAR(1) without exogenous variables is chosen.  
ttt uycy  11            where c is a vector of constants. 
The model specification for 10site portfolio can be written as: 
tttttt uyyyycy   1,1893010,11,3263,11,2122,11,481,11,48    
tttttt uyyyycy   1,1893010,21,3263,21,2122,21,481,22,212    
tttttt uyyyycy   1,1893010,101,3263,101,2122,101,481,1010,18930    
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The above VAR models indicate the interdependent relationships between the 10 sites. The 
wind speed for time t for each site can be estimated by including wind speed data for a 
previous time period from all 10 sites. In other words, this VAR model assumes that the 
lagged values of the 10 sites can explain the current value of each site. However, 
evaluation of the significance of variables in the VAR and joint correlation need to be 
tested. This test can be referred to as a causality test. Granger described the causality and 
feedback test approach to the question of whether changes in one variable cause changes in 
another variable (Granger 1969). The argument follows that if 1y causes 2y , lags of 1y
should be significant in the equation for 2y . If this is the case and not vice versa, it can be 
said that 1y  ‗Granger-causes‘ 2y  or that there exists unidirectional causality from 1y to 2y  
(Brooks 2002). The use of the F-test to jointly test for the significance of the lags on the 
explanatory variables is in effect the same as tests for ‗Granger causality‘ between these 
variables. The Grange causality does not mean that the changes in one variable are the real 
reason for the changes in another variable. It identifies the correlation between the current 
value of one variable and the past values of different variables. 
In our case, the current wind speed of one site, for example site48, can be explained by the 
past values of its own wind speed at the same site. This has already been examined in the 
ARMA models. However, current wind speed for site48 might be explained by the past 
values of site212, in other words they are correlated. Thus the question is whether or not 
the explanatory power of the model would be improved by adding the lagged values of 
other sites into the model.  Table 4.18 shows a section of the Granger Causality test result. 
It indicates that the lagged value of wind speed at site212 causes the current value of wind 
speed at site48. Since the test statistic )365.27(2 is greater than the critical value
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84.3)05.0,1(2  , it can be said that ‗lagged wind speed at site212 causes current wind 
speed at site48‘. On the other hand, the test statistic )814.34(2  is greater than the critical 
value 84.3)05.0,1(2  for lagged wind speed at site48, thus the lagged wind speed values 
at site48 Granger causes current wind speed at site212‘. If both sets of lags are significant it 
would be said that there is ‗bi-directional causality‘ or ‗bi-directional feedback‘. In contrast, 
lagged values of wind speed at site326 cannot Granger cause the current wind speed values 
at site48 (2.35) and lagged wind speed values at site48 cannot Granger cause the current 
wind speed at site 326 (1.245). It is worth noting that the Granger causality test results do 
not mean that the previous wind speed at site212 is physically caused by the current wind 
speed at site48. It merely indicates the joint correlation between wind speed data at these 
two wind farms.  
   Table 4.18. The Granger Causality test (one part of the result). 
  +------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
  |          Equation           Excluded |   chi2     df Prob > chi2 | 
  |--------------------------------------+---------------------------| 
  |      nwindspeed48      nwindspeed212 |  27.365     1    0.000    | 
  |      nwindspeed48      nwindspeed326 |  2.3526     1    0.125    | 
  |      nwindspeed48     nwindspeed1006 |  46.753     1    0.000    | 
  |      nwindspeed48     nwindspeed1190 |  1.0026     1    0.317    | 
  |      nwindspeed48     nwindspeed1346 |  1.8267     1    0.177    | 
  |      nwindspeed48     nwindspeed1395 |  .86494     1    0.352    | 
  |      nwindspeed48    nwindspeed16581 |  26.501     1    0.000    | 
  |      nwindspeed48    nwindspeed16725 |  .34489     1    0.557    | 
  |      nwindspeed48    nwindspeed18930 |  .32398     1    0.569    | 
  |      nwindspeed48                ALL |  292.39     9    0.000    | 
  |--------------------------------------+---------------------------| 
  |     nwindspeed212       nwindspeed48 |  34.814     1    0.000    | 
  |     nwindspeed212      nwindspeed326 |  50.871     1    0.000    | 
  |     nwindspeed212     nwindspeed1006 |  240.04     1    0.000    | 
  |     nwindspeed212     nwindspeed1190 |  5.0491     1    0.025    | 
  |     nwindspeed212     nwindspeed1346 |  3.2573     1    0.071    | 
  |     nwindspeed212     nwindspeed1395 |  4.9711     1    0.026    | 
  |     nwindspeed212    nwindspeed16581 |  .08253     1    0.774    | 
  |     nwindspeed212    nwindspeed16725 |  3.3361     1    0.068    | 
  |     nwindspeed212    nwindspeed18930 |  6.9745     1    0.008    | 
  |     nwindspeed212                ALL |  675.05     9    0.000    | 
  |--------------------------------------+---------------------------| 
  |     nwindspeed326       nwindspeed48 |  1.2453     1    0.264    | 
  |     nwindspeed326      nwindspeed212 |  32.167     1    0.000    | 
  |     nwindspeed326     nwindspeed1006 |   107.2     1    0.000    | 
  |     nwindspeed326     nwindspeed1190 |   97.08     1    0.000    | 
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  |     nwindspeed326     nwindspeed1346 |  16.671     1    0.000    | 
  |     nwindspeed326     nwindspeed1395 |   14.66     1    0.000    | 
  |     nwindspeed326    nwindspeed16581 |  52.912     1    0.000    | 
  |     nwindspeed326    nwindspeed16725 |  8.7533     1    0.003    | 
  |     nwindspeed326    nwindspeed18930 |  .60203     1    0.438    | 
  |     nwindspeed326                ALL |  701.78     9    0.000    | 
  |--------------------------------------+---------------------------| 
 
 
Table 4.19 is the distance matrix for the 10 sites. The statistical significance of Granger 
causality drops dramatically with increasing distance. For instance, the lagged wind speed 
at site 212, 1006, and 16581 is significantly correlated to current wind speed at site48 since 
these three sites are closer to site48 than other sites. Therefore, the distance matrix is 
important for building a wind farm portfolio. 
Table 4.19. The distance matrix of 10 sites. (Kilometers)  
site ID 48 212 326 1006 1190 1346 1395 16581 16725 18930 
48 0.00 212.43 464.10 311.57 609.54 792.59 901.79 208.72 737.67 816.73 
212  0.00 294.58 131.95 397.17 582.82 700.05 234.91 572.36 645.22 
326   0.00 343.26 305.87 498.19 654.49 331.04 278.60 354.39 
1006    0.00 328.86 491.55 591.09 366.71 603.03 666.02 
1190     0.00 200.12 349.69 568.71 417.27 446.56 
1346      0.00 162.98 767.62 539.64 540.46 
1395       0.00 903.33 699.90 695.26 
16581        0.00 577.57 660.09 
16725         0.00 83.07 
18930                   0.00 
 
Table 4.20. A part of VAR(1) result for the portfolio. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
nwindspeed48 | 
nwindspeed48 | 
         L1. |   .7840005   .0072963   107.45   0.000     .7697001    .7983009 
nwindspe~212 | 
         L1. |   .0438098   .0083747     5.23   0.000     .0273956     .060224 
nwindspe~326 | 
         L1. |    .016124   .0105123     1.53   0.125    -.0044797    .0367277 
nwindsp~1006 | 
         L1. |   .0533735   .0078059     6.84   0.000     .0380743    .0686727 
nwindsp~1190 | 
         L1. |  -.0069126   .0069035    -1.00   0.317    -.0204433    .0066181 
nwindsp~1346 | 
         L1. |  -.0107583   .0079599    -1.35   0.177    -.0263595    .0048428 
nwindsp~1395 | 
         L1. |    .007546   .0081138     0.93   0.352    -.0083568    .0234489 
nwinds~16581 | 
         L1. |   .0274275   .0053279     5.15   0.000     .0169851    .0378699 
nwinds~16725 | 
         L1. |   .0055085   .0093798     0.59   0.557    -.0128755    .0238925 
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nwinds~18930 | 
         L1. |  -.0059128    .010388    -0.57   0.569     -.026273    .0144473 
       _cons |   .6091264   .0868817     7.01   0.000     .4388413    .7794115 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
nwindspe~212 | 
nwindspeed48 | 
         L1. |   .0387279   .0065637     5.90   0.000     .0258633    .0515926 
nwindspe~212 | 
         L1. |   .7408407   .0075339    98.33   0.000     .7260745    .7556068 
nwindspe~326 | 
         L1. |     .06745   .0094568     7.13   0.000      .048915     .085985 
nwindsp~1006 | 
         L1. |   .1087948   .0070221    15.49   0.000     .0950316    .1225579 
nwindsp~1190 | 
         L1. |   .0139549   .0062104     2.25   0.025     .0017828    .0261271 
nwindsp~1346 | 
         L1. |  -.0129236   .0071607    -1.80   0.071    -.0269583    .0011111 
nwindsp~1395 | 
         L1. |  -.0162742   .0072992    -2.23   0.026    -.0305803    -.001968 
nwinds~16581 | 
         L1. |  -.0013769   .0047929    -0.29   0.774    -.0107709    .0080171 
nwinds~16725 | 
         L1. |  -.0154121    .008438    -1.83   0.068    -.0319503    .0011261 
nwinds~18930 | 
         L1. |   .0246796    .009345     2.64   0.008     .0063637    .0429955 
       _cons |   .1583617   .0781586     2.03   0.043     .0051737    .3115497 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The Granger causality test and F-test will suggest which of the endogenous variables in the 
VAR system have statistically significant impacts on the future values of each of the 
variables in the system. In our case, Tables 4.18, 4.19, and 4.20 present the estimated wind 
speed data at site 48 using the relationship: 
 
                        (107.45)          (5.23)           (6.84)               (5.15) 
There are statistically significant impacts on the current wind speed at site 48 from the 
wind speed at sites 212, 1006, and 16581, one hour in advance of the current speed. The 
wind speed at other sites within the portfolio has no significant correlation with site 48. The 
VAR(1) can be applied to all sites to indicate the interdependence of different wind speed 
time series.  
tttttt uyyyyy ,11,168511,10061,2121,48,48 027.0053.0044.0784.0609.0  
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4.5.3 Impulse response function 
The correlations or interdependences between variables have now been identified. 
However, joint F-test results will not reveal whether changes in the value of a given 
variable have positive or negative effects on other variables in the system or the length of 
time it take for these effects to materialise. Therefore the Granger causality may not tell us 
the complete story about the interactions between the variables of a system. The impulse 
response functions can be used to produce the time path of the dependent variables in the 
VAR model, as well as shocks from all the explanatory variables. Impulse responses 
measure the time profile of the effect of a shock, or impulse on the expected future values 
of a variable. If the system of equations is stable then any shock should decline to zero. An 
unstable system would produce an explosive time path. Therefore, if there is a reaction in 
one variable to an impulse in another variable, we may say the latter has caused the former 
(Lutkepohl 2007). 
Impulse responses trace out the responsiveness of the dependent variables in the VAR 
model to shocks to each of the variables (Brooks 2002). These shocks can be exogenous 
shocks or innovations in one of the variables. In other words, a shock to 
48y  not only 
directly affects 
48y  but also gets transmitted to all of the other endogenous variables 
through the dynamic structure of the VAR. For example, a change in the innovations tu ,1  
will change the current value of
48y . The shock will also change all future values of 
endogenous variables, since lagged 
48y  appears in all other equations for other sites. It 
traces out the responses of each site to the shocks or forecast errors in the disturbance terms 
of site48. 
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The process of formula derivation for the impulse response function has been summarized 
in several academic publications. For example, Brooks‘(2002) and Lutkepohl‘s(2007) 
described the formulas for impulse response function and used the impulse response 
function to analyse macroeconomic issues. I have used STATA10 to run the impulse 
response functions on my portfolio. There are many combinations of the impulse response 
relationships for each pair of sites. 
The response is often portrayed graphically with time horizon on the horizontal axis and 
response on the vertical axis. I have shown an impulse response function for an impulse 
from the wind speed at site48 on the wind speed at the ten sites of the portfolio in the VAR 
(Figure 4.15). This graph shows the impulse response functions of the VAR system over 
time after a one-time, one unit shock on the error terms at site 48. It is clear from Figure 
4.15 that the site where the error term originates from gives the biggest response, which in 
this case is site48. The responses at other sites depend on the values of the coefficient of 
the estimated VAR model. The responses at site212, 1006, and 10581 are bigger than the 
others and these results are in accordance with the Granger causality. The responses will be 
greater when sites are closer to each other. Although the response at site48 is strong, as 
time elapses it declines to zero. 
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Figure 4.15. Impulse response function from a VAR of wind speed at different sites as responses to a 
unit impulse in the wind speed at site48. 
 
 
 
It is convenient to use STATA to get impulse response functions for each pair of sites. It 
allows us to determine the interaction of wind speed between wind farms. It also helps us 
to find out the degree of intensity and the length of the effect that a shock of wind speed at 
one site would have on other sites.  
4.5.4 VAR with exogenous variables 
The values of exogenous variables are independent from the values of the other variables in 
the system. A VAR process can be affected by other observable variables that are 
174 
 
determined outside the system of interest. Exogenous variables can be stochastic or non-
stochastic. The VAR(1) with exogenous variables can be defined as: 
tttt uxyy    11  
We use a vector of exogenous variables 
tx to represent hourly and monthly dummy 
variables. The wind speed time series is subject to seasonality. The VAR(1,q) model may 
capture this effect and measure it‘s intensity.  
 Table 4.21 shows the exogenous parameters that are estimated for the VAR(1,23) model. 
There are 23 exogenous variables in the vector to present the hourly dummy variables. At 
most sites the hourly effects are significant at peak hours during the day. This indicates that 
those locations experience greater wind speed during the peak hours of around 8am to 4pm. 
Table 4.21. Coefficients and test statistics for hourly dummy variables 
  site48 site212 site326 site1006 site1190 
  coef. z coef. z coef. z coef. z coef. z 
hr2 0.32 1.39 0.04 0.17 0.14 0.82 0.27 1.20 0.32 1.31 
hr3 0.23 1.03 -0.11 -0.57 -0.15 -0.90 0.15 0.69 0.28 1.22 
hr4 0.15 0.69 0.02 0.12 -0.02 -0.12 0.30 1.38 0.12 0.51 
hr5 0.31 1.40 0.17 0.85 -0.09 -0.55 0.19 0.88 0.20 0.88 
hr6 0.30 1.36 -0.04 -0.18 -0.08 -0.48 0.14 0.66 0.26 1.12 
hr7 0.46 2.09 0.28 1.39 0.14 0.85 0.47 2.19 0.16 0.68 
hr8 0.54 2.45 0.10 0.50 0.21 1.31 0.26 1.21 0.14 0.62 
hr9 1.03 4.70 0.40 2.05 0.19 1.20 0.60 2.84 0.86 3.72 
hr10 1.13 5.18 0.69 3.49 0.33 2.04 0.68 3.23 0.68 2.94 
hr11 1.18 5.40 0.86 4.37 0.55 3.37 0.65 3.04 0.89 3.84 
hr12 1.24 5.62 0.65 3.28 0.27 1.65 0.48 2.27 0.72 3.11 
hr13 1.30 5.93 0.64 3.25 0.34 2.11 0.54 2.54 0.37 1.59 
hr14 0.95 4.32 0.52 2.65 0.10 0.62 0.25 1.18 0.13 0.56 
hr15 0.84 3.81 0.41 2.05 -0.15 -0.91 0.47 2.20 -0.03 -0.12 
hr16 0.59 2.69 -0.08 -0.43 -0.24 -1.45 0.17 0.80 0.08 0.33 
hr17 0.37 1.69 0.02 0.10 -0.51 -3.13 -0.02 -0.07 -0.37 -1.57 
hr18 -0.07 -0.31 -0.30 -1.51 -0.29 -1.79 -0.20 -0.95 -0.53 -2.30 
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hr19 0.11 0.51 -0.28 -1.44 -0.67 -4.12 -0.57 -2.67 -0.53 -2.27 
hr20 0.32 1.44 -0.30 -1.52 -0.19 -1.17 -0.43 -2.00 -0.39 -1.66 
hr21 0.05 0.23 -0.28 -1.44 -0.46 -2.84 -0.51 -2.42 -0.31 -1.35 
hr22 0.14 0.62 -0.27 -1.36 -0.23 -1.45 -0.30 -1.40 0.13 0.58 
hr23 0.16 0.75 -0.32 -1.61 -0.24 -1.49 0.01 0.04 0.31 1.32 
hr24 0.22 1.02 -0.19 -0.98 -0.05 -0.28 0.33 1.57 -0.01 -0.02 
  site1346 site1395 site16581 site16725 site18930 
  coef. z coef. z coef. z coef. z coef. z 
hr2 0.07 0.31 -0.07 -0.38 -0.18 -0.76 -0.21 -1.17 0.10 0.55 
hr3 0.00 0.01 -0.23 -1.35 -0.13 -0.57 0.05 0.26 -0.05 -0.28 
hr4 -0.13 -0.64 -0.09 -0.51 0.22 0.96 -0.09 -0.54 0.03 0.16 
hr5 -0.08 -0.38 -0.08 -0.45 -0.02 -0.09 -0.09 -0.50 -0.05 -0.26 
hr6 -0.39 -1.96 0.03 0.15 -0.11 -0.46 0.05 0.32 0.20 1.10 
hr7 0.02 0.1 -0.01 -0.06 -0.19 -0.82 0.20 1.15 0.48 2.61 
hr8 0.24 1.18 0.14 0.84 0.04 0.19 0.47 2.73 0.47 2.57 
hr9 0.58 2.92 0.32 1.91 0.04 0.17 0.59 3.43 1.03 5.73 
hr10 0.68 3.42 0.57 3.37 -0.38 -1.67 0.60 3.46 0.71 3.94 
hr11 0.52 2.63 0.73 4.33 0.00 -0.01 0.54 3.13 1.17 6.44 
hr12 0.68 3.41 0.48 2.81 -0.08 -0.35 0.66 3.82 0.98 5.41 
hr13 0.53 2.66 0.28 1.66 -0.36 -1.55 0.28 1.60 0.81 4.45 
hr14 0.29 1.44 0.38 2.25 -0.56 -2.41 0.13 0.76 0.46 2.51 
hr15 0.52 2.6 0.21 1.25 -0.68 -2.92 0.05 0.27 0.43 2.38 
hr16 -0.03 -0.16 -0.09 -0.51 -0.85 -3.67 -0.30 -1.75 -0.05 -0.25 
hr17 -0.39 -1.95 -0.35 -2.03 -0.93 -4.01 -0.72 -4.17 -0.16 -0.85 
hr18 -0.51 -2.57 -0.52 -3.09 -0.56 -2.45 -0.75 -4.33 -0.31 -1.70 
hr19 -0.72 -3.58 -0.49 -2.91 -0.56 -2.45 -0.51 -2.96 -0.32 -1.77 
hr20 -0.62 -3.09 -0.56 -3.30 -0.49 -2.13 -0.73 -4.21 -0.40 -2.19 
hr21 -0.54 -2.71 -0.47 -2.77 -0.44 -1.92 -0.47 -2.73 -0.07 -0.36 
hr22 -0.46 -2.28 -0.42 -2.50 -0.15 -0.66 -0.14 -0.80 0.11 0.59 
hr23 -0.07 -0.33 -0.27 -1.61 -0.32 -1.41 -0.07 -0.40 0.19 1.06 
hr24 -0.33 -1.63 -0.18 -1.05 -0.02 -0.10 -0.20 -1.17 0.13 0.74 
 
 
Figure 4.16 plots the hourly parameters for the 10 sites. The sites display a similar daily 
pattern with the exception of site16581. The reason for this could be that the location of 
site16581 is near Fraserburgh, which is on North-East coast. All other sites are located in 
the middle of the country or west coast.  
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Figure 4.16.Hourly effects in the VAR(1,23) of the portfolio. 
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Table 4.22. Coefficients and test statistics for monthly dummy variables 
  site48 site212 site326 site1006 site1190 
  coef. z coef. z coef. z coef. z coef. z 
mm2 0.29 1.84 0.20 1.40 0.10 0.92 0.02 0.17 -0.64 -3.91 
mm3 0.08 0.50 0.10 0.73 0.31 2.67 -0.03 -0.17 -0.62 -3.71 
mm4 0.39 2.49 0.19 1.37 -0.03 -0.26 -0.24 -1.57 -0.79 -4.78 
mm5 0.46 2.83 -0.04 -0.27 -0.59 -5.02 -0.03 -0.19 -0.99 -5.81 
mm6 0.52 3.24 0.02 0.13 -0.62 -5.33 0.18 1.15 -0.63 -3.74 
mm7 0.66 4.10 0.03 0.20 -0.74 -6.35 0.07 0.46 -0.76 -4.48 
mm8 0.48 3.11 -0.21 -1.52 -0.59 -5.21 0.00 0.01 -0.50 -3.02 
mm9 0.23 1.44 -0.13 -0.94 -0.45 -3.83 0.06 0.40 -0.80 -4.77 
mm10 0.15 1.00 -0.02 -0.15 -0.40 -3.57 0.29 1.94 -0.47 -2.91 
mm11 0.11 0.70 -0.14 -0.98 -0.14 -1.20 0.20 1.32 -0.73 -4.45 
mm12 0.10 0.64 -0.13 -0.95 -0.12 -1.03 -0.05 -0.36 -0.69 -4.22 
  site1346 site1395 site16581 site16725 site18930 
  coef. z coef. z coef. z coef. z coef. z 
mm2 -0.11 -0.79 0.03 0.28 -0.22 -1.36 -0.15 -1.23 -0.23 -1.81 
mm3 0.03 0.19 0.10 0.85 -0.18 -1.09 -0.09 -0.69 0.19 1.48 
mm4 0.19 1.33 -0.18 -1.49 -0.61 -3.72 -0.05 -0.43 0.06 0.43 
mm5 0.07 0.46 -0.26 -2.12 -0.82 -4.90 0.44 3.43 0.13 0.99 
mm6 0.14 0.93 -0.19 -1.52 -0.43 -2.60 -0.22 -1.73 0.32 2.39 
mm7 0.15 1.04 -0.10 -0.80 -0.61 -3.66 -0.12 -0.92 0.47 3.58 
mm8 0.19 1.32 -0.20 -1.66 -0.61 -3.74 -0.14 -1.14 0.45 3.46 
mm9 0.25 1.70 -0.22 -1.79 -0.25 -1.50 0.17 1.31 -0.06 -0.49 
mm10 -0.07 -0.50 -0.02 -0.18 0.18 1.11 0.11 0.89 -0.29 -2.30 
mm11 0.13 0.94 0.01 0.09 0.15 0.94 0.20 1.61 -0.57 -4.44 
mm12 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.36 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.68 -0.38 -2.97 
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Table 4.22 and Figure 4.17 show the monthly effects which are identified by the VAR(1,11) 
model. The monthly effects vary among different sites. The wind speed at site48 shows a 
typical monthly effect. It is windier during the summer months. However, site1190 appears 
to be less windy than any other site.  
 
Figure 4.17.Monthly effects in the VAR(1,11) of the portfolio. 
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5. Converting from wind speed to power output 
I have modelled the correlations between wind speed data in a wind farm portfolio. 
However, a wind speed portfolio is different from a wind energy output portfolio. This 
section introduces a technique, ―wind power curve‖, which is used to convert wind speed 
data into energy output for a wind turbine. This is an extension of the wind farm portfolio 
theory. 
It has been suggested that modelling wind turbine power output should be based on 
modelling wind speed rather than directly on time series forecasting of wind power 
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(Alexiadis et al. 1998). The size of a wind turbine and the wind speed at each site are 
strongly related to power output. The turbine design and local wind speed of a wind farm is 
significantly affected by the terrain in which it is located. However, as is made clear above, 
we assume that the hub heights of turbines are the same. Furthermore, we do not take 
terrain conditions into account. This is mainly due to a shortage of relevant information 
rather than attempting to generalise and simplify the model. 
Some studies have opted to convert wind speed into wind power. The energy produced by a 
wind turbine is equal to the power output multiplied by the operating hours. The power 
output derived from a specific wind power curve depends on the size and type of wind 
turbine.  
Mclean and Garrad Hassan and Partners (GH) (2008) produced an equivalent power curve 
including such factors as array losses, topographical losses, electrical losses, availability etc. 
They also took into account the possible future developments in wind turbine power curves 
and hub heights. They produced a series of wind power curves for Stall-regulated turbines. 
Stall-regulated turbines currently make up a significant proportion of the installed wind 
capacity exclusively in Germany and Denmark (McLean 2008). 
Miranda and Dunn (2007) used a power law to initially convert wind speed at 10metres 
above ground level into wind speed of a hub height of 80metres.  

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where V1 and V2 are the wind speed at height H1 and H2 respectively.  is an empirically 
derived coefficient that reflects atmosphere stability conditions. In their study, the value of 
 is 1/7. After the wind speed time series is scaled to the established hub height of 
80metres, they then converted these into power using a normalised wind power curve. 
They used the power curve of 3MW Vestas V90 wind turbine. Then they studied the 
generation adequacy by combining this wind model with the generation data in the GB 
Seven Year Statement. Figure 4.18 is the normalised wind power curve for 3MW Vestas 
V90 wind turbine. 
Figure 4.18 Vestas V90 (3MW) wind turbine power curve. 
 
Source: Page6, Figure 6 (Miranda and Dunn, 2007). 
Sinden and ECI (2005) introduced a power curve for a Nordex N80 wind turbine. The rated 
capacity of Nordex N80 is 2.5 MW. The rated capacity of a wind turbine represents the 
maximum power that each individual wind turbine can produce under suitable wind 
conditions (ECI  2005).  
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Table 4.23 is the conversion table of wind speed to power output for a Nordex N80 
(2.5MW) wind turbine. At between 14ms
-1
 and 25ms
-1
 the power output of this wind 
turbine has reached a maximum, and essentially remains constant irrespective of changes in 
wind speed (ECI 2005).  
If wind speed data at two wind farms from different locations are negatively correlated, it is 
not necessarily the case that portfolio risk of energy output in these two wind farms is low. 
This is because the wind speed at these two wind farms may not be in the range of between 
14 ms
-1
 and 25 ms
-1
. If this happens, wind energy output from these two wind farms may 
be zero. As a result the security of energy supply of this portfolio of wind farms is low. In 
summary, wind speed and correlations between wind speeds of the portfolio are both 
essential for assessing the portfolio risk of wind energy output. 
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Table 4.23 Conversion of wind speed to power output for a 2.5MW wind turbine. 
 
Source: “Wind power and the UK wind resource” (ECI  2005). 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, the British renewable energy policies and climate change policies have been 
reviewed. The majority of key issues regarding the renewable energy industry and 
electricity industry have been discussed. It is important to understand the background and 
current situation of green electricity. Wind farms play an increasingly important role in 
providing a climate-friendly source of energy to enable the government to meet its relevant 
environmental targets. 
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The government has recently announced a new Renewable Energy Strategy (RES) (2009). 
It lays out the government‘s 2020 targets for renewable and low-carbon energy. It sets a 
goal of generating 30 percent of the UK‘s electricity from renewable sources and a further 
10 percent from low carbon sources such as nuclear and clean coal plants. These new 
targets will accelerate the rollout of renewable and low-carbon technologies as part of its 
wide-ranging Low Carbon Transition Plan
28
. This provides a new opportunity for wind 
electricity in the current economic recession. The UK Climate Change Secretary Ed 
Miliband has stated that there will be around 10,000 wind turbines onshore and offshore 
around UK to meet the renewable energy target
29
. 
The reliability of wind electricity supply and security of the electricity transmission system 
are more essential under a large wind energy penetration scenario, intermittency of wind 
impacts on the output of wind farms and the running of an electricity system. Therefore, 
the area of interest is modelling the output of wind farms.  
In this study, I have used econometric methods to model the wind speeds of a set of wind 
farms. I have found that correlations between wind speeds for a set of wind farms provides 
a method of assessing the portfolio risk of wind farm output. The modelling results from 
different models are all based on the British wind speed data from onshore wind farms and 
wind speed observation sites. These experiments have not been conducted before. 
 There are several other methods, such as ANN (Artificial Neural network). However, it is 
beyond the scope of this study. We find VAR(1) models provide a good estimate of 
                                               
28
 http://www.reuters.com/article/gwmCarbonEmissions/idUS276585079820090716 
29
 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/christopherbooker/5858989/How-can-
wind-turbines-generate-so-much-lunacy.html 
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correlations between the wind speed time series for a portfolio of a number of wind farms 
simultaneously. Table 4.24 summarises the advantages and disadvantages of different 
models based on the results form previous sections. 
At present the number of offshore wind farms in Britain is quite small, but the offshore 
wind farms will play an increasing important role. These models can also be used to 
analyse the performances of the offshore wind farms.  
Table 4.24. Summary of wind speed forecasting models. 
Model Advantages Disadvantages 
Weibull-Rayleigh 
distribution 
1. Relate to type or 
manufacturing of wind 
turbines. 
2. Direct viewing of 
patterns of wind speed 
distribution. 
1. Cannot be used to 
estimate future wind speed. 
It describes the historical 
wind speed distribution. 
2. For individual wind 
turbine.  
3. Considering the current 
wind speed data is 
independent to previous 
wind speed data. 
ARIMA 1. Including the correlation 
between current wind 
speed data and previous 
wind speed data. 
2. Can estimate the future 
wind speed data based on 
historical wind speed data 
only. 
3. Flexible model selection 
and derivative models.   
1. Requiring input data is 
stationary.  
 2. For individual wind 
turbine or wind farm.  
3. Do not consider the 
correlation between wind 
turbines. 
4. Linear model and do not 
include the volatility. 
ARCH-GARCH 1. Measuring the volatility 
of wind speed at each site. 
2. Combination with 
ARMA model gives a good 
estimation of wind speed 
time series. 
 
1. For individual wind 
turbine or wind farm. 
2. Do not consider the 
correlation between wind 
turbines. 
 
VAR 1. A multiple-time series 
generalisation of AR 
models. 
1. Difficulties of 
identifying the restrictions 
of the model. 
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2. Simultaneously 
estimates the 
interrelationship between 
more than one endogenous 
variable. 
3. Very flexible of model 
selection. 
4. Impulse response 
function to produce the 
time path of the dependent 
variables in the VAR, to 
shocks from all the 
explanatory variables. 
2. Over parameterisation. 
 
 
In conclusion, this study implies that if interconnected grids of wind power are used on a 
large scale, it will be important to model the correlation of wind energy output for a set of 
wind farms in order to assess the portfolio risk. This should help wind farm owners to 
hedge the electricity price risks and secure the energy supply. It is also vital for the system 
operator to balance the system and operate the balancing mechanism under a large wind 
energy penetration scenario. The VAR(1) model is superior to other statistic models for 
modelling correlations between wind speeds for a wind farm portfolio.  
This chapter discusses what kind of econometric model we should choose to measure the 
variation and correlation of wind speed. However, it has further implications on the 
decision-making process of electricity companies and investors who are risk averse. The 
benefits of lower output risks come from investment in wind farms that are negatively 
correlated in this research. The power company should choose a location where have better 
wind resource than other sites to build wind farms. The ARMA(1,1) and ARMA(1 24,1) 
model will help them to find out the variation in wind speeds and wind speed distribution at 
a particular site for a certain time period. Moreover, if a power company decides to build 
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wind power only portfolio, it needs to manage the risks of this portfolio which causes by 
the intermittency of wind speed. The VAR(1) model can measure the correlation of wind 
speeds in this portfolio. Thus, companies should invest in wind farms of which wind 
energy outputs are negatively correlated.  
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
 
In Great Britain, the wholesale electricity market comprises bilateral trades, spot and 
futures markets and the balancing mechanism. Each of these provides important functions 
for market participants.  
From the supplier‘s perspective, the primary function of energy markets is to manage the 
risks of variance (surprises) in future prices. Electricity suppliers buy electricity at the 
wholesale market and sell to the consumers at retail prices. The short run price elasticity of 
residential demand for electricity is relatively small: consumers do not reduce their 
electricity consumption when electricity price increases in the short run. This is partly 
because there are no obvious substitutes for electricity in making available some services 
e.g. broadband, television and refrigeration and, where alternatives are available, 
significant investment is required before substitution is possible e.g. heating. Therefore, the 
short run demand for electricity can be predicted by considering weather forecasts, 
historical demand trends, and special TV events such as popular football matches.  
Suppliers usually have a fixed tariff price for consumers, but the volume of consumption 
varies on a daily, weekly and seasonal basis. Producers must provide the amount of power 
they have agreed to the National Grid or face imbalance charges. Consequently, they may 
need to buy electricity in the spot market in order to adjust their position. This also means 
they are exposed to the risk of price volatility. The electricity suppliers may occasionally 
pay more for purchasing electricity from the wholesale market than the price they charged 
to their consumers. There have been instances when extremely high prices in the balancing 
market and spot market during the peak times have been caused by unexpected power 
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outage or increases in demand. One way of hedging the risk of price volatility is to enter 
into the forward/futures market. If suppliers expect the wholesale electricity price to rise in 
the future, for example in 3 months, they will buy futures/forward contracts at a lower price 
paid now but the electricity will be delivered in 3 months.  An alternative method is to 
forecast the spot prices in order to take advantage of trading.  
The generators also face risks from future electricity and fuel prices, and carbon prices. The 
cost of generation is comprised of fuel costs (including transportation), emission costs, cost 
of shut down and switch on, and the efficiency of power stations. The generators need to 
manage the risks associated with emissions and also with selling electricity and buying fuel 
ahead of delivery. Therefore, generators also use energy markets to enter different types of 
contract to reduce potential price risks. A high electricity selling price for generators is one 
of the primary incentives for new investments in infrastructures and new technology. 
This highlights the importance of market participants forecasting electricity prices. In this 
thesis both stochastic and fundamental models for electricity pricing have been investigated. 
I have examined the unique characteristics of spot electricity prices. These prices 
experience seasonality, mean reversion, jumps and volatility in Great Britain. The 
development of the stack model is one of the main contributions of this PhD thesis. The 
stack model is a fundamental model used to simulate wholesale electricity prices in the 
United Kingdom. The objective of the stack model is to identify the marginal cost of 
electricity generation. The model consists of five components. These components are 
demand forecast, station capacity availability forecast, fuel cost, wind energy forecast, and 
status of interconnectors. This basic version of the stack model assumes that transmission 
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constraints and variation of capacity of interconnectors have no influence on the wholesale 
electricity price.  
The stack model uses demand and supply to determine the wholesale electricity price based 
on the marginal cost pricing rule. My experiments show that the stack model provides a 
reasonable simulation of short run marginal cost curve and supply curve for the British 
electricity industry. 
A key principal of the stack model is that renewable power plants and nuclear plants stack 
into the model first because they have ―zero‖ marginal costs. The energy output of wind 
farms varies due to the intermittency of wind. Therefore, the variation of wind energy 
output should impact on the wholesale price from the stack model. In the large wind energy 
penetration scenario the capacity of wind energy is required to be 13 GW from onshore 
wind and 18 GW from offshore wind by the UK Renewable Advisory Board (RAB)
30
. 
Under ideal weather conditions, wind farms can generate the bulk amount of electricity, 
thus the generation stack will be made up of renewables, nuclear, and gas or coal (the 
cheapest option) power plants. In contrast, wind energy outputs are reduced dramatically 
due to quiet weather, meaning the generation stack will be made up of nuclear, gas, coal, 
and oil power plants. The wholesale price will be equal to the marginal cost of oil fired 
plants.  
The wind energy is treaded as a single participant in the basic version of the stack model. 
The available capacities of wind farms come into the stack model firstly due to the ―zero 
marginal cost of generation‖. However, the intermittency of wind energy output is not 
                                               
30
 http://www.docstoc.com/docs/22042135/EU-wind-energy-industrial-capacity-to-meet-2020-
targets 
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reflected in the stack model because this requires load factor information for each of the 
wind farms. The average load factor of 40% for UK wind farms is an input in the stack 
model in both low and high penetration scenarios. However, the intermittency of renewable 
energy has impact on the load factor of both renewable power plants and conventional 
power plants. In order to study the intermittency of wind energy output, we build a 
portfolio of wind farms to examine the correlation and variation of wind speed in each site. 
This has further implications on the extension of the stack model. It is possible to measure 
the impacts of intermittency of wind energy output on the wholesale electricity prices and 
new investment on conventional power generation capacities.  
As a result wind energy forecasting should be taken into account. A further contribution of 
this PhD thesis is to model the correlations of wind energy in Great Britain. I have 
attempted to determine to what extent wind energy outputs are correlated across the 
country or if they are effectively independent. In order to examine this issue I have applied 
modern portfolio theory. I have assumed that electricity companies have a portfolio of wind 
farms composed of diverse wind farms in different locations. The correlations between 
wind speeds are used to measure the portfolio risk.  
I have examined the characteristics of wind speed in Great Britain using several different 
statistical models. The Weibull distribution, ARMA, and GARCH models are used to 
model the wind speed at single location. The Weibull distribution is independent of the 
sequence of observations. If the order of observations changes there will be no effects on 
the estimated parameters. It is not currently possible to have an autocorrelated wind speed 
pattern modelled by the Weibull distribution. However, the pattern of wind speed has 
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impacts on the wholesale prices of the stack model. Thus, univariate time series models are 
constructed using only information on the past wind speeds and the error term. I have 
found that the ARMA(1,1) and ARMA(1& 24,1) models provide a better fit for wind speed 
than other ARMA family models. The main disadvantage of using an ARMA model is that 
its error term is normally distributed with a zero mean, constant variance, and zero 
autocorrelation. The GARCH model is constructed in order to reflect autocorrelation in the 
volatility of wind speed. It allows the conditional variances of the error term to depend on 
past own lags. GARCH type models also allow for a period of high or low volatility in 
wind speed. However, GARCH models are also used for each individual location. The 
comparison between these different models has not been previously preformed, and is 
therefore a further contribution of this PhD thesis. 
In addition, I have modelled wind farms jointly with various vector autoregression (VAR) 
models. This is the only method that allows for inter-dependence between the outputs of 
different wind farms. This gives another method for energy companies or investors to 
assess the portfolio risk. It also helps us to model wind energy output when using the stack 
model. 
Further research 
I have listed several suggested points for continuing to improve the performance of the 
stack model.  In addition, there are some areas of further research I would like to undertake 
to broaden the understanding of the British wholesale electricity market. 
The basic version of the stack model provides the outline for a price forecasting model of 
wholesale electricity. There are components of the stack model that can be more specific.  
191 
 
1. Coal and gas fired plants could be grouped into high efficiency plants and low efficiency 
plants. CCGT has a higher level of thermal efficiency than traditional gas fired plants. The 
efficiency of clean coal power plants will be greater than that of old coal fired plants. And 
they also have lower carbon emission costs.  
2. The basic version of the stack model uses the average load factor to measure the 
availability of generation capacity. Industry users can calculate the generation capacity for 
the system in real time. It is easier for industry users to acquire information on planned 
and unplanned outages of generation capacity and  power plants status. 
3. The stack model could be made more flexible to combine the age and efficiency of the 
plants. The lower efficiency of aging power plants will increase the marginal cost of 
generation. 
 
I have used historical wind speed data to measure the correlation of wind energy. I would 
like to undertake further research on the pattern of wind energy output. This will require a 
database of real wind energy output for a set of wind farms. The amount information 
available on this area is currently limited. 
 
I would also like to develop a pricing model for electricity forward contracts. There are a 
series pricing models for financial assets.  There is value in developing a pricing model if 
wholesale electricity markets can function as commodity markets or financial markets. 
Although current trading prices are confidential in the United Kingdom, there is a growing 
trend of interest in this area.  
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Appendix. Power stations in the Stack model (updated on May 2009). 
 
Company Station Type Capacity 
MW 
build 
year 
region 
EPR Eye Ltd Eye, Suffolk AWDF 13 1992 East 
E.On UK Steven's Croft biomass 44 2007 Scotland 
GDF Suez teesside 
Limited 
Teesside Power Station CCGT 1875 1992 North East 
RWE Npower Plc Didcot B CCGT 1390 1998 South East 
E.On UK Connahs Quay CCGT 1380 1996 Wales 
Centrica South Humber Bank  CCGT 1285 1996 Yorkshire and 
the Humber 
International Power / 
Mitsui 
Saltend  CCGT 1200 2000 Yorkshire and 
the Humber 
Barking Power Barking CCGT 1000 1994 London 
E.On UK Killingholme CCGT 900 1993 Yorkshire and 
Spalding Energy 
Company Ltd 
Spalding CCGT 860 2004 East Midlands 
Seabank Power 
Limited 
Seabank 1 CCGT 812 1998 South West 
EDF Energy Sutton Bridge CCGT 803 1999 East 
Scottish Power Damhead Creek CCGT 800 2000 South East 
Rocksavage Power 
Co. Ltd 
Rocksavage CCGT 748 1998 North West 
Coryton Energy 
Company Ltd 
Coryton  CCGT 732 2001 East 
Scottish Power Rye House CCGT 715 1993 East 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Medway CCGT 688 1995 South East 
Centrica Killingholme CCGT 665 1994  Yorkshire and 
the Humber 
RWE Npower Plc Little Barford CCGT 665 1995 East 
Premier Power Ltd Ballylumford C CCGT 616 2003 Northern Ireland 
International Power / 
Mitsui 
Deeside  CCGT 500 1994 Wales 
RWE Npower Plc Great Yarmouth CCGT 420 2001 East 
Seabank Power 
Limited 
Seabank 2 CCGT 410 2000 South West 
Coolkeeragh ESB Ltd Coolkeeragh CCGT 408 2005 Northern Ireland 
Centrica Peterborough  CCGT 405 1993 East 
Corby Power Ltd Corby CCGT 401 1993 East Midlands 
E.On UK Cottam Development 
 Centre 
CCGT 400 1999 East Midlands 
Scottish Power Shoreham CCGT 400 2000 South East 
E.On UK Enfield CCGT 392 1999 London 
Centrica Kings Lynn CCGT 340 1996 East 
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Centrica Glanford Brigg CCGT 260 1993 Yorkshire and 
Centrica Barry CCGT 230 1998 Wales 
Centrica Roosecote CCGT 229 1991 North West 
E.On UK Sandbach CCGT 56 1999 North West 
E.On UK Castleford CCGT 56 2002 Yorkshire and 
the Humber 
E.On UK Thornhill CCGT 50 1998 Yorkshire and 
the Humber 
Drax Power Ltd Drax coal 3870 1974 Yorkshire and 
the Humber 
Scottish Power Longannet coal 2304 1970 Scotland 
EDF Energy West Burton coal 2012 1967 East Midlands 
EDF Energy Cottam coal 2008 1969 East Midlands 
E.On UK Ratcliffe coal 2000 1968 East Midlands 
British Energy Eggborough coal 1960 1967 Yorkshire and 
the Humber 
RWE Npower Plc Aberthaw B coal 1586 1971 Wales 
Scottish Power Cockenzie coal 1152 1967 Scotland 
International Power / 
Mitsui 
Rugeley  coal 1006 1972 West Midlands 
E.On UK Ironbridge coal 970 1970 West Midlands 
RWE Npower Plc Tilbury B  coal  1063 1968 East 
Uskmouth Power 
Company Ltd 
Uskmouth coal/bio
mass 
363 2000 Wales 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Fiddler‘s Ferry coal/bio
mass  
1980 1971 North West 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Ferrybridge C coal/bio
mass  
1960 1966 Yorkshire and 
the Humber 
RWE Npower Plc Didcot A coal/gas 1958 1972 South East 
E.On UK Kingsnorth coal/oil 1940 1970 South East 
AES Kilroot coal/oil 600 1981 Northern Ireland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Lerwick diesel 67.2 1953 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Stornoway diesel 26 1950 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Kirkwall diesel 16.2 1953 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Loch Carnan, South  
Uist 
diesel 10 1971 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Bowmore diesel 6 1946 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Arnish diesel 3 2001 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Tiree diesel 2.5 1945 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Barra diesel 2.1 1990 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern Fife Power Station gas 123 2000 Scotland 
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Energy plc 
RGS Energy Ltd Knapton gas 40 1994 Yorkshire and 
the Humber 
Scottish Power Pilkington - Greengate gas 10 1998 North West 
British Energy Sevington District 
Energy 
gas 10 2000 South East 
British Energy Bridgewater District 
Energy 
gas 10 2000 South West 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Chippenham gas 10 2002 South West 
British Energy Aberdare District Energy gas 10 2002 Wales 
British Energy Solutia District Energy gas 10 2000 Wales 
Scottish Power Ravenhead gas 9 1999 North West 
Immingham CHP LLP Immingham CHP gas CHP 1240 2004 Yorkshire and 
the Humber 
Derwent 
Cogeneration 
Derwent gas CHP 214 1994 East Midlands 
Magnox North Ltd  Fellside CHP gas CHP 180 1995 North West 
Gaz de France Shotton gas CHP 180 2001 Wales 
EDF Energy London Heat & Power 
Company (Imperial 
College) 
gas CHP 9 2000 London 
EDF Energy Barkantine Heat & 
Power Company  
Gas CHP 1.4 2000 London 
RWE Npower Plc Cowes  gas oil 140 1982 South East 
E.On UK Taylor's Lane GT gas oil 132 1979 London 
RWE Npower Plc Littlebrook GT gas oil 105 1982 South East 
RWE Npower Plc Didcot GT gas oil 100 1972 South East 
Drax Power Ltd Drax GT gas oil 75 1971 Yorkshire and 
the Humber 
RWE Npower Plc Tilbury GT gas oil 68 1968 East 
RWE Npower Plc Fawley GT gas oil 68 1969 South East 
E.On UK Grain GT gas oil 55 1978 South East 
RWE Npower Plc Aberthaw GT gas oil 51 1971 Wales 
International Power / 
Mitsui 
Rugeley GT gas oil 50 1972 West Midlands 
EDF Energy West Burton GT gas oil 40 1967 East Midlands 
E.On UK Ratcliffe GT gas oil 34 1966 East Midlands 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Fiddler‘s Ferry GT gas oil 34 1969 North West 
E.On UK Kingsnorth GT gas oil 34 1967 South East 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Ferrybridge GT gas oil 34 1966 Yorkshire and 
the Humber 
RWE Npower Plc Little Barford GT gas oil 17 2006 East 
Western Power 
Generation 
St Marys gas oil 6 1958 South West 
Western Power Lynton gas oil 2 1961 South West 
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Generation 
International Power / 
Mitsui 
Indian Queens gas 
oil/keros
ene 
140 1996 South West 
Baglan Generation 
Ltd 
Baglan Bay gas 
turbine 
575 2002 Wales 
Citigen (London)  UK 
Ltd 
Charterhouse St, London gas/gas 
oil CHP 
16 1995 London 
EDF Energy Thames Valley Power Gas/Gas 
oil CHP 
15 1995 London 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Peterhead  gas/oil 1540 1980 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Keadby gas/oil 749 1994 Yorkshire and 
the Humber 
Premier Power Ltd Ballylumford B gas/oil 540 1968 Northern Ireland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Burghfield gas/oil 47 1998 South East 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Chickerell gas/oil 45 1998 South West 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Sloy hydro 153 1950 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Glendoe hydro 100 2008 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Errochty hydro 75 1955 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Fasnakyle hydro 69 1951 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Clunie hydro 61 1950 Scotland 
E.On UK Rheidol hydro 49 1961 Wales 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Lochay hydro 45 1958 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Rannoch hydro 45 1930 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Clachan hydro 40 1955 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Glenmoriston hydro 39 1957 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Deanie hydro 38 1963 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Luichart hydro 34 1954 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Tummel hydro 34 1933 Scotland 
Scottish Power Tongland hydro 33 1935 Scotland 
Magnox North Ltd  Maentwrog hydro 28 1928 Wales 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Inverawe hydro 25 1963 Scotland 
Scottish Power Glenlee hydro 24 1935 Scotland 
Scottish Power Kendoon hydro 24 1936 Scotland 
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Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Aigas hydro 20 1962 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Kilmorack hydro 20 1962 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Ceannacroc hydro 20 1956 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Invergarry hydro 20 1956 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Grudie Bridge hydro 19 1950 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Mossford hydro 19 1957 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Shin hydro 19 1958 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Orrin hydro 18 1959 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Quoich hydro 18 1955 Scotland 
RWE Npower 
(Npower Renewables 
Ltd) 
Dolgarrog High Head hydro 18 2002 Wales 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Culligran hydro 17 1962 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Finlarig hydro 17 1955 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
St. Fillans hydro 17 1957 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Livishie hydro 17 1962 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Torr Achilty hydro 15 1954 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Nant hydro 15 1963 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Pitlochry hydro 15 1950 Scotland 
RWE Npower 
(Npower Renewables 
Ltd) 
Dolgarrog Low Head hydro 15 2002 Wales 
Scottish Power Earlstoun hydro 14 1936 Scotland 
Scottish Power Carsfad hydro 12 1936 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Cashlie hydro 11 1959 Scotland 
Scottish Power Bonnington hydro 11 1927 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Cassley hydro 10 1959 Scotland 
RWE Npower 
(Npower Renewables 
Ltd) 
Cwm Dyli hydro 10 2002 Wales 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Fasnakyle Compensation 
Set 
hydro 8 2006 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Striven hydro 8 1951 Scotland 
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Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Gaur hydro 8 1953 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Allt-na-Lairige hydro 6 1956 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Loch Gair hydro 6 1961 Scotland 
Scottish Power Stonebyres hydro 6 1927 Scotland 
RWE Npower 
(Npower Renewables 
Ltd) 
Kielder hydro 6 2006 Yorkshire and 
the Humber 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Foyers Falls hydro 5 1968 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Sron Mor hydro 5 1957 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Lubreoch hydro 4 1958 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Dalchonzie hydro 4 1958 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Kingairloch hydro 4 2005 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Lairg hydro 4 1959 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Lednock hydro 3 1961 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Achanalt hydro 3 1956 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Cuaich hydro 3 1959 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Cuileig hydro 3 2002 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Mullardoch Tunnel hydro 2.4 1955 Scotland 
RWE Npower 
(Npower Renewables 
Ltd) 
Braevallich hydro 2 2005 Scotland 
RWE Npower 
(Npower Renewables 
Ltd) 
Garrogie hydro 2 2005 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Culligran Compensation  
Set 
hydro 2 1962 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Lochay Compensation 
Set 
hydro 2 1959 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Mucomir hydro 2 1962 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Kilmelfort hydro 2 1956 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Lussa hydro 2 1952 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Loch Ericht hydro 2 1962 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Storr Lochs hydro 2 1952 Scotland 
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Scottish Power Drumjohn hydro 2 1985 Scotland 
RWE Npower 
(Npower Renewables 
Ltd) 
Inverbain hydro 1 2006 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Loch Dubh hydro 1 1954 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Chliostair hydro 1 1960 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Kerry Falls hydro 1 1951 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Loch Dubh hydro 1 1954 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Nostie Bridge hydro 1 1950 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Foyers hydro/pu
mped 
storage 
300 1974 Scotland 
Western Power 
Generation 
Roseland kerosene 5 1963 South West 
Western Power 
Generation 
Princetown kerosene 3 1959 South West 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Thatcham light oil 10 1994 South East 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Five Oaks light oil 8.9 1995 South East 
EPR Glanford Ltd Glanford meat & 
bone  
13 1993 East 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Wheldale mines 
gas 
8 2002 Yorkshire and 
the Humber 
British Energy Heysham 2 nuclear 1240 1988 North West 
British Energy Torness nuclear 1205 1988 Scotland 
British Energy Hartlepool nuclear 1190 1984 North East 
British Energy Sizewell B nuclear 1188 1995 East 
British Energy Heysham1 nuclear 1160 1984 North West 
British Energy Dungeness B nuclear 1040 1983 South East 
Magnox North Ltd  Wylfa nuclear 980 1971 Wales 
British Energy Hunterston B nuclear 860 1976 Scotland 
British Energy Hinkley Point B nuclear 840 1976 South West 
Magnox North Ltd  Oldbury nuclear 434 1967 South West 
RWE Npower Plc Littlebrook D  oil 1370 1982 South East 
E.On UK Grain  oil 1300 1979 South East 
RWE Npower Plc Fawley  oil 968 1969 South East 
EPR Thetford Ltd Thetford poultry 
litter 
39 1998 East 
EPR Scotland Ltd Westfield poultry 
litter 
12 2000 Scotland 
International Power / 
Mitsui 
Dinorwig pumped 
storage 
1728 1983 Wales 
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Scottish Power Cruachan pumped 
storage 
440 1966 Scotland 
International Power / 
Mitsui 
Ffestiniog pumped 
storage 
360 1961 Wales 
EPR Ely Limited Elean straw/gas 38 2001 East 
company description type mwatts built region 
South East London 
Combined Heat & 
Power Ltd 
SELCHP ERF waste 32 1994 London 
Scottish Power Black Law wind 124 2005 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Hadyard Hill wind 120 2005 Scotland 
Braes of Doune 
Windfarm  
Braes of Doune wind 72 2006 Scotland 
Fred Olsen Paul's Hill wind 64.4 2005 Scotland 
RWE Npower 
(Npower Renewables 
Ltd) 
Little Cheyne wind 59.8 2008 South East 
Fred Olsen Rothes wind 51 2004 Scotland 
Fred Olsen Crystal Rig Windfarm wind 50 2003 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Minsca wind 37 2008 Scotland 
Beaufort Wind Ltd Carno wind 34 1996 Wales 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Drumderg wind 32 2008 Scotland 
E.On UK Bowbeat wind 31.2 2002 Scotland 
Scottish Power Penryddian & 
Llidiartywaun 
wind 31 1992 Wales 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Slieve Divena wind 30 2008 Northern Ireland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Dalswinton wind 30 2008 Scotland 
Scottish Power Beinn an Tuirc wind 30 2001 Scotland 
Scottish Power Beinn Tharsuinn wind 30 2007 Scotland 
Scottish Power Cruach Mhor wind 30 2004 Scotland 
RES-Gen Ltd Black Hill wind 29 2006 Scotland 
Scottish Power Greenknowes wind 27 2008 Scotland 
EDF Energy 
Renewables 
Bicker Fen wind 26 2008 East Midlands 
RES-Gen Ltd Altahullion wind 26 2003 Northern Ireland 
Centrica Glens of Foudland wind 26 2005 Scotland 
RES-Gen Ltd Gruig wind 25 2009 Northern Ireland 
Fenland Windfarms 
Ltd  
Red Tile wind 24 2007 East Midlands 
Ardrossan Windfarm  Ardrossan wind 24 2004 Scotland 
Scottish Power Whitelee wind 23 2007 Scotland 
HG Capital Tyr Mostyn & Foel Goch wind 21 2005 Wales 
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Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Tappaghan wind 20 2005 Northern Ireland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Artfield Fell wind 20 2005 Scotland 
Beaufort Wind Ltd Llyn Alaw wind 20 1997 Wales 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Tangy wind 19 2002 Scotland 
E.On UK Stags Holt  wind 18 2007 East 
Scottish Power Wether Hill wind 18 2007 Scotland 
Scottish Power Callagheen wind 17 2006 Northern Ireland 
Beaufort Wind Ltd Novar wind 17 1997 Scotland 
Scottish Power Dun Law wind 17 2000 Scotland 
Scottish Power Coldham wind 16 2006 East 
Fenland Windfarms 
Ltd  
Deeping wind 16 2006 East Midlands 
Fenland Windfarms 
Ltd  
Glass Moor wind 16 2006 East Midlands 
RWE Npower 
(Npower Renewables 
Ltd) 
Knabs Ridge wind 16 2008 North East 
Scottish Power Hagshaw Hill wind 16 1995 Scotland 
E.On UK Deucheran Hill wind 15.75 2001 Scotland 
Scottish Power Barnesmore wind 15 1997 Northern Ireland 
Cemmaes Windfarm 
Ltd  
Cemmaes wind 15 2002 Wales 
EDF Energy 
Renewables 
Walkaway wind 14 2008 North East 
RES-Gen Ltd Lendrum's Bridge wind 13 2000 Northern Ireland 
Scottish Power Hare Hill wind 13 2000 Scotland 
Fenland Windfarms 
Ltd  
Red House wind 12 2006 East Midlands 
RES-Gen Ltd Altahullion2 wind 12 2007 Northern Ireland 
Scottish Power Coal Clough wind 10 1992 North West 
Scottish Power Wolf Bog wind 10 2008 Northern Ireland 
Beaufort Wind Ltd Bryn Titli wind 10 1994 Wales 
Beaufort Wind Ltd Mynydd Gorddu wind 10 1996 Wales 
E.On UK Out Newton wind 9.1 2002 Yorkshire and 
the Humber 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Bessy Bell wind 9 2008 Northern Ireland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Bin Mountain wind 9 2008 Northern Ireland 
Beaufort Wind Ltd Taff Ely wind 9 1993 Wales 
Llangwyryfon 
Windfarm Ltd  
Llangwyryfon wind 9 2003 Wales 
Yorkshire 
Windpower Ltd 
Ovenden Moor wind 9 1993 Yorkshire and 
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High Hedley Hope 
Wind Ltd 
Langley Park wind 8 2008 North East 
High Hedley Hope 
Wind Ltd 
Broomhill wind 8 2008 North East 
RES-Gen Ltd Lough Hill wind 8 2007 Northern Ireland 
Beaufort Wind Ltd Bein Ghlas wind 8 1999 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Spurness wind 8 2004 Scotland 
E.On UK High Volts wind 7.8 2004 North East 
Beaufort Wind Ltd Lambrigg wind 7 2000 North West 
K/S Winscales  Winscales 2 wind 7 2005 North West 
Cold Northcott 
Windfarm Ltd 
Cold Northcott wind 7 1993 South West 
E.On UK Rhyd-y-Groes wind 7 1992 Wales 
Yorkshire 
Windpower Ltd 
Royd Moor wind 7 1993 Yorkshire and  
the Humber 
Ardrossan Windfarm  Ardrossan Extension wind 6 2008 Scotland 
Scottish Power Carland Cross wind 6 1992 South West 
Beaufort Wind Ltd Trysglwyn wind 6 1996 Wales 
RES-Gen Ltd Dyffryn Brodyn wind 6 1994 Wales 
E.On UK Oldside wind 5.4 1996 North West 
High Hedley Hope 
Wind Ltd 
High Hedley 2  wind 5.2 2008 North East 
High Hedley Hope 
Wind Ltd 
Trimdon Grange wind 5.2 2008 North East 
E.On UK Hare Hill wind 5.1 2004 North East 
E.On UK Holmside wind 5.1 2004 North East 
Beaufort Wind Ltd Kirkby Moor wind 5 1993 North West 
E.On UK Bessy Bell wind 5 1995 Northern Ireland 
Scottish Power Corkey wind 5 1994 Northern Ireland 
Scottish Power Elliots Hill wind 5 1995 Northern Ireland 
Scottish Power Rigged Hill wind 5 1994 Northern Ireland 
RES-Gen Ltd Forss2 wind 5 2007 Scotland 
RWE Npower 
(Npower Renewables 
Ltd) 
Burgar Hill wind 5 2007 Scotland 
RES-Gen Ltd Four Burrows wind 5 1995 South West 
E.On UK St Breock wind 4.95 1994 South West 
E.On UK Askam wind 4.62 1999 North West 
E.On UK Lowca wind 4.62 2000 North West 
RWE Npower 
(Npower Renewables 
Ltd) 
Hameldon Hill wind 4.5 2007 Northwest 
E.On UK Siddick wind 4.2 1996 North West 
Great Orton Great Orton wind 4 1999 North West 
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Windfarm Ltd  
RWE Npower 
(Npower Renewables 
Ltd) 
Bilbster wind 3.9 2008 Scotland 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Bu wind 3 2002 Scotland 
RWE Npower 
(Npower Renewables 
Ltd) 
Hollies wind 2.6 2008 East 
E.On UK Blood Hill wind 2.25 1992 East 
Beaufort Wind Ltd Tow Law wind 2 2001 North East 
K/S Winscales  Winscales 1 wind 2 1999 North West 
RES-Gen Ltd Forss wind 2 2003 Scotland 
E.On UK Rheidol wind 2 1997 Wales 
High Hedley Hope 
Wind Ltd 
High Hedley 1 wind 1.8 2001 North East 
Kirkheaton Wind Ltd Kirkheaton wind 1.2 2000 North East  
Beaufort Wind Ltd Farr wind   92 2006 Scotland 
Beaufort Wind Ltd Ffynnon Oer wind   32 2006 Wales 
Beaufort Wind Ltd Windy Standard wind   22 1996 Scotland 
Beaufort Wind Ltd Bears Down wind   10 2001 South West 
Beaufort Wind Ltd Causeymire wind    48 2004 Scotland 
Centrica Barrow Offshore 
Windfarm 
wind 
offshore 
90 2006 North West 
Vattenfall Wind 
Power 
Kentish Flats wind 
offshore 
90 2005 South East 
E.On UK Scroby Sands wind 
offshore 
60 2005 East 
Beaufort Wind Ltd North Hoyle wind 
offshore 
60 2003 Wales 
Scottish & Southern 
Energy plc 
Beatrice wind 
offshore 
10 2007 Scotland 
E.On UK Blyth Offshore wind 
offshore 
4 2000 North East 
Source: Digest of UK energy statistics 5.7 
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